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AN ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN 
PAKISTAN'S PUBLIC SECTOR  
 
FAISAL IQBAL 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Context: Despite a long history of reforms, Pakistan‘s public sector (PS) is still 
considered cumbersome, corrupt, and inefficient by its citizens, government and 
international development community. Recent reforms were operationalised in 
2001 under a new economic policy called the Poverty Reduction Programme 
(PRP) designed to facilitate the New Public Management (NPM) influenced 
transformation. The overarching objectives of these reforms were to strengthen 
the market and public sector simultaneously and so that they complemented each 
other. The PS reform actions taken under this strategy were mainly based on the 
World Bank‘s (WB) experience of developing countries which identified the 
state‘s weak institutional capacity as bottleneck to this transformation. Therefore, 
with the view to removing these impediments, actions to train the public servants, 
improve their salaries, and enhanced the use of information technology (IT) were 
included. However, many recent reports and indicators confirm the situation in 
Pakistan has remained unchanged. Various generic explanations of these 
compromised results have been provided; however, the concrete reasons in a 
Pakistani setting are still unknown.  
Research Questions: This study aims to investigate the reasons why Pakistan‘s PS 
organisations appear to be resistant to reform and why the repeated attempts at 
reform appear to have had so little impact. It addresses the following questions: 
 What effects, if any, have NPM-inspired reform attempts had on the 
way that public sector organisations function? 
 What have been the intended and unintended consequences of reform 
attempts? 
Research approach: This case study aims to bridge this gap through analysing the 
effects of administrative reforms in the federal tax agency where these actions 
have been revived as a part of the comprehensive reform programme. 
This study is qualitative and adopts a social constructionist approach. This case 
study is ethnographically oriented and works within pragmatist criteria of truth 
and validity; the case study organisation has been conceptualised as negotiated 
order (Strauss, 1978); and the initiatives of training, salaries and information 
technology are understood as managerial attempts to reshape organisational 
structures, processes, and the employment relationship with employees in line 
with the requirements of NPM.  
This research mainly depends on the interpretation and analysis of data gathered 
through 22 semi-structured interviews, participant observation and documentary 
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sources of information including public and classified reports from donors and 
government repositories as well as published scholarly articles. The data were 
analysed in two stages: 1. abstract analysis took place during data collection, 
arranging, cleaning, and extraction of themes and patterns; and 2. firm analysis 
happened through an iterative process of comparing these themes, patterns, and 
field notes to make the sense of data. 
Findings: The findings suggest that the desired results of efficiency, transparency, 
fairness, and controlling corruption could not be achieved due to the takeover of 
prevalent contextual corrupt practices of nepotism, favouritism and 
recommendation at the time of its implementation. Moreover, this content-focused 
approach has also ignored the context and processes that led to compromised 
results. I have supported these findings through the identification of these 
contextual problems at the organisational and national levels. 
Contribution: This research contributed to a greater understanding of the initiation 
and implementation processes of the NPM-inspired PSR in Pakistan through the 
identification of factors limiting its results at organisational and national levels. In 
turn, it helped to highlight the problems behind reformer‘s taken for granted 
assumptions of quick-fixing the institutions through rapid dosage of reform. The 
results will also be valuable to reformers as they will not only help reformers to 
understand the reasons affecting its intended results but also help them to include 
these in the list of safeguard. 
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Chapter 1. Public sector reforms in Pakistan  
 
1.1 Aim and Introduction 
Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has made successive but unproductive 
attempts to reform its public sector. The espoused aim of these reforms has been 
to create a more responsive, transparent, efficient and affordable public sector so 
as to improve the quality of services and strengthen the national economy. The 
latest phase of these efforts was initiated by the Government in the year 2001 as 
part of its Poverty Reduction Programme (PRP). This PRP was based on an 
understanding made through the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)
1
 
between the Government and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) whereby 
financial assistance was linked to a wide range of structural, financial and 
governance reforms. The areas covered under governance reforms were civil 
service, tax administration, financial management, procurement and devolution. 
The adopted strategy of poverty reduction viewed the reforms of the public sector 
as a means to encourage responsive governance and as the main contributor to the 
reduction of poverty in the country. The IFIs, on the basis of their lessons learnt 
through past experience of PSR, suggested institutional reforms to strengthen the 
human, organisational and institutional capacities of Pakistan in order to improve 
the functioning of its public sector.  
To do this the government adopted a two-pronged strategy: the first was to 
address the generic problems prevalent in the public sector as a whole; and the 
second prong was to introduce comprehensive reforms in selected key 
organisations through specially designed programmes. Besides improving the 
‗rules of the game‘, general measures taken included improved training and career 
planning, taking a strict stance against corruption, enhanced salaries, reduction in 
                                                            
1 The Structural Adjustment Programme has been renamed and replaced with PRSP. 
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the size of Government and promotion of the use of IT (ADB, 2001). These 
measures were again invigorated in the federal tax agency between the years of 
2005-2011 as part of the comprehensive reform programme. This time again the 
reformers demanded the public sector to be more effective, responsive, 
economical and transparent. Consequently, the organisational leaders were under 
pressure to bring suggested changes to promote professional practices which 
could help to achieve this goal. These influential social structures are considered 
in this project under the umbrella of New Public Management (NPM) which 
offers a menu of choices to governments for attaining the objectives of cost-
effectiveness, responsiveness, transparency and efficiency (see chapter 3 for 
details).  
Haque (2004) argued that the weaknesses or failures of traditional state 
bureaucracy such as its monopolistic nature, unmanageable size, managerial 
inefficiency, public inaccessibility, economic inertia and self serving agenda are 
the most common explanations provided for adoption of NPM-type reforms. The 
aim of such reforms was to reduce the scope and role of public bureaucracy, 
transfer resources and services from the public sector to the private sector, and 
restructure the public service in the image of business management. This is 
because the private sector was believed to be more competitive, productive, 
efficient, innovative, responsive and customer friendly. 
Despite these efforts Pakistan‘s public sector is, however, still held in low esteem 
by the public who regard public servants as unresponsive and corrupt (ICG, 
2010). The World Competitiveness Report 2012-13 ranks Pakistan at 124 out of a 
total of 144 countries and counts its inefficient government bureaucracy as the 
second leading cause of this lack of competitiveness after corruption. 
Transparency International
2
 (2011) ranked Pakistan‘s public sector as the 134th 
most corrupt out of 182 countries. There has been very little systematic national or 
international evaluation of these reforms, but recent poor indicators and rankings 
suggests that overall they appear to have had little effect on its functioning. These 
                                                            
2 Transparency International represents itself as the global civil society organisation leading the 
fight against corruption. 
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reforms are reliant on scarce national resources and international loans. Therefore, 
evaluating their efficacy is critical.  
I was working for the federal tax agency when it was selected as a key federal 
organisation to undergo a comprehensive tax administration reform programme 
the model of which, according to Polidano (1999) ―is an African variety of NPM 
which has been adopted in Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Rwanda, and it is also being exported elsewhere—notably to Pakistan‖ (pp. 7). In 
this approach the tax department is converted ―into corporatized national revenue 
authorities. Corporatisation has allowed these bodies to raise wages, shed poor 
performers while hiring better-qualified staff, offer bonuses in return for meeting 
revenue targets, and operate on a self-financing basis‖ (ibid.). To implement these 
reforms a new wing was established within the organisation and this wing was led 
by a very senior officer. Along with other colleagues, I was posted to assist him in 
this task. None of us, including the reform leader, had any prior experience of 
driving administrative reform. However, as public servants, we had been 
subjected to prior and on-going generic reforms introduced in the public sector. 
As a recent Masters graduate in Business, direct involvement in the 
implementation of reform was a unique opportunity for me. As a member of the 
reform team I got involved in its implementation and my interest also started 
growing gradually as I gained greater access to documents and proceedings. I 
started understanding the reform process from all three of the perspectives 
involved: the Government, the donors and the public sector employees. At about 
the time when the reforms were bedded in, the person leading the reform quit the 
job (for details see chapter 4). This situation caused adverse effects on the morale 
of the reform team and on the reform process. Subsequently, I also decided to 
resign from the public sector and moved to the development sector. However, 
despite my separation from the public sector I could not separate myself from the 
reforms. Questions such as why, how and when to reform kept buzzing in my 
mind, and finally I decided to follow my questions in the form of this research 
project, guided by experts in the field.  
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This research, therefore, aims to investigate the impact of administrative reforms 
on the functioning of Pakistan‘s public sector organisations. It does so by using a 
case study of the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) where administrative reforms 
have explicitly been introduced as part of a comprehensive organisational reform 
programme. There are three main reasons why the FBR is an interesting site for 
this investigation of broader public sector reform in Pakistan: the first and the 
most important, which alone can justify is its unique feature of representing the 
three
3
 elite civil service groups (Income Tax, Sales Tax, Customs and Excise) 
constituting Pakistan‘s largest federal bureaucracy, which cannot be found in any 
other public sector organisation; second, its national importance, as it was part of 
the structural adjustment programme, poverty reduction programme and 
governance reforms; and, third, similarity of identified problems between the 
national and organisational diagnosis (i.e. red-tapeism, inefficiency, corruption, 
manual system, etc). This study aims to investigate the reasons why Pakistan‘s 
public sector organisations appear to be resistant to reform and why these repeated 
attempts of reform appear to have had so little impact. It addresses the following 
questions: 
i. What effects, if any, have NPM-inspired reform attempts had on the 
way that public sector organisations function? 
ii. What have been the intended and unintended consequences of reform 
attempts? 
 
In the rest of this first chapter I summarise the research context and rationale, the 
research methods I adopted, the fieldwork, how empirical materials were 
analysed, and the main contributions I make.  
1.2 Research Context and rationale 
Poor economic conditions were the first challenge faced by Pakistan on its 
independence in 1947. Therefore, to survive as an independent country the first 
challenge for Pakistan was to gain economic viability (Bhatia, 1979; Yusuf, 
1988). Burki (1999) stated that against all odds, Pakistan survived economically. 
                                                            
3 After reform, these groups have been rationalised into two categories: the Inland Revenue 
Service and Pakistan Customs Service 
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Its economy kept moderately growing
4
 during the period of war and even after 
dividing into two parts (Easterly, 2001); however, during 1990s Pakistan‘s 
economy performed very poorly and that period is now remembered as the ‗lost 
decade‘ (Stern, 2001). The major reasons for this lost decade are political 
instability (nine elected and caretaker governments changed during this period) 
and subsequent policies as well, corruption (Pakistan topped the list), global 
recessions, various Gulf crises and the imposition of international economic 
sanctions due to nuclear tests. General Pervaiz Mushraf, after overturning the 
civilian government in October, 1999, took charge of the country at a time when 
Pakistan was trying to recover from this so called ‗lost decade‘. Following the 
9/11 crisis, Pakistan became a U.S. ally in the ‗war against terror‘ and qualified 
for international assistance for its economic development.  
The Government utilising this opportunity accepted the loans from International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) along with its conditions under PRSP. Consequently, 
it launched wide-ranging structural, economic and governance reforms under the 
PRP in the year 2001. Ever since, consensus has emerged that good governance is 
a sine qua non for development and poverty reduction, it has been made a 
compulsory part of the donor funded reform programmes. One of the major 
strategies to bring about good governance that followed is the reform of the public 
sector (Brillantes, 2001). In Pakistan this approach meant the government 
declared the adoption of a holistic approach to revamping the civil services at all 
three levels of federal, provincial and district.  
This research is based on the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) where, as part of 
governance reforms, the Tax Administration Reform Programme (TARP) was 
implemented during the period of 2005-2011. The FBR, as the federal tax agency, 
is responsible for the collection of all federal taxes and levies from across 
Pakistan. The reform of the FBR was agreed as conditions of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the year 1998. However, its implementation was 
delayed twice, first because of political resistance from within the ruling party and 
then due to a sudden change in the ruling regime (details in chapter 5). 
                                                            
4 During first 40 years average GDP growth remained above 5%. 
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Nevertheless, during this time the background work on its reorganisation 
continued through the constitution of a task force with the financial and technical 
assistance of the WB. The military-led government was not politically constrained 
and, realizing its importance for the country‘s economic growth and resource 
mobilization, supported this initiative and launched TARP in the year 2005 under 
PRP. These reforms targeted two areas: policy reforms and administrative 
reforms. This thesis focuses on the latter as managerial control attempts were 
made through increased salaries, more training, workforce rationalisation, 
improved working conditions, reengineering of business processes, enhanced use 
of information technology and reorganisation on functional lines (separating the 
core and support functions) under this initiative. These reforms were designed by 
the WB through their project appraisal document (PAD) along the lines of 
recommendations made by the Government‘s appointed task force. The project 
implementation plan (PIP) for these reforms was prepared by a United Kingdom 
(UK) based international consulting firm. The reforms were implemented through 
an internal wing within the organisation – the Policy and Restructuring Wing. 
This wing was technically supported by the WB through its offices in Pakistan 
and Washington, D.C. and also backed up by various international technical 
assistances and IMF missions (details in chapter 5).  
These types of administrative reforms have been tried in several countries under 
different labels. Manning (2001) argued that, despite its complex and diverse 
nature, from the time its pattern emerged in the 1980s NPM was seen as a useful 
model for developing countries to pursue. Since then these reforms have been 
imposed by the IFIs with SAP as precondition for financial assistance with the 
belief that this model will increase flexibility and dynamism in the public sector 
(ADB, 2004; The World Bank, 2002). Thus, financially wretched developing 
countries are guided in adopting market-led policies and restructuring their public 
sectors based on business sector principles found in the NPM. However, the 
results of these reforms in developing countries do not present a healthy picture. 
In his extensive review of PSR in developing countries Batley (1999) finds mixed 
results at best. Walle (2001) and Kiragu et al. (2003) also highlight the scarcity of 
PSR success stories. The WB (2008) also reported a huge failure rate of 55% in its 
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PSR activities during the period of 1999-2006. It also admits that systematic 
evidence on what works, and why, in civil service reforms is lacking. 
In this regard, Polidano (1999) argues that ―there is little examination of the 
outcomes of such NPM reforms as have been tried in developing countries‖ (pp. 
4). Furthermore, rather than based on empirical assessments answering what has 
worked, most reform assessments have been based on a priori reasoning about 
what seems to be suitable for the developing world. Batley (1999) also noted the 
lack of research on the outcomes of reforms. Nunberg (1995) argued that 
administrative reforms in developing countries are driven by operational wisdom 
instead of empirical research, as their impact on government performance has still 
to be evaluated – particularly on organisational and structural (process) aspects. 
More recently, Goldfinch et al. (2013), in their extensive review of 49 low-income 
countries, found only a few documents linking PSR with implementation and even 
fewer documents assessing its outcome. They noted that ―evidence is often 
lacking on the implementation of reforms. Evidence is also lacking on improved 
services or outcomes seen as encouraged through public administration reform 
and implementation of these reform agendas‖ (pp. 50). The WB (2011) itself 
admits lack of explicit theories and evidence-based research for understanding the 
factors positively influencing the PSMR (details in chapter 3).  
Nunberg (1995) argued that little evaluation evidence is available because of the 
adolescence of these reforms in developing countries. Polidano (2001) stated that 
in many developing countries reforms failed because it was not possible to get to 
the implementation stage and not on account of unsatisfactory results after 
implementation. Consistent with the analysis of Polidano, in Pakistan none of the 
government‘s reform initiatives completed the reform cycle during the last six 
decades due to frequent government changes. Thus, the practical evaluation stage 
never arrived (details in chapter 2). However, during recent attempts at reform, 
donor and recipient have both evaluated the results periodically against the agreed 
benchmarks for the release and receipt of the next tranche of funding for these 
reforms and have confirmed modest improvement. However, as of yet, no 
independent and systematic research evaluating the reasons behind the limited 
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impact of PSR reforms has been made. This research is an endeavour to work in 
this direction. 
After explaining the background and providing justification of the research, now I 
will present my account of the methods I used to investigate the reforms in the 
case study organisation. 
1.3 Methods 
This study investigates what effects the reforms have had on the functioning of PS 
organisations and why their effects seem to have been limited in Pakistan‘s public 
sector. To achieve the objectives set for this research I have endeavoured to 
conduct a sociological analysis of the consequences of reform interventions on the 
functioning of FBR and its social structure and processes. The key social structure 
for the FBR was the demand by government and IFIs for transforming itself into a 
more efficient, effective, transparent and responsive organisation so that it can 
facilitate economic growth as a key national institution and also so that it can 
better mobilise resources the government needs to run the country‘s affairs. To 
represent the both the government and IFIs in this thesis I have used the term 
‗reformers‘.  
This research considers organisations as socially constructed phenomena that 
appear to have an objective reality when patterns of actions and meaning are 
internalised by their members (Berger and Luckmann, 1996). Together with the 
‗process relational‘ ontology is taken which regards social relationships as 
originators of reality. This approach acknowledges the relations between 
individual, human motivation and emotions, hence this approach helps to analyse 
the organisational change while equally considering the both practical thinking 
and the complex interconnection of emotions, needs and desires of an individual. 
These ontological assumptions lead towards related epistemological assumptions 
and I align believe about knowledge with constructionsim. As truth or meanings 
are constructed through interaction with the realities therefore, I have adopted an 
epistemology of inter-subjectivity and ontological belief that reality is socially 
constructed and consist of people‘s subjective experiences of outer world. Reality 
is an ‗ongoing human production‘ (Berger and Luckmann, 1996). It is made by 
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human processes and relationships (becoming ontology). Therefore, I am trying to 
find out about these processes and relationships from people who participate in 
them as well as by using my knowledge as a former insider.  
This investigation is based on the assumption that reality is socially constructed 
and can be understood through the interpretation of people‘s actions and the 
meanings they express. As Strauss (1978) argues, that ‗order‘ emerges from the 
interaction of formal (rules, procedures, structures) and informal (norms, beliefs, 
values, attitudes) dimensions of an organisation. So, even the rules depend on 
‗negotiations‘ for them to work. Strauss‘s (1978) idea of ‗negotiated order‘ has 
been used to conceptualise the FBR where ‗order‘ is the result of social 
interactions between the senior managers on behalf of the reformers are leading 
the reforms and other employees with all their respective personal and 
professional interests as part of the whole society. As Fagenson (1993) argued, 
―an individual and his/her organisations cannot be understood separately from the 
society (culture) in which he or she works; and when the individual, the 
organisation or the system in which they are embedded changes, the other 
components change as well‖ (pp. 6). And Watson (2008) notes that ―even the 
smallest utterance or mundane piece of dialogue can be linked back to the wider 
culture, social structure and processes of the society in which it takes place‖ (pp. 
42). Further, I endeavoured to use Mills‘ (2000) ‗social imagination‘ while 
analysing my field work and to relate conversations and events to broader social 
structures.  
To do this, I have adopted an ethnographically oriented approach. The working 
definition of ‗ethnography‘ in this thesis is the same as that of Watson (2008): ―a 
written account of the cultural life of a social group, organisation or community 
which may focus on a particular aspect of life in that setting‖ (pp. 100). In the 
case study organisation, organisational restructuring, altering business processes, 
increased salary, providing better work conditions, training and extended use of 
IT are considered as managerial control attempts in-line with NPM requirements. 
Gouldner (1954) argues that in all such managerial control attempts both intended 
and unintended consequences are inevitable. 
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The research is divided into two broad phases. The first phase consisted of 
thoroughly analysing the theoretical dimensions of the PSR in Pakistan by 
reviewing a large range of documentary evidence such as published and 
unpublished reports from the government‘s and IFIs repositories, scholarly 
articles and academic research theses. The second phase consisted of exploratory 
study in the field to conduct semi-structured interviews and make field notes 
through participant-observation. Thus far, the impacts of public sector reforms in 
the Pakistani context have not been extensively researched. Therefore, I opted to 
use an exploratory case study approach as the most suitable for this research 
considering its uniqueness and the lack of availability of contextual literature 
(Yin, 1998, pp. 236). According to Strauss and Corbin (1998) ‗qualitative study‘ 
refers to ―any type of research that produces findings not arrived at by statistical 
procedures or other means of quantification‖ (pp. 10-11). Since reform is not a 
formula, but rather a concept which needs to be interpreted and acted upon by the 
individuals within their social and organisational context, and keeping in mind the 
subjective and complex nature of this study, qualitative research methods have 
been used for this investigation.  
The data required for this research was collected from the FBR through my own 
personal links. The interviewees were selected through the snowball sampling 
technique. During fieldwork, I conducted 22 semi-structured, in-depth interviews 
with FBR managers and representatives from donor organisations. I also recorded 
notes on participant observation of a period of three and half months. My 
interpretation also draws inevitably on my prior experience as a full participant 
while concluding this research. 
1.4 Structure of thesis  
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Having provided an aerial view of my 
study in this first chapter, in the second chapter I review relevant literature on 
Pakistani bureaucracy. The historic aspect of bureaucracy is usually restricted to 
introductory remarks in the designing of public sector reforms. Recognition of its 
role is important while analysing ‗what is‘ and ‗what can be‘ as it hinges on ‗what 
has been‘. The historical heritage of ‗what has been‘ brings more clues for PSR 
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analyses and understand ‗what is‘ and ‗why‘ (Brösamle, 2012). To cover this 
aspect, this second chapter has been included. It covers the bureaucratic heritage 
of Pakistan, including its origin, evolution, structure, role and future vision. It also 
takes stock of the major public sector reform efforts made under different 
governmental eras. While this chapter introduces the reader to the functioning of 
the Pakistani PS, it also provides the basis for the reader to understand the 
responses given by the research participants in the empirical chapter (chapter 6). 
In the second chapter published and unpublished reports from the government and 
international agencies as well as published work from researchers are the main 
sources of information. 
The third chapter is the second part of the literature review. This draws 
discussions from literature on two of the most relevant streams of organisational 
studies and public administration. I start by defining ‗public sector‘ and 
considering the problems that have been attributed to it and which have led to 
widespread reform interventions. Then I examine the established model of a 
public sector, i.e. bureaucracy, and its ideal type and characteristics as 
conceptualised by Max Weber. The literature evaluates the effectiveness, 
advantages and disadvantages of bureaucracy as a means of organising and 
providing public services. The criticising literature highlights the gap that 
provided the space to NPM. The main charges levelled against bureaucracy are 
wastefulness, red-tapeism, rigidity and inefficiency. Thus, I review the literature 
on NPM for understanding its claims of economy, efficiency, responsiveness and 
flexibility. Here I start with locating its origin, which is arguably based on a union 
of new institutional economics and managerialism. Although there are differences 
even amongst leading advocates of NPM regarding both new institutional 
economics and managerialism, I noted considerable consensus on the conceptual 
bundling in two groups. The first group comprises ideas regarding management 
improvement and restructuring (managerialism) and the second group contains 
ideas related to competition and the role of the market (institutional economics). 
Finally, this chapter covers the governance literature discussing the state‘s 
capacity issues that are, according to the reformers, hindering the progress of 
NPM-type reforms.  
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The fourth chapter explains and justifies the methods I used for investigation, 
analysis and interpretation. I start by explaining the basic and philosophical 
assumptions and explain the ethnographic-oriented approach that was adopted in 
order to illustrate the conceptual framework upon which the research is based. I 
then set out the research design. Following this I reflexively explain my position 
as researcher and as an ex-employee of the case study organisation. After that, the 
fieldwork is elaborated in chronological order and I discuss the issues faced 
during it. Finally, I explain how I analysed and interpreted the data.  
Chapter five is the first empirical chapter of the thesis. In this chapter I analyse the 
official change intentions of the reformers to make the federal tax agency more 
efficient, effective and transparent. After briefly introducing the organisation I 
explain the main reasons and areas of reforms identified by the reformers to bring 
improvements. Then I analyse the aims and strategy opted by the reformers to 
introduce major reform initiatives in the case study organisation. This chapter 
primarily relies on documentary evidence of project data from classified and 
public documents of the reformers. The main government documents I analyse in 
this chapter are a report from National Commission on Government Reforms 
(NCGR), a report from the Task force on Reform of Tax Administration, the 
approved Strategy Document and documents from the WB including the PAD and 
the Project Implementation, Completion and Results Report (PICRR). Classified 
documents included various internal memos, presentations and PIP prepared by 
UK based consultants. From the review, it appears that the reformers have divided 
the reforms in two categories: policy and administration. Policy reforms targeted 
the actions relating to the elimination of procedural difficulties in the conduct of 
the organisation's affairs while administrative reforms mainly consist of 
managerial control attempts involving salaries, training, workforce rationalisation, 
business process reengineering, structural changes in the organisation and 
enhanced use of IT.  
The sixth chapter is the second empirical chapter of the thesis. In this chapter I 
have analysed the employees‘ experiences and accounts of organisational reforms. 
The focus is on the issues the research informants thought were central during the 
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reform process. It also addresses the questions raised by research participants of 
the case study organisation on the role of donors. The interviews mainly 
surrounded the process of reform such as its conceptualisation, its implementation 
and results. The information gained was used to identify what impact the reforms 
have made on PS employees, their work, their organisation and the public sector 
as whole. 
Seventh Chapter is the last chapter of this thesis. It starts with a brief overview of 
the main concepts discussed in the thesis and reviews the research questions. Then 
it discusses the issues found in the case study organisation in relation to three 
analysed reform measures: training, salaries and IT. Following this, the contextual 
issues at the institutional and national levels are discussed which leads to 
highlighting the gaps in assumptions held by reformers through an analysis using 
NPM theory. After that I discuss the issues that informants raised as important for 
the Pakistani setting yet were missing from the reform programme. I endeavour to 
explain throughout this chapter that how ignoring the local context of Pakistan 
react against the content based technocratic assumptions hold by the reformers at 
organisational and national levels. The issues present in the local context not only 
counteract the intended change in the public sector, but also generate unintended 
consequences. This research contributes to a greater understanding of the 
initiation and implementation of NPM-inspired reforms in Pakistan and it 
identifies contributing factors to its limited results at organisational and national 
levels. 
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Chapter 2. The historical evolution and future 
direction of Pakistan’s public sector 
2.1 Introduction  
The historical perspective of the bureaucracy is often ignored by the reformers 
while conceptualising and designing the public sector reforms. This is simply 
ignorance of the historical effect of ‗what has been‘ on ‗what is‘ and ‗what can be‘ 
(Brösamle, 2012). Painter and Peters (2010, pp. 13) argues that the public sector is 
subject to ‗legacy effects‘ as ‗inheritance exerts its influence in the face of 
pressures for change‘. Also, a number of scholars (Peter and Pierre, 1998; Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2004; North, 1990) have recognised the ‗path dependence‘ of 
institutional change. According to North (1990) path dependence ―means that the 
history matters‖ (pp. 102). Historic institutionalists Hall and Taylor (1996) also 
argue that the reforms are path dependent. This position ―rejects the traditional 
postulate that the same operative forces will generate the same results everywhere 
in favour of the view that the effect of such forces will be mediated by the 
contextual features of a given situation often inherited from the past‖ (pp. 941). 
Tambulasi and Codesria (2010) argue that path dependence could also help to 
understand why reform fails. Peters (2005) suggested that reforms are ―path 
dependent and once launched on that path they will persist in that pattern until 
some significant force intervenes to divert them from the established direction‖ 
(pp. 20). Greener (2002) also noted that the established operating procedures 
―become so institutionalised and historically embedded that it's become nearly 
impossible to break free from the established path‖ (pp. 164).  
Therefore, this chapter, the first of the literature review, covers the historical 
emergence and current role of Pakistani bureaucracy. In this chapter I explain its 
origin, heritage, evolution, structure, role and future vision. Then, this chapter 
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explains the roots of the current problems and their long history to assess its 
proposed remedy through NPM type reforms. For this, I also examine the past 
efforts made by various governments to reform the Pakistan‘s public sector. This 
chapter provides the reader a holistic view of the Pakistani state and the 
functioning of its Public Sector. More importantly, it binds the basis for the reader 
to better understand the responses given by the respondents in the empirical 
chapter six. The main sources of information for this chapter are public and 
embargoed reports of the National Commissions / Committees government 
formed to assess the administrative problems and suggest changes. Particularly, 
following important reports have been analysed: Munir, Egger, Gladieux, Ahmed, 
Cornelius, Power, Meer, Haq, Patel, Anwar, Chattah, Pasha, Imam, Choudhary, 
Hussain, National Reconstruction Bureau and the World Bank. These reports 
contain the unique historical account of PPS evolution and suggested remedies 
over time. Alongside, published works of historical and contemporary researchers 
are also consulted to shed light on the process. 
2.2 Heritage of Pakistani bureaucracy 
In 1872 the East India Company (The Company) started administering the 
revenue collection and regulating the civil service in three states
 
of Indian sub-
content (Braibanti, 1959 cited in Braibanti, 2003 (Reprint), p. 7). Next year in 
1973, the Company introduced the system of seniority in promotion
5
 and started 
the custom of preparing the young man for lifelong service. To educate, train and 
shape the early lives of ‗writers‘, as Company named them, Fort William College 
was established in 1800 in Calcutta. However, just after six years in 1806 The 
Company decided to establish another superior college called Haileybury in 
England and restricted the role of Fort William to train in oriental languages only. 
The young guardians were educated, trained and moulded for two years. Thomas 
Babington Macaulay, explaining the adopted education philosophy in his famous 
minutes of February, 1835 noted:  
―We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters 
between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian 
in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in 
                                                            
5 Braibanti, 1959 cited in 33 Geo. III, Cap. 52, section 26 (1793) 
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intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of 
the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from 
western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for 
conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population.‖  
In the year 1854, on the recommendation of the Macaulay Committee, the 
foundation stone of the modern Indian Civil Service (ICS) was laid. It 
recommended the replacement of patronage based system of the East India 
Company with a competitive examination to promote the merit. It also 
recommended the recruitment of Oxford and Cambridge graduates to improve the 
quality of recruits. The East India Company accepted the recommendation of the 
Committee and from 1855 started a merit-based induction system.  Until 1922, 
when the Company decided to recruit locals in the ICS and started competitive 
exam in India, it kept recruiting its officers from the Universities of Oxford and 
Cambridge. Therefore, ICS is generally called an ‗Elite Service‘ (India, 2008). 
In 1886, on the recommendation of a Commission headed by Sir Charles U. 
Aitcheson, a series of reforms were introduced to organise the Indian public 
service.  On its recommendation the distinction between ‗covenanted‘6 and 
‗uncovenanted‘ was eliminated and new terms ‗Imperial Civil Service‘ (ICS) and 
‗Provincial Civil Service‘ (PCS) were introduced. On its recommendation it was 
also agreed that ICS will only be consisting of a limited number of corps d'elite 
while the rest of the civil servants would be placed in PCS. Furthermore, the 
members of corps d ‗elite (ICS) would be selected through open competitive 
exams held in England only and their salaries would be higher than officers of 
PCS. Cadre system was also introduced as part of these reforms which divided the 
services into four classes according to degree of responsibility. This division 
clearly made the ICS more prestigious than PCS. The policy behind preparing 
such a group, which was highly trained and empowered, was to prepare the 
executive for controlling the key position of district officers (DOs). The 
nomenclature used for these officers was Deputy Commissioner. These officers 
were responsible for all the affairs in the district they were controlling. The 
district officers were prepared to represent the crown at the smallest 
                                                            
6 The senior officials of the company who usually signed employment contract were called 
‗covenanted‘ and the junior officials who do not ‗unconvenanted‘ 
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administrative units. Therefore, the DOs at the district level were heading all 
functions like revenue collection, policing, magistrate and registration of land 
records. This unique combination of responsibility also gave them unprecedented 
authority. As Lord Macaulay said in the House of Commons (cited in Braibanti, 
2003, p. 17): 
―The collector of revenue in many parts of India is the sole consul of a 
great province, the district assigned to him being about the size of one of 
the four provinces of Ireland, of Leinster or of Munster, and the 
population therein probably about 1,000,000 of human being. In all that 
district there is not a single village – there is not a single hut – in which 
the difference between a good and a bad collector may not make the 
difference between happiness and misery..... Such power as that which 
collectors of India over the people in India is not found in any other part 
of the world possessed by any class of functionaries ......‖ 
It is pertinent to note here that these civil servants were not accountable to any 
elected body or people‘s representative but direct servants of the Crown. Hence, 
they themselves were ‗political bureaucracy‘ not only maintaining the 
administration of the district, but also taking decisions on a variety of political, 
social, economic and judicial issues. Commenting on the colonial civil service 
Robert Heussler suggested that: 
―The colonial administrators have not been civil servants in the usual 
sense, that is, servants of elected or appointed governments whose higher 
officers hold the lion‘s share of whatever power there is to be exercised. 
They themselves were the Government. Spread thinly over the ground, 
relying on their wits, personalities and physical stamina, they have 
embodied in their own persons virtually all the stuff and substance of 
rule.‖7 
When it became independent in 1947 Pakistan inherited this steel-frame
8
 of the 
British Administrative system, which was adopted by Pakistan with minor 
adjustments (Kennedy, 1987). The ICS cadre was renamed the Pakistan 
Administrative Service (PAS) in 1947 and from 1950 known as Civil Services of 
Pakistan (CSP).   
                                                            
7 Mavis Puthucheary, The Politics of Administration: The Malaysian Experience (Oxford 
University Press, 1978, pp. 24) 
8 Prime Minister Lloyd George in his speech to British Parliament in 1922 famously referred to the 
Indian Civil Service as ―the steel frame‖ that held together the British Raj.  
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2.3 Bureaucracy and its historical role in Pakistan 
Despite Pakistan‘s inheritance of a weak and inexperienced political leadership, to 
run the affairs of the new state, the British trained and organised civil service 
started performing their role immediately. They started to work on a long list of 
monolithic tasks faced by the Government on independence, including the 
settlement of a flood of refugees coming from India, maintenance of law and 
order, allotment of land and the establishment of a fully functional system of 
sovereign state (Gorvine, 1965). Despite the administrative difficulties like lack of 
trained manpower, places for offices and allied equipments to be operational they 
faced at the time of partition, the trained civil service took up the challenge. 
Braibanti (1963) highlighted this when he argued that on independence the most 
serious administrative problem faced by Pakistan was an acute shortage of 
managerial talent. At partition, only 157 officers (including 95 Muslims) from the 
total number of 1,157 Indian Civil Services (ICS) officers decided to join services 
in Pakistan. The main reason for such a low Muslims representation in the ICS 
was their traditional anti western education stance, which kept them handicapped 
from joining the ICS. To fill the gap, a number of British officers were retained in 
various positions, including the very important positions of provincial governors 
and Secretary Establishment (Sayeed, 1958; Ziring and Laporte, 1974). The 
following presents Muslim representation in ICS on independence.  
Table 1: Muslim representation in ICS 
Province British Hindu & 
Others 
Muslims Total 
Assam 20 17 2 39 
Bengal 74 75 18 167 
Bihar 53 45 4 102 
Bombay 62 66 5 133 
Central Provinces & Berar Madras 38 38 3 79 
Madras 63 86 12 161 
N.W.F. Province & Orissa 32 9 5 46 
Punjab 93 32 27 152 
Sind 19 5 5 29 
United Provinces 83 67 16 166 
Princely States 71 8 4 83 
Total 608 448 101 1,157 
Total Percentage 52% 39% 9% 100% 
Source: LaPalombara (1963), pp. 365 
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This small group also encountered difficult physical problems. They started their 
operations without any offices or office equipment in miscellaneous buildings 
across Karachi. Huntington (1968) noted that despite this, the Pakistani 
bureaucracy passed the first test and provided a much needed start in the shape of 
leadership and security. According to him ―The best tribute paid to the 
competence of these civil servants is the fact that Pakistan did not collapse in its 
first 90 days‖ (p. 322). 
Even in the very early days of Pakistan‘s independence, the civil servants started 
receiving political pressures for favours. While this came to the notice of the 
founder Mr. Jinnah, he addressed the civil servants within only eight months (i.e. 
April, 1948) of independence at Peshawar and spelled out the guiding principles 
for the civil servants:  
 ―The services are the backbone of the state. Governments are formed, 
Governments are defeated, Prime Ministers come and go, Ministers come 
and go, but you stay on and therefore there is a very great responsibility 
placed on your shoulders. You should have no hand in supporting any 
political party or leader. This is not your business. Whichever 
government is formed according to the constitution, and whoever 
happens to be the Prime Minister coming into power in the ordinary 
constitutional course, your duty is only to serve that government loyally 
and faithfully, but at the same time, to fearlessly maintaining your high 
reputation, your prestige, your honour and the integrity of your service.  I 
wish also to take the opportunity of impressing upon our leaders and 
politicians in the same way, that if they ever try to interfere with you and 
bring political pressure to bear upon you, which leads to nothing but 
corruption, bribery and nepotism - which is a horrible disease and for 
which not only your province but others, too, are suffering - if they try to 
interfere with you in this way, I say they are doing nothing but disservice 
to Pakistan.‖ (Ahmad, 1970, p. 23-24)  
Such open political support from the founder of the country (who was also the 
Governor General of Pakistan) should have raised the morale of the newly formed 
Pakistani bureaucracy. This clear message also kept the politicians and 
opportunist businessmen away from the affairs of the Administration initially and 
the structure of the Government was successfully built within months of 
independence. The essential departments like banking, posts and telegraph, trade 
and commerce and railways started functioning. Also diplomatic function of the 
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Government was enabled to represent Pakistan internationally. Despite of their 
entire numerical and physical constraints, this small band of men recorded 
unprecedented achievements (Ahmad, 1970). 
The expanding role of Government also demanded an increase in the number of 
its functionaries. Hence, a number of officials were recruited to serve in the 
various Government departments. However, the quality of the recruits was 
compromised due to various compensatory actions taken by the Government in 
the wake of the unavailability of suitable candidates, as discussed above. 
According to the Pakistan Public Service Commission‘s report of 1952 strong 
exceptions to candidates‘ education and suitability were provided to make them 
eligible for joining the public service. This included relaxation in educational 
qualification, age limits, so much so they were exempted from the comprehensive 
tests used to be required to enter the ICS. Furthermore, the introduction from of a 
provincial quota system
 
also undermined the merit in the selection process of civil 
servants. This expansion facilitated the government to run its affairs with 
additional workforce, but it also provided another opportunity to politicians for 
interfering with the state services due to the unfortunate deaths of the founder and 
his faithful companion. Ahmad (1970) noted that ―The Ministers not only failed to 
fulfil their obligation, but also instead of looking to the people, they relied on the 
Services to consolidate their positions and sought favours for their relatives and 
friends in government services and private business‖ (pp. 86). An early sign of 
this shift appeared the same year in the shape of an extraordinary price hike of 
essential commodities at the end 1952.  A number of 1,134 persons were trailed 
under FER Act and Hoarding, and Black-marketing Act, including 735 civil 
servants (PID special release on 04.07.1952). This was the first time when the 
prestige and clean character of Pakistan civil service was polluted in desire of 
joining the rich class of the Pakistani society (Ahmad, 1970, pp. 83). Since then 
the state bureaucracy has not been able to regain respect in the eyes of common 
citizens and it considered to be an ineffective, unresponsive and corrupt institution 
(ICG, 2010). Again, in 1969 again, 303 class-I (including very senior) gazetted 
officers were suspended by then President on the charges of corruption, misuse of 
power and misconduct. In the country‘s post split scenario of 1971 some 1,300 
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civil servants were compulsorily retired by the then Prime Minister Mr. Z. A. 
Bhutto, who blamed bureaucracy for the country‘s many ills (discussed in some 
detail later in this chapter). In his own words:  
―No institution in the country has so lowered the quality of our national 
life as to what is called Naukarshahi [bureaucratic rule]. It has done so by 
imposing a caste system on our society. It has created a class of 
‗Brahmins‘ or mandarins, unrivalled in its snobbery and arrogance, 
insulated from life of the people and incapable of identifying itself with 
them‖9. 
He initiated the first ever comprehensive reforms of the PPS in the year, 1973 and 
thereafter a number of attempts were made by various governments to bring 
improvements. However, instead of improving the situation kept on deteriorating 
and PPS became an alleged source of red-tape, corruption and financial burden. 
Wilder (2009) argued that ―over the course of the past six decades, the so-called 
steel frame of the civil service that Pakistan inherited from colonial India has 
become decidedly rusty‖ (pp. 19). This unique historical journey of PPS reforms 
might have helped the reformers to improve the results of the latest attempts if 
they had considered it in designing and implementation stages due to its 
acclaimed path dependent nature subjected to legacy effects.  
Having reviewed the history of the Pakistan civil services I will now turn to 
considerations of the succession of attempts that have been made to reform the 
Pakistan‘s public sector. 
2.4 History of Pakistan Public Sector Reforms 
In the public perception, Pakistan‘s 2.4 million civil servants are widely seen as 
unresponsive, corrupt and bureaucratic procedures are cumbersome and 
exploitative (ICG, 2010). Almost all the Governments since its independence have 
recognised this and various scattered attempts have been made in the past to 
improve the performance of the public sector as Governments greatly relies on 
their executing hand for the conversion of their policies into action.  
                                                            
9 Quoted in W. Eric Gustafson, ―Economic Reforms under the Bhutto Regime,‖ Journal of Asian 
and African Studies 8 (July-October 1973), 256. 
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There have been frequent attempts to make the PPS effective during almost all the 
country‘s democratic or autocratic ruling eras. However, most of these attempts 
remained unsuccessful owing to frequent switchovers of political-military ruling 
regimes. Both political and military administrations successfully overturned each 
other‘s rule either before the recommendations were finalised by their appointed 
committees/ commissions or rolled back opponents‘ initiatives by labelling them 
unsuitable for the country. As argued by Polidano (2001), reforms have failed in 
many developing countries because they were never implemented rather than 
because of unsatisfactory results after implementation. Consistent with Polidano‘s 
analysis, in Pakistan as well, none of the government‘s reform initiative was able 
to complete the full reform cycle.  
In Pakistan, during the last six decades more than twenty studies have been made 
on administrative reform by different government committees and commissions 
(Wilder, 2009). These reports proposed a number of actions to makes changes to 
the country‘s administrative system, but only a few recommendations to curb 
bureaucracy were implemented (Ishrat et al., 2008). Most of these attempts 
remained on the shelves owing to frequent switchovers between political setups or 
military takeovers. In addition, none of the elected governments completed its 
tenure
10
. The only exception is the last government, which has just recently 
completed its tenure and for the first time in the history of Pakistan, rule has been 
passed to the next elected government. The following table shows the politico-
military switchovers in Pakistan.  
Table 2: Dictator and Democratic ruling pattern 
Eras Period 
First democratic era  1947–1958  
First military era  1958–1971 
Second democratic era 1971–1977  
Second military era   1977–1988 
Third democratic era  1988–1999  
Third military era   1999–2007 
Fourth democratic era  2008–present  
Source: Author‘s compilation 
                                                            
10 In total 18 civil Prime Ministers took oath during four democratic stints 
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In a nutshell, the colonial legacy, the political instability and army rule have 
contributed greatly to the shaping of the present Pakistan Public Sector.  As noted 
earlier a number of committees and commissions were constituted by the 
respective governments to suggest improvements in the public sector over the 
years. A summary of some important studies / reports on administrative reforms, 
their main recommendations and progress have been placed at appendix - B.  
By looking at these reform attempts, we can divide last six decades into three 
main phases i) 1948-1971 formation period of just after independence: during 
which the focus remained largely on the establishment of basic government 
departments and their governing rules to run the affairs of the country. Although 
Pakistan gained independence in 1947 together with India, but India inherited 
more settled and streamlined institutions than Pakistan.  This was due to two main 
reasons:  first, Delhi was the capital from where the British was ruling the sub-
continent and hub of all bureaucratic activities went under, its control and second, 
the majority of the civil servants were either Hindus or Sikhs who opted to live 
and serve in India rather than Pakistan; ii) 1973-1990 consolidation period in the 
country‘s post split scenario: Sadly, in 1971 Pakistan got split in two parts and 
Bangladesh came into existence which once again brought the Pakistani public 
sector into jolts as a large number of Bengali nationalist bureaucrats preferred to 
serve Bangladesh over Pakistan. Therefore, majority of reform time and efforts 
spent over the formation, organisation and reorganisation of the public sector at a 
very basic level, i.e. structure, size, authority, pay and powers, etc. Two 
significant actions taken during this period were bringing bureaucracy under the 
political leadership through constitutional amendments to control them and 
nationalization of private corporations. This situation kept the Pakistan 
handicapped from modernising its public sector with global pace to reap the 
potential benefits of globalisation. Moreover, frequent changes in ruling regimes 
and their fluctuating policies also flattered the economic growth of the Pakistan, 
which set the path for Pakistan to seek International Assistance; and iii) 1990-
onwards NPM inspired reforms have been initiated by various governments to 
recover Pakistan from deep rooted fiscal problems and improve its public sector 
functioning, but no substantial achievement could be made. The governments 
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seem to be taking ambitious actions on two streams: of altering its role from 
leading to facilitating and reducing the size and cost of the government by exiting 
from the market through privatisation and deregulation; and promoting private 
sector practices through managerialism in the public sector to gain more from less 
through efficiency and economy. These actions seem to be changing the PPS‘s 
institutionalised character of centralisation, nationalisation, bureaucratisation and 
rule-bound with decentralisation, privatisation, innovation and disaggregation. 
From the year 2000 the Military led government in Pakistan, with the assistance 
of International developing partners, paid special attention to modernise its public 
sector under the agenda of good governance. These institutional reforms were 
arguably aimed at accelerating growth and poverty reduction, particularly in the 
areas of tax administration; financial management, procurement, and devolution 
of power to local governments are worth mentioning.  
After explaining the reform efforts that have taken place over-time in the Pakistan 
public sector, I will now explore the donors‘ intentions behind the latest reforms 
initiated with the assistance of the World Bank. 
2.5 Development, policies, institutions and capacity 
Historically, the donors have considered the development as technocratic 
challenge. The underlying assumption of the donors was that prescription of good 
policies will be implemented by good governments through its competent 
executive branch (The World Bank, 2000). This assumption led the donors to 
develop consensus on a set of economic policies which presumably can help the 
struggling countries to grow. In the academic literature, it has often been argued 
that Washington consensus was based on the agreed economic policies, OECD 
countries used over-time from mid 70s to recover from financial crises and 
achieve development goals. Encouraging experience of these policies during the 
1990s in some East Asian countries by the IFIs set the stage for its export in 
developing countries. The key elements of the Washington consensus were: fiscal 
discipline, prioritising public expenditure, tax reform, deregulation, promoting 
foreign direct investment, financial liberalisation, stabilising exchange rate, trade 
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liberalisation, privatisation and property rights (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; 
Williamson, 2003). 
From the 1990s, Public Sector Reform (PSR) in Pakistan was also started as a 
precondition of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The SAP is a set of 
policy changes in the country‘s economic structure for stability and development 
(Anwar, 1996). Usually, these policy changes are imposed onto the receiving 
nations by the IFIs as conditions of loan to remove the bottlenecks which they 
believe are the reasons for economic destabilisation and underdevelopment. Three 
key promoted benefits of these programmes are the elimination of balance of 
payments and public sector deficits, achieving economic growth, and installation 
of protective shield for future shock prevention (Ahmed and Lipton, 1997). The 
SAPs are supposed to allow the economies of the developing countries to become 
more market oriented. This forces them to concentrate more on trade and 
production so they can boost their economy. As a beneficiary of the SAP Pakistan 
initiated major structural reforms, including the tax legislation, trade reforms, 
privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), financial sector reforms, human 
resource development and social protection. It was believed that the objectives of 
sustaining high growth, low inflation, and external payment viability could be 
achieved through removing structural barriers prescribed through SAP (Pakistan, 
2006-07). However, the poor results of SAP did not support this supposition hold 
by SAP (Moser, et al. (1993), Batley and Larbi (2004)). The seminal research of 
Douglas North in 1980s argued that institutions are the ‗rules of the game‘ and the 
countries with better rules of the game have more chances of growth and 
development.  The World Development Report, 1997 also recognises the policies 
and institutions of equal importance for development. These researches at a time 
when the IFIs were also trying to locate the reasons behind the poor results of 
SAP attracted their attention and they realised: 
―Providing good policy advice is not enough; the Bank needs to focus 
even more than it has in the past on helping governments develop the 
processes and incentives to design and implement good policies 
themselves. Only through such institution-building will countries be able 
to achieve the ultimate goals of poverty reduction, inclusion, 
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environmental sustainability, and private sector development.‖ (The 
World Bank, 2000, pp. ii) 
Hence, by the end-1990s the institutional development and capacity building 
moved to centre stage of PSR efforts. 
2.6 PSR in Pakistan – change in donors’ perspective 
A main lesson learnt by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) from their 
experience with SAP in various developing countries was that the overarching 
objective of development cannot be achieved without prior placement of strong 
institutional mechanism. Therefore, they started including it in their reform 
agenda. The World Bank (1983) for the first time acknowledged the importance 
of state institutions besides policies. This report analysing size, role and 
managerial efficiency of the state noted: 
―Policy and institutional reforms are complementary. Policies are 
relevant only if there is the institutional capacity to carry them out, while 
strong institutions are ineffective- even counterproductive – if the policy 
framework discourages efficiency.‖ (pp. 126). 
This change in the Bank‘s strategy was emerged after identifying governmental 
incapability for effective implementation of prescribed policies as a major threat 
for the successful development. Particularly, with its recent experience of Africa 
Region where extreme incapacity of the government compromised the expected 
results. Therefore, it started pushing institutional reform in its Country Assistance 
Strategy (CAS) from the margins in the mid-forties to centre in late-nineties. 
Alongside this, another notable change was a global consensus in favour of smart 
but efficient government and an extended role for the private sector in replacing 
the existing model of government led development (The World Bank, 2008). In 
Pakistan as well, the poor civil services were seen as weak institution that 
hindered effective implementation of the policies by the IFIs. Thus they suggested 
its reformation as part of Governance reforms. Particularly, the World Bank 
(1998) through its report titled ‗A Framework for Civil Service Reform in 
Pakistan‘ identified following shortcomings which needed to be addressed 
immediately: 
i. Over-centralised structure and excessively rule bound: due to which 
official system is slow and over-occupied by rules and procedures. This 
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causes slow response to general public/ clients and also distracts seniors 
from strategy formulation, policy making and result oriented management. 
ii. Unbalanced skill mix: excessive employment at the lower levels of 
Government has created an unbalanced public sector. This is mainly 
because of the state‘s historical role as employer to accommodate low 
skilled citizens. 
iii. Accountability: both internally and to the public is missing. This is partly 
because of colonial heritage and military rules civil servants have 
remained unanswerable to public. But internal mechanisms have also 
failed to ensure the accountability of civil servants. 
iv. Political intrusion: has reduced the professionalism and effectiveness of 
public service and also they have continued to fail to perform their 
oversight function in public favour. 
v. Tug-of-War between different cadres of civil servants has also 
compromised the effectiveness of the civil service. 
vi. Corruption: across all branches of Government have seriously undermined 
the effectiveness of Government. 
vii. Huge PS wage bill a source of non developmental expenditure. 
The World Bank, (1998) further recommended a comprehensive instead of a 
piecemeal approach to resolve these interrelated problems for better results. But 
before that, they recommended to craft a clear vision regarding the role of the state 
in Pakistan‘s development. The proposed guidelines for crafting such vision were: 
i. Classification of core public sector functions 
ii. Identification of accurate means (financing/regulation) to perform these 
functions 
iii. Assessment of private sector capacity to perform the non-core functions 
excluded from public sector 
Furthermore, the World Bank (1998, pp. ii) viewed following essential changes in 
the role of the state to support the above vision: 
i. Exit from commercial activities in favour of the private sector 
ii. No more generating direct employment for society 
iii. Fair and effective regulation mechanism 
iv. Focus on provisioning of basic social services 
v. Public information sharing 
vi. Maintenance of law and order and provisioning of justice 
The WB resembling the Pakistan‘s shared history with Commonwealth countries 
supported the valuable lessons from the United Kingdom, Australia, and others. 
Whereas, referring various researchers the report suggested not to replicate the 
New Zealand model, but adopt it with precautions in the absence of presupposes 
developed contractual relations and markets that are not normally found in 
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developing countries including Pakistan. However, the report emphasised the 
development of appropriate institutional capacity to support the future endeavours 
in this direction. The donors for the effective implementation of their 
recommendation attached these reforms with the poverty reduction programme 
(PRP) they negotiated with Pakistan. It was argued by the donors‘ that by 
following this strategy Pakistan will be able to regain its financial stability. 
2.7 Government’s vision and strategy for Reforms 
Following the international advice, Pakistan first produced ‗Vision 2010‘ in the 
year 1998 and then its updated version ‗Vision 2030‘ in the year 2007 conveying 
Pakistan‘s vision about the state. Vision 2030 delineating Pakistani State‘s role in 
future said: 
―In today‘s world, emphasis has to be laid on stabilisation, liberalisation, 
privatisation and de-regulation as key pillars of economic policy. This 
separates government from the task of running businesses, which latter is 
better handled by the entrepreneurship of the private sector, allowing the 
government to concentrate on its core functions of regulation and 
essential services. The future world will require Pakistan to make its own 
variation on these basic themes to suit its national requirements and 
conditions‖ (Pakistan, 2007b, pp. 38). 
The above statement clearly shows the persistent stance of the Government to 
withdraw in favour of the private sector from the commercial activities and focus 
on the basic functions of the state. To do this, it reiterated its position to re-invent 
the stronger institutions to ensure good governance in the public sector for 
efficient public service provisioning and sustainable economic growth.  
Changes in the public sector being the executing hand are inevitable to be aligned 
with the government‘s new strategy of reinventing itself as ‗small but smart 
government‘. In practical terms, it means complete reorientation of the public 
sector from being representative of the government essentially ‗everywhere‘ to be 
a systematic facilitator and regulator ‗where-needed‘. This strategy, which 
government adopted meant to be working both ways, i.e. i) by exiting from the 
market and decreasing its size through privatisation, deregulation and 
liberalisation and; ii) strengthening public sector capacity for improved 
performance. The following diagram depicts both strategies. 
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Figure 1: Government’s strategy of public sector reforms 
 
Source: author 
As argued earlier, the desired outcome of this transformation was getting more 
from the less, or controlling costs and gaining efficiency. Therefore, its usefulness 
should be measured against these two parameters. Although, following this 
strategy, the government was able to reduce its size through privatisation of some 
of the state owned assets in Banking, Telecommunication and Oil and Gas sectors 
which resulted in long term benefits like relieving from monthly salaries, 
retirement benefits and operational costs etc. and also short term financial support 
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from its sales receipts. However, the impact on the responsiveness, efficiency and 
transparency of the remaining public sector are yet to be noticed, as it is being 
persistently ranked poorly by various international indicators, as explained in the 
first chapter. Ideally, as envisaged by the reformers, after reducing the size of the 
public sector by involving specialists from the private sector and focused efforts 
to improve the efficiency in the remaining public sector the quality of these 
institutions should have been improved. But practically, the process till now has 
helped the government to reduce its size and costs only.  
Undoubtedly, managing such extraordinary transformation also bring its own 
challenges for the government and public sector managers. One of the biggest 
challenges both faced was the poor capacity of the institutions, organisations and 
human resources to alter the institutionalised bureaucratic character of the ways of 
work. Therefore, government is constantly pushing its public sector to perform 
better through different capacity building programmes being run with the help of 
international agencies under governance agenda.  
Now, after reviewing the government‘s strategy to reform Pakistan public sector, I 
will now discuss some of the major action taken by the government and referred 
by the research informants to bring improvement and become ‗smart‘ in the 
remaining public sector. However, I am not including the actions taken to become 
‗small‘ (i.e. privatisation and downsizing) as they are out of the scope of this 
study. 
2.8 Actions taken by the Government to improve its public sector 
To improve the functioning of the public sector, the government seems to be 
addressing capacity issues at all interrelated levels of individuals, organisations 
and institutions. The government seems to be adopting the WB‘s advice by 
adopting the twofold strategy of: comprehensive reforms of key national 
institutions, and; addressing the generic problems of the public sector. It would 
not be possible to include all the actions taken by the government on both the 
accounts, however, I will briefly discuss the actions more relevant to this study. 
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2.8.1 Comprehensive reform of key institutions 
From the year 2000, the federal government with the assistance of International 
developing partners, paid special attention to modernise its public sector on 
scientific patterns and introduced an NPM-inspired, ambitious and comprehensive 
reform programme mainly to stabilize the economy and accelerate growth and 
poverty reduction. At the federal level, four key institutions were selected for 
undergoing the major reforms with the aim to improve their functioning resulting 
in better performance. These institutions were i) Central Board of Revenue 
(CBR), which is responsible for the collection of all federal taxes i.e. Income Tax, 
Customs, Sales Tax and Federal Excise from all corners of the country ii) Pakistan 
Agriculture Research Council (PARC), mandated to undertake, aid, promote and 
coordinate agricultural research; arrange expeditious utilization of research 
results; and develop scientific manpower, iii) Supreme Audit Institution (SAI), 
which is the primary National Institution that partners both executive and 
legislature in promoting accountability and good governance in public sector 
management and iv) Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) which is responsible for all 
kinds of Civil Aviation related activities including the regulatory, air traffic 
services, airport management, infrastructure and commercial development at the 
airports. This research involves analysis of these reforms in one of the selected 
key institutions. Now I will explain some of the generic actions introduced across 
the public sector. 
2.8.2 Compensation 
Besides other independent research on pay differentials, a number of studies 
conducted by the Government itself have already suggested that the existing pay 
structure is deficient and recommended a substantial increase in the salaries of 
public servants. However, due to the fiscal stress, the Pakistan Government could 
never address the problem completely (NCGR, 2008). During the last six decades 
following six national commissions and committees categorically addressed this 
issue and presented their findings. Five out of six confirmed the substantial pay 
gap between the public and private sector employees, particularly at higher 
positions and suggested its improvement to provide the public servants a decent 
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living wage. The only exception is the report of 1948, which recommended 
reduction in public servant‘s salary (reasons already explained above): 
i. Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol-I 1948 
ii. Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol-II 1950 
iii. Report of the Pay and Services Commission: 1959 
iv. Report of the Pay Committee, 1983 
v. Pay and Pension Committee, 2001 
vi. Report of the National Commission for Government Reforms, 2008 
Partially implementing recommendations of these committees and commissions, 
the Government had raised the salaries of public servants marginally every time, 
which, though increased the burden on the exchequer by swelling wage bill, but 
was never able to convey a clear message to public servants that we have done our 
part, now it‘s your turn to perform honestly and efficiently. These increases could 
never satisfy the employees need and they kept looking for other legal and illegal 
means of income (NACS, 2002). As a result, many of public servants became 
involved in financial corruption. I know from my own experience that the 
employees who avoided the financial corruption got involved in the moral 
corruption in the shape of absenteeism, late-attending and early-leaving the 
offices, working too slow or not working at all, thus saving their energies to work 
or business in their private capacities. Although it is illegal for all government 
servants to work parallel in the private sector or conduct private business, but the 
majority of the financially clean government servants does this to meet their 
necessities (details in chapter six). This is very common in the important areas of 
health and education, where doctors and teachers operate their clinics and conduct 
teaching in private capacities. The junior level officials take clerical assignments 
in the private sector and supporting staff do odd jobs like gardening, cooking and 
gate keeping in the posh areas. However, the main hurdle comes in the way of 
officers who are generalist in nature and exposed to a particular type of 
administrative experience finds themselves in trouble. They, due to their status in 
government machinery and social structure neither can do clerical work nor odd 
jobs to meet their financial needs. The Government doesn‘t provide sufficient 
financial assistance to their employees, however, provides enough discretionary 
powers, which they may use to generate extra money. 
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Though it is very difficult to showcase the benefits arising from increased salary 
in an ordinary environment, but in the established context of Pakistan it can 
directly help to gain commitment and reduced corruption from government 
servants by providing them a living wage. The latest assessments of the 
government and the World Bank points that still the Pakistani public servants are 
not getting the living wage. I have discussed this issue in the chapter six alongside 
the responses of the research participants. 
2.8.3 Capacity building through trainings 
As part of an overall strategy to improve the efficiency of the Pakistan public 
sector, the government with the help of International Agencies identified that the 
skills of its workforce are not sufficient and need to be upgraded for better results. 
It is also a fact the resources earmarked for Human Resource Development in 
Pakistan public sector are not sufficient. The Committee on Civil Service Reforms 
noted that only 0.5% of the compensation is being spent on training. To address 
the gap and build the capacity of public sector employees a project named ‗Public 
Sector Capacity Building Project‘ (PSCBP) was launched by the Government 
with the financial assistance of the World Bank. The total financial outlay of the 
project was set at USD 61 Million. Through this project officers (grade 17 and 
above) were financed for professional degrees and courses in reputable local or 
international institutions. However, it ignored the capacity related problems of the 
majority of civil servants working in grades 16 and beneath. According to Project 
Appraisal Document (PAD) of PSCBP, the prime objective of this project was to 
create ‗champions of change‘ at middle and higher level to promote reforms and 
modernisation. And create a workforce comprise of qualified analysts, decision 
makers and implementers (The World Bank, 2004). 
To strengthen the domestic training institution, the faculty has been trained and 
curriculum has been updated under this initiative. Where needed new recruitment 
of qualified individuals was also made to improve the quality of training. Also a 
superior institution has been established by the name of National School of Public 
Policy after merging Pakistan Administrative Staff College (PASC) and National 
Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) at Lahore (The World Bank, 2004). 
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According to NCGR‘s report (2008) during 3 years of PSCBP‘s project life a total 
of 327 scholarships was awarded to mid-level officers (17-19). A tracer study 
conducted with 178 officers on this initiative provides the following information: 
i. Most officers opted for a programme which is more suitable for their 
professional career outside the public sector 
ii. No proper TNA was conducted before the programme is launched. 
iii. Out of 173 officers 63 are on unsuitable assignments after training 
These results of the Government‘s own tracer study present dismal situation. It is 
clear that though money and efforts are being spent on staff training, but the 
desired output is missing. This study has also tried to find the reasons behind it in 
empirical chapter six with the help of answers given by the research informants 
during the fieldwork. 
2.8.4 Promoted use of Information Technology or E-Government 
The focus on e-Government in Pakistan is quite recent. The concept of e-
government entails establishing an environment wherein the Government and all 
its partners and stakeholders can interact digitally. The roots of this initiative can 
be traced just a decade back when the Government approved the National IT 
Policy and Action Plan in 2000. The Federal Government attributed this initiative 
as well towards economic development and competitiveness as it provides 
transparent, effective and economical environment for citizens and businesses to 
access public services. To proceed and accomplish this, four areas were focused 
on: Government-to-Government (G2G) to increase efficiency between different 
levels of government i.e. between Federal and Provincial and between Provincial 
Governments; Government-to-Business (G2B) to promote partnership with 
entrepreneurs and business communities: Government-to-Citizens (G2C) for 
greater contact and facilitation of general masses and Government-to-Employees 
(G2E) for effective and efficient communication between Government and its 
employees. 
To achieve these broad objectives of E-Government, the Federal Cabinet in 2005 
approved the ‗E-Government Strategy & Five Year Plan‘. The emphasis of this 
strategy was firstly to build the basic infrastructure of IT base in the public sector 
through acquiring necessary equipments and establishment of a networked 
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environment within and between the government departments. Then identification 
of common application to perform standardized officials businesses and finally 
development of specialized applications for each agency.  To create the enabling 
environment for making this happen, it was also agreed that the Federal 
Government will take the lead and provide all required financial and legal support 
and the agencies individually will own their projects and prepare their staff 
through trainings and positive campaigns.  
This initiative has achieved its first milestone of establishment of basic IT base 
and has provided easy access of information to the citizen through organisation 
specific websites. Now most federal and provincial organisations not only have 
sufficient equipment interlinked in a networked environment, but also operating 
their independent web sites (NCGR, 2008). However, argued reasons for limited 
progress of second and third stages are at a halt due to the involvement of huge 
business process reengineering before the development and installation of generic 
and specialized softwares. The NCGR found the progress of the entire initiative 
very slow and recommended Government‘s patronage at top level to achieve 
important milestones ahead. The slowness of further development can also be 
interpreted as mal-intentioned on the part of political and bureaucratic leadership 
as if IT enabled environment is established it may also create an internal firewall 
against the actions that are possible to perform without it. Another ground reality 
is illiteracy and digital divide amongst the public which also raise questions about 
its efficacy as well. This issue is also addressed in empirical chapter for deeper 
understanding. 
2.9 Summary 
In Pakistan, during the last six decades more than twenty studies have been made 
on administrative reform by different government committees and commissions. 
These reports proposed a number of actions to makes changes to the country‘s 
administrative system, but only a few recommendations to curb the bureaucracy 
were implemented (Ishrat et al., 2008) to bring them under political influence. 
From the late 1970s, Pakistan landed into massive politico-army turmoil which 
took Pakistan into deep financial crises by 1990s. To regain its financial 
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sovereignty Pakistani leadership negotiated SAP with the IFIs but, its results were 
not impressive like many other developing countries. Based upon the IFIs 
experience of PSR, from the year 2000, the Government has initiated the NPM 
inspired governance reforms to reorient its role and improve the functioning of the 
public sector. To facilitate the smooth transition and create the favourable 
environment for NPM type reform various human, organisational and institutional 
capacity building initiatives have been taken. However, yet no substantial 
breakthrough has been made to improve its efficiency, economy or quality. In 
public perceptions, the PPS is widely seen as unresponsive, corrupt, and 
exploitative (ICG, 2010). 
Having reviewed the historical perspective of Pakistani bureaucracy and the 
efforts of its reformation, the next chapter covers the theoretical perspective to 
map and discusses main concepts of PSR relevant to this project. 
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Chapter 3. PSR – transforming bureaucracies in 
developing countries 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In 1970s the established model of ‗Bureaucracy‘ was challenged for its 
wastefulness, red-tapism, rigidity and inefficiency by the new models with the 
claims of managing the public sector more economically, effectively and 
efficiently. In this chapter I explore them for binding the theoretical foundation of 
this thesis, as in Pakistan the Government is also making efforts to introduce 
NPM-type reforms to replace the bureaucracy.  
Before exploring both the contrasting models in detail I have defined the public 
sector, its jurisdiction, examine argued reasons of its reformation. Then I turn 
towards the established model of bureaucracy, how it was conceptualised, how it 
has emerged historically and why it had become the ‗normal‘ form for the 
provision of government services. After that I explain the alternative model of 
New Public Management to understand its origin, claims, rise and appropriateness 
as an option to replace the prevalent model of Bureaucracy. This debate will take 
us to locate the challenges posed by this transformation in developing countries 
and I will discuss the main issue of state capacity which is being addressed by the 
reformers under the ‗Governance‘ agenda.  
3.2 What is claimed to be wrong with the PS and why to reform it? 
Before proceeding to explain the reasons of public sector reforms, it would be 
useful to define what it is. A broad definition of public sector can be any 
institution or organisation that helps government to form and execute its policies 
to perform its functions. Depending on the country, its levels can vary, i.e. Central 
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and Provincial or upstream core Ministries and central agencies like Finance and 
downstream sector agencies, i.e. health, education which delivers and regulate the 
services (The World Bank, 2011). 
At the end of World War II both development and development economics were 
born (Rajan and Zingales, 2001). It also began the era of great struggle between 
capitalism and communism where both wanted to establish large governments to 
create close regulatory welfare states (Haque, 2007). Hence, the policy paradigm 
that governments will lead the development was established (Haque and Montiel, 
1994). As a result an era of government-led development had begun that 
proliferated public sector organisations to make, plan and execute state‘s policies. 
The countries that appeared as a result of World War II also tried to follow the 
footsteps and established the large governments in the search of development. But 
soon these financially struggling poor countries realised that it was difficult to 
sustain such huge public sector institutions. To finance them they had to borrow 
internally and externally. Mukherjee and Manning (2002) noted that during the 
1970s and 80s the size of the government in developing countries was so 
ballooned that after covering its cost (i.e. wage bills) there was hardly any budget 
left for the public investments.  
Also, in developed countries where this phenomenon had touched its peak, people 
started highlighting problems and demanded efficiency from their governments 
(Kelly, 1998; Kettl, 1997). Explaining the situation Jones and Kettl (2003) argued:  
―Critics have alleged that governments are inefficient, ineffective, too 
large, too costly, overly bureaucratic, overburdened by unnecessary rules, 
unresponsive to public wants and needs, secretive, undemocratic, 
invasive into the private rights of citizens, self-serving, and failing in the 
provision of either the quantity or quality of services deserved by the 
taxpaying public‖ (pp. 1). 
This situation demanded a paradigm shift for the provision of public service. 
Hence, the public voice besides growing fiscal stress forced its leaders to rethink 
and recast the role of government (the ideologies of Keynesian and New Right are 
discussed later in this chapter). Reflecting the same ―Ronald Reagan, Margaret 
Thatcher, and Brian Mulroney proclaimed that government was not the solution to 
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societies‘ ills but a major part of the problem‖ (Ingram and Romzek, 1994, pp. 1). 
This changing philosophy initiated an unending reform process in the developed 
industrial economies.  
According to Manning (1996) during the past 30 years, these massive reform 
waves have initiated in the developed world, where political leadership was 
pressurised by their citizens to not increase taxes, control expenditure and also 
maintain the high standards of public service and welfare. Whereas mainly in 
developing countries such reform has been initiated as a condition of Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP). Whereby, initially, recipient governments were 
suggested to reduce the size of public sector employment and control the wage 
bill (The World Bank, 1999). But as the crises deepen, the agenda grew wider and 
the struggling countries were prescribed a set of measures consisting of a set of 
economic policies being followed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries to regain the financial stability and 
development track. However, the poor results of these policies in the shape of 
high inflation, unemployment and a rise in the poverty level pushed the reformers 
to reassess their approach. Their experience, coupled with international trends and 
scholarly research highlighted the importance of institutions in development. This 
time, the focus of transforming the administration and government was mostly 
towards the techniques and practices from the market and private sector (Larbi, 
1999). Summarising the reasons of reforms he asserted that these reforms are 
driven by multiple factors and not by single alone. The seven factors he explained 
were: 
i. Economic problems and fiscal pressures were faced by governments 
globally during 70s and 80s, which badly affected the developing parts of 
Asia and Africa. This brought governments under fiscal stress due to 
enhanced debt burden, trade imbalances and public sector deficits.  
ii. Increased public criticism on ineffective and inefficient public service 
through bureaucratic institutions. The classical public administration was 
being criticised for being too slow, rule bound, inefficient and 
unresponsive. 
iii. Political consensus on neoliberal agenda (e.g. ‗Reganomics‘ and 
‗Thatcherism‘) in favour of small government and big market during 70s 
and 80s.  
iv. Marketing and proliferation by the international management consultants. 
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v. For developing and transitional countries, advocacy, prescription and 
imposition as lending condition of the Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP) by the International Financial Institutions (e.g. IMF & WB).  
vi. Changes that have emerged as a result of expansion of global markets in 
other countries are forcing the public sector to transform. 
vii. The introduction and expansion of Information Technology have also 
helped to transform. 
 
One of the central beliefs of reforms was that the state had overextended itself, 
even to the spheres where the market can perform better (The World Bank, 1997).  
Therefore, the main focus of administrative reform initiatives was to create small 
but efficient governments while involving the private sector and society as well. 
These strong waves of Administrative reform after crossing developed economies 
reached to developing nations in search of efficiency, economy and effectiveness 
through the carrier of IFIs. 
The weaknesses and or failures of traditional state bureaucracy such as 
monopolistic nature, unmanageable size, managerial inefficiency, public 
inaccessibility, economic inertia and self serving agenda are the most common 
explanations provided for adoption of NPM type reforms. The new agenda was to 
reduce the scope and role of public bureaucracy, transfer resources and services 
from the public sector to the private sector, and restructure the public service in 
the image of business management, because the private sector was believed to be 
more competitive, productive, efficient, innovative, responsive and customer 
friendly (Haque, 2004).  
However, this transformational journey which seems to be simple and linear on 
paper actually has not turned so. During implementation it has posed a number of 
challenges to reformers in developed and especially in the context of developing 
countries (details later in this chapter). This involves the transformation of large, 
comprehensive, hierarchical, functionally uniform organisations led by strong 
democratic governors with the support of neutral and competent civil servants for 
the service of citizens (Ostrom, 1974) to an organisational society which many of 
its functions performs through multi-organisational programmes. These 
programmes are ―interconnected clusters of firms, governments, and associations 
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which together within the framework of these programmes‖ (Hjern and Porter, 
1981, pp. 212-13). These implementation structures operate within a notion of 
governance as the concept of NPM shifts the responsibility from the government 
to society within which these implementation structures operates. Therefore, the 
governance approach is seen as a ―new process of governing, or a changed 
condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed‖ 
(Stoker, 1998, pp. 17).  
It appears from a holistic review of the PSR conversion process that the concepts 
of Bureaucracy, NPM and Governance are central to this transformation. It would 
therefore be useful to explore these interlocked concepts before embarking upon 
the empirical chapters of this thesis. 
3.3 Exploring Bureaucracy 
The word bureaucracy is extracted from Greek words ‗bureau‘ means office and 
‗Kratos‘ means rule or power. Therefore, term bureaucracy is used to refer 
officialdom or power of the office (Hummel, 1998, pp. 307). The term 
‗bureaucracy‘ can be found in the mid of the 18th century (Albrow, 1970, pp. 16). 
However, bureaucracy as a concept in the social sciences was introduced by Max 
Weber in the 19th century. This concept has been interpreted by different 
sociologist differently according to their own theoretical standpoint. In 
administrative sciences bureaucracy has long been recognised as a major branch 
(Gouldner, 1954).  
Max Weber is known for development of more comprehensive concept of 
‗bureaucracy‘ along with its characteristics. The roots of Weber‘s concept of 
bureaucracy are in his study of authority. In his effort to explain as to why people 
have obeyed their rulers in history, he identified three ‗ideal-types‘ of authorities, 
i.e. traditional, charismatic and legal-rational (Stillman, 2000). The last form of 
authority, i.e. legal-rational which is based on ―a belief in the legitimacy of the 
pattern of the normative rules and the rights of those elevated to authority under 
such rules to issue commands‖ (ibid. pp. 51) also provides the foundation to the 
concept of Weber‘s bureaucracy. Unlike traditional and charismatic authority 
where power remained with the personalities, this form of authority gives the 
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power to ‗office‘ and not to ‗person‘, so any person who occupies the office can 
exercise the power ‗according to rules‘. Hence, ―obedience is owed to a legally 
established, impersonal set of rules, rather than to a personal ruler‖ (ibid. pp.55). 
According to Weber, knowledge was the basis of exercising control in an 
administrative function. Due to its rational-legal structure Weber promoted 
bureaucracy as most effective and effective organisational form which ensures the 
acceptable behaviour both on seniors and juniors part according to the established 
hierarchy.  
As noted by Meier and Hill (2005 pp. 52); Pollitt (2009); Wren (1994) and 
Watson (2003) the basic characterises of bureaucracy Weber provided were:  
i. The labour is divided according to their authority and responsibility  
ii. Functions and tasks are performed in a hierarchal manner from top to 
bottom to ensure the chain of command 
iii. Any communication or orders travel through the hierarchy (up or down) 
without escaping any step. 
iv. The workers are selected according to their technical expertise after 
passing test or on the basis of training or education 
v. The workers are selected, not elected. 
vi. The workers are paid according to their place in the hierarchy and they are 
career officials 
vii. The positions are not owned by the office holders 
viii. The official working is done through written files to record the 
proceedings 
ix. The decisions and judgments are made on merit with any partiality, 
emotions and prejudice. 
Based upon these characteristics, Weber claimed technical superiority of 
bureaucracy over other forms of organisations. According to him: 
―Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type 
of administrative organisation—that is, the monocratic variety of 
bureaucracy— is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of 
attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the 
most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings. It 
is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of 
discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high 
degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organisation and for 
those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in intensive 
efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of 
applications to all kinds of administrative tasks‖. (Weber, 1978, pp. 223, 
cited in Gajduschek, 2003) 
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Hence, he claimed bureaucracy as the most efficient form of organisation to 
accomplish administrative tasks (Weber, 1978; Heugens, 2005). He also claimed 
bureaucracy ―among the social structures which are hardest to destroy‖ (Weber, 
1978, pp. 987).  Emphasising further, Weber said precision, speed, clarity of 
command, accord, and economy were the technical advantages of this form. In his 
words: 
―The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has 
always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of 
organization. The fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with 
other organizations exactly as does the machine with non-mechanical 
modes of production. Precision, speed, certainty, knowledge of the files, 
continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and 
material and personal costs—these are raised to the optimum point in the 
strictly bureaucratic administration, and especially in its monocratic form.‖ 
(Weber, 1978, p. 973) 
Weber himself realised that the tendency of Bureaucracy to impose excessive 
control on employees will be similar to putting them in ‗iron cage‘, in his own 
term (Weber, 1978).   
A number of scholars (Merton, 1957; Gawthrop, 1969; Perrow, 1972; Jaques, 
1992; Wren, 1994; Robbins, 2003; Du Gay, 2005) has extended arguments in 
support of Weber‘s concept of bureaucracy. Amongst the early work done by 
Robert King Merton in 1957 through his book ‗Social theory of social structure‘ 
he praised the work of Weber. He advocated the concepts of authority, hierarchy, 
rules and merit at the workplace. Wren (1994), while highlighting the importance 
of legal authority wrote: 
―rational-legal must provide the basis for a bureaucracy, since it (1) 
provided a basis for continuity of administration; (2) was rational, that is 
the member occupying the administrative office was chosen on the basis 
of competence to perform the duties; (3) provided the leader with a legal 
means for exercising authority; and (4) clearly defined and carefully 
delimited all authority to the functions necessary to accomplish the 
organisation‘s task‖ (pp. 196). 
Joining Merton and Wren, Gawthrop (1969, pp. 8) argued three interrelated 
advantages of bureaucracy i) bureaucracy brings simplification to complex tasks 
by subdividing the tasks on the basis of specialisation, ii) this subdivision and 
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specialisation ensure quality and efficiency, iii) and this subdivision of tasks at 
various levels the decision making is made more objective and impersonal. Jaques 
(1992) stressing the importance of bureaucracy notes,  
―With 35 years of research have convinced me that managerial hierarchy is 
the most efficient, the hardiest, and in fact the most natural structure ever 
devised for large organisations. Properly structured, hierarchy can release 
energy and creativity, rationalize productivity and actually improved the 
morale.‖ (pp. 382).  
He also re-validates Weber‘s stance that for large organisations bureaucracy is the 
most suitable structure. His emphasis is on better understanding of managerial 
hierarchy rather than a quest for a new form of organisation (ibid. pp. 382-383). 
Perrow (1972) recommended the bureaucratic approach for straightforward tasks 
being performed in stable environments requiring standardisation and precision 
(pp. 40-44). Lorsch (1992, pp. 322-323) argued another advantage of the 
managerial hierarchy is optimum coordination between the functions and units. 
Robbins (1990) while talking in favour of the characteristics of the bureaucracy 
pointed: 
―We can single out the attempt to eliminate the use of irrelevant criteria for 
choosing employees; the use of tenure to protect employees against 
arbitrary changes in skill demands, and declining ability; the establishment 
of rules and regulations to increase the likelihood that employees will be 
treated fairly and to create stability over time; and the creation of a vertical 
hierarchy to ensure that clear lines of authority exist, that decisions are 
made, and accountability over decision is maintained.‖ (pp. 311) 
Responding to scholars who claimed the demise of the bureaucracy or 
absoluteness of its structure he argued that still bureaucracies are everywhere. For 
most private and public sector organisations bureaucratic structure still provides 
the most efficient way to organize. Robbins (2003) has strongly argued that: ―In 
spite of some changes, bureaucracy is alive and well in many venues. It continues 
to be a dominant structural form in manufacturing, service firms, hospitals, 
schools and colleges, the military and voluntary associations. Why? Because it‘s 
still the most efficient way to organize large-scale activities‖ (pp. 444).   
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While Weber‘s concept of bureaucracy was supported by many it was also 
questioned and criticised by several academic scholars, i.e. Merton (1940, 1952), 
Bennis (1965), Mouzelis (1967), Fergouson (1985), Blau and Meyer (1987), 
Johansen and Swigart (1994).  They questioned the concepts from almost all 
possible directions, i.e. authority, ration-legal, rules, discipline, hierarchy, 
efficiency and economy.  
One of the frequently raised criticisms on the Weber‘s bureaucracy is on his 
claims of ‗ideal-type‘ or ‗fully developed‘. Scholars contending it said that 
Weber‘s own idea of bureaucracy lacks many social and political dimensions and 
no such thing as ‗ideal-type‘ exists. However, Weber fully recognised this fact 
and he proposed it as an analytic concept. On this Blau and Meyer (1987) argued: 
―Weber‘s writings on bureaucracy present what he termed an ‗ideal type‘. 
This is a methodological construct, a device used by Weber to generalize 
about the bureaucratic form of organization. It does not represent an 
average of all existing bureaucracies (or other social structures) but a pure 
type, derived by abstracting the most characteristic bureaucratic aspects of 
all known organizations. Since perfect bureaucratization is never fully 
realized, no existing organization precisely fits the ideal type.‖ (pp. 25). 
Another limitation of Weber‘s concept of bureaucracy appears as his focus on the 
formal elements of the organisation i.e. rules and ignores informal elements of the 
organisation. Barnard (1979) defined informal organisation as ―the aggregate of 
the personal contacts and interactions and the associated grouping of people‖ (pp. 
115). Highlighting its importance he asserts that ―informal organizations are 
necessary to the operation of formal organizations as a mean of communication, 
of cohesion, and of protecting the integrity of the individuals‖ (ibid. pp. 123). 
These informal organisational structures that evolve amongst employees to 
maintain the practice have also been illuminated by Anselm Strauss (1978) 
through his theory of ‗negotiated order‘. Hummel (2007) extending the Barnard‘s 
argument resembled the bureaucrats with mechanistic technicians as they are free 
from all human characteristics of emotions, society and humanity. Bodley, (2003) 
argued that organisational identity replaces the human identity, character and will 
(pp. 75). In this way human surrenders their personal judgments, feelings in 
favour of rules and instructions. Consequently, they also, in Hummel‘s term start 
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dealing with ‗cases‘ instead of ‗human beings‘ (Hummel, 2007, pp. 28). Thus, he 
saw the bureaucracy and society as polar-opposite and argued that ―all attempts to 
humanize relationships between a bureaucracy and society must therefore be 
considered as suicidal or window-dressing when they come from within 
bureaucracy itself, and as declaration of war when they originate in society‖ (ibid. 
pp. 41). However, du Gay (2000) defending it argued that bureaucracy is 
necessary if you have to allocate scarce resources. Also, one can‘t do this fairly 
unless he/she recognises that the person in front of him isn‘t the only one in need, 
therefore some sort of criteria are needed in order to judge the importance of need. 
Robert Merton (1940, pp. 562) analysing the structure raised concerns on career 
structure, rules, similar work conditions and impersonality. Commenting on 
graded career structure his concerns were that it may encourage the bureaucrats to 
cross expected lines of discipline, discretion and process. Furthermore, he argued 
that the bureaucracy will create a group of people whose internal conflict may be 
less due to its rule of seniority based promotion, but it will form a self-serving 
behaviour which will resist the change and cause conflict with citizens (ibid, pp. 
565).  
So much so that Warren Bennis (1965) concluded that: 
―It is my premise that bureaucratic form of organization is becoming less 
and less effective; that it is hopelessly out of joint with contemporary 
realities; that new shapes, patterns, and models are emerging which 
promise drastic changes in the conduct of operations and managerial 
practices in general.‖ (pp. 31).  
He thought this transformation will be made between 25-50 years. After 
explaining the concept of bureaucracy, its ‗ideal-type‘ and characteristics from 
Weber‘s point of view, exploring its praises and dysfunctions by various scholars, 
now I will explain its argued replacement of NPM. 
3.4 Understanding New Public Management (NPM) 
Hood (1991) argues that the doctrine of NPM has emerged from the bureaucratic 
administrative reform agenda followed by many OECD countries at the end 1970. 
The seven components of NPM doctrine he narrated are (pp. 4-5): 
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i. Hands-on professional management in the public sector 
ii. Explicit standards and measures of performance 
iii. Greater emphasis on output controls 
iv. Shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector 
v. Shift to greater competition in public sector 
vi. Stress on private- sector styles of management practice 
vii. Stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use 
Hood (1991) argues that NPM is a result of marriage between the sets of two 
converging ideas i.e. new institutional economics and managerialism. First 
partner, new institutional economics is derived from the public choice theory 
(PCT) and principal agent theory (PAT) based on the work of Arrow (1963) and 
Niskanen‘s (1971) revolutionary theory of bureaucracy. Contrary to the traditional 
concept of bureaucracy where the emphasis is on the hierarchy and elimination of 
duplication, new institutional economics facilitated the wave of administrative 
reforms based on the concepts of user choice, transparency and incentive structure 
(Hood, 1991; Ostrom, 1974). The second partner managerialism emerged from 
the traditions of scientific management movement which placed technical 
expertise as less important to professional management (Hume, 1981; Pollitt, 
1990).  Managerialism generated a set of portable (Martin, 1983) professional 
management practices based on trusting the manager‘s abilities with a free hand to 
achieve results and create appropriate cultures (Peters and Waterman, 1982) for 
better organisational performance. It appears as the reforms in developed 
countries were primarily motivated by the second partner, while in the financially 
struggling developing countries the first partner was the main motivator of PSR. 
As argued by (Zifcak, 1994; Greer, 1994; Kettle, 1997) the PSR in the western 
countries is driven by the changes on the economic, social, political, technological 
fronts. Whereas, in developing countries PSR is being used as driving force to 
motivate economic, social and technological changes.  
Hood (1991) highlighted that many academic commentators have associated the 
rise of NPM with the political rise of the ‗New Right‘. Signifying this Farnham 
and Horton (1993) asserted that NPM influenced managerialism ―was a distinctive 
element in the policies of the New Right towards the public services‖ (pp. 47).  
George and Wilding (1992) explaining the central idea behind the New Right 
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declared the ―freedom, individualism and inequality‖ as the fundamental social 
values (pp. 19). Larbi (1999) argues that the crisis in the developed countries 
caused by the Keynesian policies of welfare state turned them to ―search for 
alternative ways of organizing and managing public services and redefining the 
role of the state to give more prominence to markets and competition, and to the 
private and voluntary sectors‖ (pp. 2). Explaining it further, he puts it, ―The 
Keynesian paradigm was confounded with stagflation, and this led to the 
ascendancy of the monetarist alternative. This paradigmatic shift meant that the 
market economy was best left to correct itself without active government 
intervention‖ (p 2). A number of New Right theorists (i.e. Friedman, 1960; 
Hayek, 1960) criticised the Keynesian policies of economic management and 
huge expenditures on public welfare. George and Wilding (1992) argued that the 
basic reservations of these critics were that since the public services do not face 
any competition, therefore they are inefficient, costly and cluttered by 
bureaucracy as well as this limits the individual‘s options of choice. 
In the advanced industrialised countries the fashion of NPM is commonly 
associated with the dominance of neo-liberal governments in the 1980s, in 
particular with the Thatcher regime in UK and the managerialist reforms in New 
Zealand and Australia. However, in the United States (US) the momentum of 
NPM-type reforms was set after the publication of a landmark study of Osborne 
and Gaebler (1992) named ‗Reinventing Government‘. In this study, the authors 
presented the case of an entrepreneurial government to make it more efficient and 
effective. Through their seminal work they argued that the Government should 
‗row‘ instead of ‗steer‘. By which they maintained that the Government should 
concentrate on supervision rather than direct provision. They saw such reforms as 
an enabler to create ‗entrepreneurial governance‘ and presented 10 essential 
elements of reinventing the public sector: 
―Entrepreneurial governments promote competition between service 
providers. They empower citizens by pushing control out of the 
bureaucracy, into the community. They measure the performance of their 
agencies, focusing not on inputs but on outcomes. They are driven by their 
goals – their missions – not by their rules and regulations. They redefine 
their clients as customers and offer them choices – between schools, 
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between training programmes, between housing options. They prevent 
problems before they emerge, rather than simply offering services 
afterwards. They put their energies into earning money, not simply 
spending it. They decentralize authority, embracing participatory 
management. They prefer market mechanisms to bureaucratic 
mechanisms. And they focus not simply on providing public services but 
on catalyzing all sectors – public, private and voluntary – into action to 
solve their community‘s problems‖ (Ibid. pp. 19-20).  
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) argued that bureaucratic organisations increasingly 
fail us because extremely flexible and adaptable institutions are needed, ―that lead 
by persuasion and incentives rather than commands; that give their employees a 
sense of meaning and control, even ownership‖ (pp. 15). Massey (1999) said that 
NPM style reforms are aimed at reducing the size of the public sector and 
reorienting the focus of public sector organisations away from their old 
bureaucratic producer-dominance mode to a new customer qua citizen mode. 
Minogue (1998) argued that such reforms being undertaken as part of the 
worldwide quest towards greater efficiency and cost savings which is said to be 
the driving force of the NPM. With its emergence as a response to the global 
economic malaise and the need to tackle the high costs associated with public 
services, NPM offered the promise of improvements in administrative efficiency 
and performance through the introduction of market-type conditions and ideas 
(MacCarthaigh, 2012). Pollitt (1990) also asserts that the ideological thought 
system was based on importation of ideas from private to public sector. 
Summarizing it, Larbi (2003) argued that NPM is a trend of responses by various 
countries in different stages of: ―Rethinking and reshaping government and its 
role; Restructuring and repositioning organisations; Redesigning and improving 
service delivery; reforming systems of performance and accountability; and 
Revitalising human resource capacity and organisational performance‖ (pp. 2-3).  
The following table is extracted from the work of Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) 
which compares both the organisational models against each other:  
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Table 3: Comparison between old Public Administration and NPM 
Criteria Old Public Administration New Public Management 
1. Primary theoretical 
and epistemological 
foundations: 
Political theory, social and 
political commentary 
augmented by naïve social 
science. 
Economic theory, more 
sophisticated dialogue based 
on positivist social science. 
2. Prevailing 
rationality and 
associated models 
of human 
behaviour: 
Synoptic rationality, ―admin-
istrative man‖. 
Technical and economic 
rationality, ―economic man‖ 
or the self-interested 
decision maker. 
3. Conception of the 
public interest: 
Politically defined and ex-
pressed in law. 
Represents the aggregation 
of individual interests. 
4. To whom are 
public servants 
responsive? 
Clients and constituents. Customers. 
5. Role of 
government: 
Rowing (designing and 
implementing policies 
focusing on a single, 
politically defined objective). 
Steering (acting as a catalyst 
to unleash market forces). 
6. Mechanisms for 
achieving policy 
objectives: 
Administering programmes 
through existing government 
agencies. 
Creating mechanisms and 
incentive structures to 
achieve policy objective 
through private and non-
profit agencies. 
7. Approach to 
accountability: 
Hierarchical – administrators 
are responsible to demo-
cratically elected political 
leaders. 
Market-driven – the 
accumulation of self-
interests will result in 
outcomes desired by broad 
groups of citizens/ customers 
8. Administrative 
discretion: 
Limited discretion allowed 
administrative officials. 
Wide latitude to meet entre-
preneurial goals. 
9. Assumed 
organizational 
structure: 
Bureaucratic organizations 
marked by top-down author-
ity within agencies and con-
trol or regulation of clients. 
Decentralized public organi-
zations with primary control 
remaining within the 
agency. 
10. Assumed 
motivational basis 
of public servants 
and administrators: 
Pay and benefits, civil service 
protections. 
Entrepreneurial spirit, ideo-
logical desire to reduce the 
size of government. 
Source: adopted & amended from Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000, pp. 554. 
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Pollitt and Summa (1997) conceptually bundles the NPM in two groups: first 
group comprises of ideas regarding management improvement and restructuring 
and second group underlines the competition and the role of the market. Larbi 
(2003) in his work identified main themes of NPM in action and also categorised 
them in these two groups. The following table is extracted from his work to 
explain these themes in practice for clearer understanding: 
Table 4: The two streams of NPM in action 
Ideas / themes of NPM 
Managerial and Structural 
(Managerialism) 
Markets and Competition 
(New Institutional Economics) 
 Creation of function-wise 
specialised agencies to replace 
huge bureaucracies i.e. separation 
of policy and operation functions. 
These offices will have contractual 
arrangements with parent 
ministries, e.g. executive agencies 
in the UK. 
 Introduction of flatter, flexible and 
more responsive structures around 
specific processes e.g. licensing 
instead of long hierarchies and 
traditional functions e.g. finance.  
 Separating function of funding and 
provisioning of goods and 
services. Which means it is not 
necessary that if the government is 
providing the funds it will also 
provide the services i.e. private 
sector can be invited.  
 Decentralising authority by 
allowing managers to manage with 
clear responsibility.  
 Decentralising financial control to 
allow managers thinking about 
other efficient methods of service 
provisioning.  
 Tighter budgets and transparent 
financial controls. 
 Shift from input to output-
orientation.  
 Contracting-out: Provisioning of 
goods and services through contracts 
with private providers after fair 
competitive bidding process. 
 Internal Market: Segregating 
contractors into feasible sized 
agencies to allow competition 
amongst them. This open‘s the more 
options for user‘s choice. 
 Vouchers: or Coupons are given to a 
service provider by the service user 
instead of direct funding to them. 
Hence, best service providers get 
more service users and also more 
vouchers or coupons to reclaim the 
amount from the Government.  
 User charges or a fee: Putting a price 
on public service. In this case the 
government may shares or refund fee 
to the user. This is done to promote 
more responsive behaviour on the 
side of the consumer.  
 Emphasis on quality: by reorienting 
the traditional role from ‗user‘ to 
‗client‘. This gives a voice to 
customers that shape service 
provision. 
 Changing employment relations: by 
offering short contracts instead of 
lifelong employment, monetised 
incentives, pay for performance, 
negotiated pay. 
Source: Adopted from Larbi, 2003 
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From the above discussion, it is evident that the emphasis of the NPM - type 
reforms is twofold: on one hand, they are changing the role (what it does) of 
public sector and on the other hand they are focusing the functioning (how it does) 
of the public sector. Regarding the role it is being argued that the government 
should promote competition and let the market flourish. While in term of 
functioning it is emphasised that the focus should be on efficient in term of costs, 
effective in term of improved service provisioning and responsive by giving 
greater say to citizens as customers.  
Reverting back to the point of steering and rowing made by Osborne and Gaebler 
(1992) it can be understood that new role demanded by the government is a policy 
making alone rather than its traditional double role of policy making and service 
delivery. Making such radical change in the public sector itself brings a great 
challenge to the reformers. Even, the advanced industrialised countries like UK, 
USA and Australia with strong political support and strong institutional capacity 
have found this transformation quite challenging (Bangura, 2000; Kickert, 1997). 
This task becomes even daunting when the developing countries aim to reorganise 
the structure and functioning of its public sector with prevalent capacity
11
 
problems (Bangura and Larbi, 2006). Schick (1998) argued against the use of 
NPM in developing countries due to missing of rule-based governments and 
robust judiciary. Hughes and Teicher (2004) argued that use of NPM principles 
can create more complexity in developing countries. Many scholars, including 
Grindle (1997) and Batley and Larbi (2004) have argued that for the successful PS 
reforms an effective state is a prerequisite for which its capacity building is sine-
qua-non. Batley (1999) argued that ―There has been considerable research on the 
difficult process of adjustment, but little on the capacity of governments to 
manage the consequences, little on the outcome of reforms‖ (pp. 756).   
3.5 The Governance approach to build state capacity  
The entrepreneurial approach was criticised mainly on the premise that the main 
difference between a business and a people's representative government remains 
                                                            
11 For more detail review on capacity and public sector reforms success see Grindle and 
Hilderbrand (1995), Heredia and Scheider (1998) and Franks (1999) 
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the welfare of the state and the nation instead of profit or income. Therefore, the 
main concern of any government is the national social and economic development 
through effective planning and implementation. Hence pendulum started trying to 
get the midpoint of a capable government in-between the debates of too much 
government and too little government. To balance this argument, and 
acknowledge the importance of the state in development along with market 
economies, the notion of good governance was introduced so that it can satisfy the 
criticism of political right, centre or left. As noted by Grindle (2010): 
―Despite some differences in the definition, the idea of good governance 
has also resonated across a wide political spectrum. For those on the 
political right, good governance has meant order, rule of law, and the 
institutional conditions for free markets to flourish. For those on the 
political left, good governance incorporates notions of equity and fairness, 
protection for the poor, for minorities, and for women, and a positive role 
for the state. For many others found along the continuum from right to left, 
the concept is attractive for its concern about order, decency, justice, and 
accountability.‖ (pp. 2). 
The World Bank (1992) provides a brief and a narrow definition of  governance as 
―the manner in which power is exercised in the management of the country‘s 
economic and social resources‖ (pp. 1). However, the updated version of the 
World Bank report (1994) provides a comprehensive and broad definition that: 
―Good governance is epitomized by predictable, open, and enlightened 
policymaking (that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy imbued with a 
professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; 
and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the 
rules of law‖ (pp. vii). The above conception of good governance clearly suggests 
emphasis on improving public sector management. A number of scholars (Lynn, 
1998, 2006; Terry, 1998; Peters and Pierre, 1998) have argued that NPM and 
Reinventing Government have put the Governance theory in practice. Minogue et 
al., (1997) asserts the good governance and the new managerialism as twin 
outcomes. Chalker (1993) presented that the good governance agenda, not only 
include accountability of the public sector, but also creating an enabling 
environment for the private sector. 
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As argued above NPM type reforms are implemented to change the role of 
government and import the private sector practices in the public sector to increase 
its performance through managerialism. The core idea of managerial reforms is 
that the government should give broad discretion to managers to ‗let managers 
manage‘ and hold them accountable against results. This involves decentralisation 
and delegation of authority about all resources from the centre to the operational 
level. But before letting managers manage, it is crucial to reach at an agreement as 
to what is expected, against what targets these results will be measured and also 
what will be the financial / performance auditing parameters (The World Bank, 
2000). Even the developed countries during the decentralised management 
reforms faced the capacity problem. As the prerequisites for such efforts are 
operational monitoring, inspection and information systems, firm budgetary 
control systems, development of reliable performance indicators and 
measurement, and capacity to manage them (Bangura, 2000; Larbi 1999). Kickert 
(1997) argued that the Netherlands faced such challenges in mid-1990s as the 
most elementary mechanisms for supervision, inspection and monitoring were 
absent from many agencies. Bangura (2000) reports that New Zealand reform also 
faced the challenges of strategic capacity in mid-1990s.  
However, in developing countries this problem is much more worsening as 
Grishankar (2001) notes ―Weak capacity is an acute problem in many developing 
countries. In many low-income countries, civil servants are not equipped with 
even basic complementary inputs such as stationery, furniture, computers, and 
other specialized technology to carry out their day-to-day tasks‖ (pp. 7). Even 
then, many developing countries have adopted the NPM type reforms, but have 
fallen into the trap of corruption and abuse as the basic PS institutions, i.e. ―rule of 
law, an independent judiciary, sturdy property rights, a formal civil service system 
based on merit and rules, proper and efficient use of public funds, and robust 
internal controls‖ (ibid, pp. 33) are not sufficiently developed. Olukoshi (1999) 
argued that in an attempt to introduce the NPM influenced managerial reforms in 
the Nigerian civil service during 1988 resulted in intensified corruption. Also a 
number of examples of gross abuses can be quoted, i.e. Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe, 
Mongolia, Ghana or Nigeria (Larbi, 1999; Bangura 2000; Ayee, 1994).  
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The emergence of the 21
st
 century also brought the challenge of globalisation, 
which further impetus for governance reforms. This literally put countries against 
each other. It was argued by the IFIs that winning countries can improve the 
wellbeing of their citizens through markets, trade, investment and exchange. 
However, this called for a capable state which can nurture and create markets that 
promote competition, act against collusion and monopolistic practices, supply 
opportunities information to all participants, transparently set the rules of the 
game, protect and guarantee property rights and provide fair, equitable and speedy 
adjudication mechanism.  The prerequisite for performing these functions were 
enhanced capacity, competency and responsiveness of the state institutions along 
with upgraded rules, enforcement mechanisms, organisational structures and 
incentives.  
The IFIs also links the capacity building initiatives with the efforts of poverty 
reduction. They argue that reducing poverty in the world's poorest countries 
fundamentally depends on a substantial effort from the countries themselves, 
especially in implementing reforms needed to improve economic performance. 
But unfortunately, poor countries often lack the capacity to implement needed 
reforms or even to make the best possible use of foreign assistance. It suggests as 
if the good government is promoted when policies are formulated and 
implemented by competent public servants, the public organisations perform their 
work effectively, and fair and authoritative rules for economic and political 
interaction are regularly observed and enforced. As Grindle (1997) argues 
―Getting good government means, among other things, efforts to develop human 
resources, strengthening organizations, and reform (or recreate) institutions in this 
sector‖ (pp. 8).  
Considering this, the next steps taken by the IFIs were towards the institutional 
development and capacity building of these crisis states under governance agenda 
to increase its efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness and create an enabling 
environment for such reforms. Similarly, Lamb (1994) assert that the PSR is an 
integral part of the donor funded prescription for good governance and the World 
Bank (2000) acknowledges this ―Indeed, institution-building components exist in 
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almost all Bank loans‖ (pp. ii). This report further says that institutional 
development is essentially synonymous with capacity building which is sometime 
used interchangeably with institutional reform. 
A number of scholars, including Grindle and Hilderbrand (1995), Grindle (1997), 
Franks (1999), Levy (2007) and the World Bank (2005) suggest that the public 
sector capacity building needs to address on the following three dimensions: 
Table 5: Dimensions of public sector capacity 
D
im
en
si
o
n
s Levy, 2007 The World 
Bank, 2005 
Franks, 
1999 
Grindle, 
1997 
Grindle and 
Hilderbrand, 
1995 
1
. 
H
u
m
a
n
 
Individual‘s 
capacity to 
provide 
service 
Individuals 
with the skills 
to analyse 
development 
needs; design 
and implement 
strategies, 
policies, and 
programs; 
deliver 
services; and 
monitor results 
Human 
resource 
development 
Supply of 
professional 
and 
technical 
personnel 
The capacity 
of the public 
servants 
2
. 
O
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
Administrati
ve and 
Financial 
capabilities 
Groups of 
individuals 
bound by a 
common 
purpose, with 
clear objectives 
and the internal 
structures, 
processes, 
systems, 
staffing, and 
other resources 
to achieve them 
Strengthenin
g of 
managerial 
systems 
Managemen
t systems to 
improve 
performance 
of specific 
tasks and 
functions; 
micro-
structures  
The 
organisational 
structure, 
resources, 
process and 
style of 
management 
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3
. 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
l 
National 
checks and 
balances on 
institutions 
The formal 
―rules of the 
game‖ and 
informal 
norms—for 
example, in 
collecting 
taxes, reporting 
on the use of 
public 
resources, or 
regulating 
private 
business— that 
provide the 
framework of 
goals and 
incentives 
within which 
organizations 
and people 
operate. 
Creation of 
enabling 
environment 
along with 
suitable 
legal and 
policy 
frameworks 
Creation of 
enabling 
environment 
and 
institutional 
development 
- The action 
environment 
of the 
country, i.e. 
Socioeconomi
c and Lego-
Political 
- The 
institutional 
environment, 
i.e. the rules 
and 
procedures 
along with 
financial 
autonomy 
 
The first dimension is related to capacity aspects of public servants - the skills, 
experience and knowledge that are vested in the people. It is often argued that the 
capacity of public servants in the developing countries is justifiably low. This not 
only adversely affects policy making, but also service provisioning. Grindle 
(1997) asserts that the aim of such initiatives is to develop human resources so 
that they can fulfil their responsibilities efficiently and effectively. For this 
improvement he suggested enhanced training, appropriate salaries, better working 
conditions and improved recruitment process as the activities which needs to 
concentrate upon (pp. 9). Frank (1999) argues that this is performed through 
adding and polishing skills, expanding knowledge and improving attitudes. The 
generic actions to build human capacity includes: education, trainings, workshops, 
seminars. Furthermore, Grindle (1997) suggests that interventions to improve 
human resource development (HRD) are aimed at recruiting and retaining talented 
employees while ensuring competitive salary structures and improved working 
conditions.  
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The second dimension of capacity building is organisational capacity. Grindle 
(1997) argues that parallel to human capacity building, the enhanced 
organisational capability to utilise them effectively is mandatory. He suggested 
improved rules of game for economic and political regimes coupled with policy 
and legal changes and constitutional reform. Franks (1999) described three 
important aspects of the institutional capacity building: enabling policies, 
legislative framework, and the financial structure. The organisational capacity 
building initiatives are also in line with the NPM type reform programmes. The 
usual issues addressed under this include: improved incentive system, effective 
utilisation of human resources, improved managerial structures, improved 
communication and healthy organisational culture (Grindle, 1997; Franks 1999).   
The third dimension of public sector capacity is institutional. The institutional 
capacity building efforts are aimed at creating a conducive and a stable 
institutional environment for the improved PS functioning. Grindle and 
Hilderbrand (1995) divide it further into two sub-categories: i) the institutional 
environment, i.e. the rules and procedures along with financial autonomy; and ii) the 
action environment of the country consisting Socioeconomic and Lego-political. 
According to North (1990) and Scott (2001) the institutional context consists of 
norms, values and beliefs which shapes the conduct and behaviours of the people. 
It is, therefore, vital to understand what is acceptable in the society, and more 
importantly the mechanism through which the capacity building initiatives are 
being internalised. Such efforts, therefore, should consider the institutional 
context of the society while deciding about the changes and also ensuring 
harmony with the organisational and human dimensions of the capacity. Grindle 
(1997) stressing this point called for ‗good-fit‘ capacity building initiatives after 
due consideration to the country specific realities i.e. the history of the PS, social 
and cultural context, rather than a ‗one size fit for all‘ approach. The second 
aspect of action environment consists of country specific fiscal condition, state of 
the civic society and private sector, political stability and judicial system. The 
results of the Grindle and Hilderbrand (1995) study of eight developing countries 
reported that the action environment as one of the critical contributing factors for 
poor or better public sector performance. In their conclusion they argued that 
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public sector performance cannot be improved until basic conditions of the 
economic development, political commitment, and social stability are not put in 
place. Highlighting this, Grindle (1997) said ‖the development of legal systems, 
policy regimes, mechanisms of accountability, regulatory frameworks, and 
monitoring systems that transmit information about and structure the performance 
of markets, governments, and public officials‖ (pp. 19). 
3.6 Summary 
Max Weber conceptualised in the early 1900s bureaucracy as the most effective 
and efficient organisational form due to the bureaucratic rational-legal structure 
provided the basis for stable and predictable behaviour on the part of both 
subordinates and superiors. In this model, the behaviour of subordinates is 
rendered reliable through the division of labour, the specification of role, and the 
clarity of hierarchical authority. Bureaucratic institutions, dominant from above a 
century are based on rules, hierarchy, impersonality and vision of labour. In early 
1980s, these institutions came under attack due to fiscal crises of governments, 
poor performance of the public sector, stiff bureaucracy, un-accountability, 
corruption, changes in people‘s expectations and better service delivery options. 
Citizens‘ voice, fiscal stress and development of information technology brought 
political leaders to a consensus where they started looking bureaucracy a problem 
and initiated actions to reform its public sector. Hood (1991) captured these 
reform trends under the term ‗New Public Management‘, defining it as a move 
away from centralization and hierarchical consolidation within the public sphere 
towards structural desegregation. In search of efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy the focus of these efforts to transform the administration and 
government was mostly towards the techniques and practices from the market and 
private sector 
Influenced by strong reference of its emergence in the OECD countries, adoption 
in USA and inspired from its results in some East Asian countries, IFIs, in 
response to poor countries‘ request for financial assistance suggested NPM type 
PSR as precondition to replace the existing model of bureaucracy. However, the 
results of these reforms remained unsatisfactory. The biggest challenge identified 
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by the reformers hampering this transformation successfully was the weak 
capacity of the crisis state and its organs, therefore they included the capacity 
building at human, organisational and institutional levels as an integral part of 
these reform attempts. 
The next chapter explains the basic and philosophical assumption, conceptual 
framework and methods I have used for this research and justify them. 
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Chapter 4. Investigating reforms in Pakistan 
public sector 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter, after reviewing the relevant literature, ended by identifying 
a research gap. This chapter explains and justifies the methodology and methods I 
have adopted to investigate the reforms in the case study organisation. It begins by 
explaining the basic assumptions I hold and the criteria of truth and validity. It 
then explains the ethnographic-oriented approach I adopted throughout the thesis. 
After that, I provide the case for a research approach using a reflexive account of 
fieldwork. After that I clarify the ethical issues before providing details of the 
fieldwork. Finally, this chapter ends with a discussion of measures taken to 
maintain research quality. 
4.2 Basic assumptions and criteria of truth and validity 
In this section there will be an examination of the core principles by which 
research has been conducted. My research treats organisations as socially 
constructed phenomena which appear to have an objective reality when patterns of 
actions and meanings are internalised by their members (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966). Also the ‗process relational‘ (Watson 2002) ontology is taken which 
regards social relationships as originators of reality. The process-relational 
perspective ―acknowledges the pluralistic, messy, ambiguous and inevitably 
conflict-ridden nature of work organisations‖ (Watson 2002, pp. 375). This 
attitude pays attention to the relations between individual, human motivation and 
emotions; therefore, this approach helps to analyse the organisational change 
while equally considering the both practical thinking and the complex 
interconnection of emotions, needs and desires of an individual. These ontological 
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assumptions also set the path of related epistemological assumptions. I align 
believe about knowledge with constructionism, as truth or meanings are 
constructed through interactions with the realities. Therefore, I have adopted an 
epistemology of inter-subjectivity and the ontological belief that reality is socially 
constructed and consists of people‘s subjective experiences of the external world. 
My research focuses on the context and people working in the case study 
organisation, as they are the ones who actually have experienced the reforms. 
Reality is an ‗ongoing human production‘ (Berger and Luckmann, 1996). It is 
made by human processes and relationships (becoming ontology). Therefore, I am 
trying to find out about these processes and relationships from people who 
participate in them as well as by using my knowledge as a former insider. Chia 
(1997, 2002) claims that from an epistemological point of view there is a need for 
a robust theory that enables us to develop a more insightful understanding of the 
phenomenon of the organisation. Making sense of human behaviour in 
organisations also requires understanding about social processes, emotions and 
bodily knowledge (Ropo et al., 2002). Instead of analysing organisations as stable 
entities, this line of research identifies itself with the organisational ontology of 
process relational (Watson 2002).  
In this research I use pragmatist criteria of truth and validity, and I regard 
knowledge as a socially constructed artefact which usefully informs action. As 
Watson (2000) argued, pragmatist knowledge claims are non-representational; 
thus, they are not aiming to provide a mirror image of the world. However, by 
using cultural language ―they inevitably talk or write about a reality which is their 
own construction‖ (Watson 2000, pp. 501). However, it is possible to evaluate a 
knowledge claim on account of its ability to empower people to address their 
specific state of affairs. As Joas (1993) says, ―truth is no longer to do with getting 
a correct representation of reality in cognition; rather, it expresses an increase of 
the power to act in relation to an environment‖ (pp. 21). This facilitates judging 
among rival knowledge claims because, as Watson (2000) argues, ―one story is 
truer than another to the extent to which it more effectively guides, practice in 
that, or a similar, setting‖ (pp. 500). As Johnson and Duberley (2000) argued, 
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―justified knowledge is a socially constructed artefact created so as to aid humans 
in their practical endeavours of settling problematic situations‖ (pp. 159). 
4.3 About the ethnographically-oriented approach I adopted  
Through the use of an ethnographically-oriented approach (Humphreys and 
Watson, 2008) I have investigated the changing social realities in the case study 
organisation.  I used both the pillars of participant observation and interviews of 
this approach to understand and describe this reality that explains the totality of 
the changing organisation and social relationships. The data were gathered 
considering the organisation as part of the society to which they belong, not 
separate, as the intended output of this project is a sociological analysis. 
‗Ethnography‘, in this thesis, is taken as a form of writing and not as a research 
method (Hammersly and Atkinson, 2007) while others have assimilated it with 
participant observation. The working definition of ‗ethnography‘ in this thesis is 
the same as that of Watson (2008): ―a written account of the cultural life of a 
social group, organisation or community which may focus on a particular aspect 
of life in that setting‖ (pp. 100). I see the writing ethnography as ‗wrapping up‘ a 
specific concern within broader attention to a cultural whole (Baszanger and 
Dodier, 2004). Using Baszanger and Dodier‘s (2004) concept of ‗cultural whole‘ I 
am doing a sociological analysis of organisational events and processes; hence, I 
am looking at the employees‘ experience of change in the wider cultural whole of 
case study organisation and Pakistani society.  
The particular techniques of qualitative research I used were semi-structured 
interviews, participant observation and analysis of official and unofficial 
documents. As Rosen (1991) argues, if it is assumed that reality is socially 
constructed, then investigations of reality must include an understanding of the 
knowledge, meanings, assumptions, ideas, values and norms of social actors 
involved in the enactment. Jansen (2008) expresses the importance of researchers‘ 
presence in the field to understand the role of a particular place in the social 
construction of reality. I am a former employee of the Pakistan public sector with 
almost a decade of work experience. Also, as part of this project, I undertook 
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more than three months of dedicated fieldwork which helped me immensely to 
understand the changing phenomena of the organisations.  
The purpose of ethnographic study is bridge the gap between an outsider‘s (etic) 
interpretation of social order and reality and the understandings held by those who 
are under study (emic). Thus, ethnographers ―understand and reproduce the logic-
in-use of the subject on the social scene because that is the material of social life‖ 
(Rock, 2001, pp. 31), attempting to study social experience from within, drawing 
on the concepts used by actors when they interact and create meaningful 
experiences (Denzin 1989). 
Undoubtedly, it‘s an uphill task to understand meanings and knowledge that 
inform the enactment of culture. As Potter and Wetherell (1978) noted, the 
accounts that people give of their actions and understandings are highly context 
dependent and therefore stable meanings cannot be reliably inferred from what 
people say (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000). This challenge gets more daunting 
when an organisational culture is under investigation as Strauss‘s (1978) analysis 
of the negotiated order concludes that the emergent order arises from the interplay 
of both official and unofficial dimensions. However, employees are often 
pressured to portray the image that only official processes are being followed. The 
demand for portray this may require an employee to engage further in unofficial 
processes (Brewer, 2001) during which they use official, or ‗legitimate‘, language 
to conceal unofficial political activity (Atheide and Johnson, 1998). 
Goffman (1959) argues that meanings are often communicated tacitly, through 
behaviour and gestures (Larsen and Schultz, 1990) as well as through oral or 
written communication. People‘s responses are often tacit and embodied through 
movement, gestures, dress and personal artefacts for instance (Elsbach, 2003). 
The organisational, social reality is thus complex and shifting, and meaning is 
frequently conveyed in hints and in tacit ways; thus, participant observation alone 
cannot overcome all problems and the researcher‘s use of methods like surveys or 
formal interviews runs the danger of touching upon the organisation‘s official 
dimension only. On the other hand, an ethnographic approach that consists of 
participant observation gives importance to the actions and accounts of the people 
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under study as they act within the particular social setting (Hammersly and 
Atkinson, 2007; Jorgensen, 1989) and counts the researcher‘s own experience of 
participation as an important and legitimate source of data (Brewer, 2000).  
While intensive participation is an important research method, as Charmaz and 
Mitchell (2001) warn, ―the researcher needs to share experiences, but not 
necessarily viewpoints, with those being studied‖ (pp. 163). Schutz (1964) notes 
that the insiders may not be aware of fundamental beliefs that shapes their culture 
and may consider particular settings as simple as ‗how the world is‘ (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 2007) against the ‗socially produced‘. Mills (2000) observes that 
people generally ignore wider institutional and social structural environment 
while making personal predictions. Therefore, the ethnographer‘s role gets more 
important while analysing the ‗raw materials‘ gathered from participants during 
fieldwork against concepts, theories and methodological assumption (Humphreys 
and Watson, 2008). 
Commenting on the tension between the emic and etic perspectives Patton (2010) 
argued that ―the challenge is to do justice to both perspectives during and after 
fieldwork and to be clear with one‘s self and one‘s audience how this tension is 
managed‖ (pp. 268).  A number of techniques have been identified by researchers 
to lessen the gap between emic and etic perspectives. At the forefront of these are 
participatory research and thick description. I endeavored to strike this balance 
through the notion of thick description (Ryle, 1949) and intensive member 
checking. According to Patton (2010) and Yin (2010) the use of rich descriptions 
coupled with the informants‘ own wording curtails the subjectivity level of the 
researcher in the data analysis process. Also from the start of my abstract data 
analysis (from the second interview) I invited the informants to identify categories 
and themes from the data. Additionally, I shared all interview transcripts with the 
informants for their feedback on my notes. Considering the exclusivity of 
subjective nature of human experience, I found Yin‘s (2010) contention useful 
that the differences between etic and emic views will always prevail. In spite of all 
efforts to address these differences Yin (2010) argued: 
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"researchers cannot in the final analysis avoid their own research lens in 
rendering reality. Thus, the goal is to acknowledge that multiple 
interpretations may exist and to be sure that as much as possible is done to 
prevent a researcher from inadvertently imposing her or his own (etic) 
interpretation onto a participant's (emic) interpretation" (p.12). 
In this project the key social structures (discussed in chapter 1) that influenced 
this public sector organisation were the demand by the reformers to improve their 
functioning by replacing manual systems with computers to bring greater 
efficiency and transparency, to control corruption, to build and renovate buildings 
to provide a more conducive work environment, to improve the capacity of 
employees through increased training and motivating them through enhanced 
perks. In the financially struggling developing world, such PSR are initiated by 
the international development institutions, to replace the existing model of 
bureaucracy as precondition for assistance (Larbi, 1999; Samaratunge et al., 
2008). However, forms of organisational control arsing from social structures 
such as NPM may be taken for granted by people in the field (Jermier, 1998; 
Rosen, 1991). As a result, employees may think differently from the ways 
expected by international strategies aimed at improving the efficiency of the 
public sector. For example people may have found the introduction of IT is 
actually a block to their productivity. Thus, this analysis is set within the context 
of social theory; and, as Rosen (1991) suggested, it will investigate how taken-for-
granted organisational arrangements are socially produced.  
Having discussed the basic assumptions, criteria of truth and validity, and the 
ethnographic oriented approach I have adopted, I will now explain the conceptual 
framework. The conceptual framework was primarily used to prepare the research 
protocol and has tentatively guided the fieldwork of this research, and thus the 
following section explains the research design and fieldwork. 
4.4 Conceptual framework 
As explained in chapters 2 and 3, PSR in developing countries has been initiated 
as a condition of financial assistance by IFIs. Radaelli (2000) argued that 
commonly coercive pressure is used to initiate PSR in developing countries as a 
condition of financial assistance. DiMaggio and Powel (1983) argued that the 
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coercive pressures are ―formal and informal pressures exerted on organisations by 
other organisations upon which they are dependent‖ (pp. 67). The same could be 
observed in the case of Pakistan, where financial assistance is linked with PSR as 
coercive pressure from the IFIs (as discussed in the previous chapter). While at 
the operational level governments entrust its senior PS managers to drive and 
bring about the changes suggested by IFIs, NPM devolves responsibility for 
implementation of reform onto the bureaucrats themselves (MacCarthaigh, 2012). 
These senior PS managers, under the technical guidance of IFIs, lead and set the 
roadmap as per their expertise and implicit contract with their employer (the 
national government) and initiate the reforms in the PS organisations. As I wanted 
to analyse the actual changes to organisational social reality related to the 
introduction of the new reorganisation initiatives, therefore, I used Strauss‘s 
(1978) concept of the ‗negotiated order‘ (as discussed above), and consider the 
individual employment relationship using the concepts of the implicit contract.  
This whole reform process involves multiple human interpretations who conceive 
them as per their own meanings to the world. Berger and Luckmann‘s 
conceptualisation enable us to see how people deploy alternative meanings and 
invent new practices in pursuit of their own purposes. As Berger and Luckmann 
(1966) show, people tend to deviate from courses of action designed by others and 
may resist definitions of their situation. However, like all organisational control 
attempts, the attempts to shape behaviour made through the introduction of these 
control attempts will have unintended, as well as intended, consequences 
(Gouldner, 1954). My research therefore is placing the employees of the federal 
tax agency in a central position with regard to their ability to answer the research 
question as to what has been tried to reform; how these reform attempts have 
affected them, their work, organisational functioning; and what the intended and 
unintended consequences of these reforms were. This framework will help me to 
analyse the details of what is happening in the FBR and also to set this within a 
wider understanding of the social and historical context of Pakistan. 
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Source: Author 
4.5 Research Design 
As explained earlier, this study investigates as to what reform actions have been 
taken and what has been their results and consequences to understand why 
Pakistan‘s public sector organisations appear to be resistant to reform and why 
these repeated attempts to reform appear to have had so little impact. In particular, 
it aims to elicit from the managers of a key government agencies ‗insider‘ 
understandings of the impact of these reform interventions. According to Strauss 
and Corbin (1998), qualitative study is ―any type of research that produces 
Figure 2: Graphical representation of conceptual framework 
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findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or other means of quantification‖ 
(pp. 10-11). Reform is not a formula, but a concept which needs to be interpreted 
and acted upon by the individuals within their social and organisational context. 
Therefore, keeping in view the highly subjective, complex and emergent nature of 
the study, a qualitative research method is being used for this investigation. 
According to Creswell (1994), ‗qualitative study‘ ―is an inquiry process of 
understanding a social or human problem, based on building a complex, holistic 
picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants, and conducted 
in a natural setting‖ (pp. 1-2). The goal of qualitative research is to discover 
patterns which emerge after close observation, careful documentation, and 
thoughtful analysis of the research topic. What can be discovered by qualitative 
research is not a generalization, but contextual findings. Creswell (1994, pp. 1-2) 
argues that qualitative research is appropriate when:  
i. The topic needs to be explored, variables cannot be easily identified, 
theories are not available to explain the behaviour of population in study, 
and needs theory development.  
ii. To present a detailed view of the topic.  
iii. To study the individuals in their natural setting. 
This is an exploratory research and it is inductive in nature, with theory 
development arising from the data as well as existing theories. The study employs 
a case study approach to investigate the impact of reforms on the functioning of a 
federal level public sector organisation. As Casey and Lury (1987) have argued, 
the application of an exploratory and inductive approach to the study of 
bureaucracy necessitates a case study approach. However, I chose the case study 
methodology as best suited for this research because, as Yin (2003) argues, this 
method focuses on the uniqueness of individual situations. Case studies can be 
explanatory, descriptive or exploratory. I opted to choose last as, according to Yin 
(1998), ―exploratory case studies are more suitable when the available literature or 
existing knowledge base is poor, offering no clues for conceptual frameworks or 
notably propositions‖ (pp. 236). Case study programme evaluations also are 
recommended when (1) the underlying links between the programme (project) and 
outcome are too complex for identification by surveys or experimental methods, 
(2) path dependence or historical legacy are important to programme (project) 
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efficacy and (3) the role of programme management or administration is critical to 
programme (project) success but the critical characteristics are not captured in a 
survey. 
4.6 Reflexivity: The foundations of the research 
Ely et al. (1991) argued that qualitative research is by nature a reflective and 
recursive process (pp. 179) while Charmaz (2006) and Holloway (1997) argued 
that interpretive research should be reflexive. In this regard, Malterud (2001) said 
"a researcher's background and position will affect what they choose to 
investigate, the angle of investigation, the methods judged most adequate for this 
purpose, the findings considered most appropriate, and the framing and 
communication of conclusions‖ (pp. 483-484). Reflexivity is believed to be 
essential for avoiding dishonesty and bias in the research process. Acknowledging 
that the researcher‘s own experience affects the entire research process, I, as a 
former employee of the case study organisation, present my own account in 
relation to the context of knowledge creation so that the reader can distinguish the 
basis of my construction of meanings through the research process. As Malterud 
(2001) noted: "preconceptions are not the same as bias, unless the researcher fails 
to mention them‖ (pp. 484). 
I worked in Pakistan‘s FBR, for about ten years. The FBR and its subordinate 
departments, namely income tax, customs, central excise and sales tax, administer 
Pakistan‘s federal tax system. Its national importance is indicated by the fact that 
it was one of four key institutions selected to undergo reforms. During this time I 
worked in various positions performing different supporting roles. For about 
seven years I provided services to the reform wing of FBR. I became involved in 
the process during late 1998 when the Special Assistant to the Chairman selected 
me from the Directorate of Research & Statistics (DR&S) to work as a member in 
a special unit – the Special Monitoring Cell (SMC). My inclusion in the cell was 
purely on a technical basis, as I was one of the very few available competent users 
of IT  at that time. The SMC had been created to monitor the revenue collection 
by the then Chairman, Mr. Moinuddin Khan, a Pakistani international banker 
recruited to bring improvements in the tax administration to enhance revenue 
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generation, minimize tax evasion and restore the confidence of genuine taxpayers. 
This effort of bringing improvement to the Pakistani tax system, however, could 
not be sustained due to a political intervention made by the Prime Minister Mr. 
Nawaz Sharif who, on 6 November 1998, suddenly changed the Finance Minister 
and his team, including the Chairman of the CBR. Nonetheless, this initial work 
experience started my journey into the reforms of the organisation. On dissolution 
of the SMC in 1999, the organisation directed me to report back to the DR&S. 
After only a few months I was posted to the new reformed unit Policy & Tax 
Reform (PTR), which later on was renamed Tax Policy & Reforms (TP&R). This 
unit was mandated to lead the reform activities in the CBR. In this wing I was 
supposed to help a senior civil servant working as a middle manager, and I was 
also responsible for helping the organisation to reengineer its business process. 
Here I was again picked by the head of the wing called ‗Member‘ (a rank lower to 
Chairman) to strengthen his office in the area of IT as he was struggling to 
organise his office and keep connected with the new international counterparts, 
like the WB and IMF, whose routine medium of correspondence was electronic 
mail with attached soft files instead of traditional hard copies sent by post. This 
assignment not only made me prominent across the organisation, but also allowed 
great access to information I could have not otherwise have had. 
I enjoyed this work because it enabled me to learn how the organisation worked in 
greater detail. After spending some time in this wing I realised that I had 
previously been in a state of blissful ignorance, unaware of the functioning of the 
public sector and particularly my organisation. Undoubtedly, it was a learning 
time that gave me the opportunity to look deep into the organisation I had been 
working in for several years. This is perhaps due to the very nature of 
departmentalised sort of bureaucratic public sector organisations where everyone 
is individually responsible for his or her desk job and does not encourage their 
employees to think holistically. The more I understood the functioning of the 
FBR, the more interested I became due to its vital national importance and 
massive presence in the country – having, as it does, thousands of offices and over 
thirty thousand employees across Pakistan.  
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My interest in organisational reform started developing soon after I was posted to 
the reform section because of the greater access I had to formal documents and 
proceedings. This position provided me with a unique opportunity to look into the 
entire process of reforms very closely. Through this window of opportunity, I was 
able to see across the entire spectrum and see the process from the national 
government‘s perspective, from the donors‘ point of view and from the 
employees‘ side. As a member of the reform team, and being the closest employee 
to the person leading the entire reform process, I was involved in the process from 
the beginning. In 2001 the IMF‘s report recommended its reforms, reforms which 
were also supported by the in-house report known as the Shahid Hussain 
Committee Report (2001). To formalise the process, a formal approval of 
recommendations was taken from the government in the same year and a 
supervisory council led by the Finance Minister was constituted. In the following 
year funds of USD 2.9 million for project preparation were issued by the WB by 
using which a UK-based international consultancy firm was hired to prepare the 
detailed strategy document and project implementation plan (details in chapter 5).  
As a silent spectator, I saw my seniors dancing like puppets to unfamiliar, alien 
beat and calling it ‗duty‘. This was just what one expected from classic 
bureaucrats tied in chain of command. There were none of us who had the 
experience or expertise to lead the reforms. And the idea of another imported 
Chairman was neither acceptable to the senior bureaucracy working in the FBR 
nor to politicians after the experience of Mr. Moinuddin Khan. Missions and 
recommendations, one after the other, were being received by the FBR from the 
donor agencies to initiate the reforms. Although in practice IFIs like the WB, the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the IMF are collectively known as ‗donor 
agencies‘ in Pakistan; but, strictly speaking, I don‘t believe the term ‗donor‘ 
should be used due to their engagement in the manifold activities like imposing 
the component of technical assistance and earning interest over the loan (the 
sizeable portion of funding). However, for the sake of this thesis, I have used this 
term ‗donor‘ as natives use it. From the recommendations, policy reforms like 
elimination of subsidies and minimisation of the rules relaxation were started 
implementing gradually. However, it was not that easy when it comes to the 
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implementation of recommendation on administrative reforms like reduction of 
discretionary powers, taxpayer facilitation and elimination of corruption, 
minimising customer and client inaction and bringing efficiency through the use 
of IT or reduction in the workforce.  
This idea of prescribed reform was not very welcomed by the FBR employees. At 
all levels they were having corner meetings and gossiping about its implication 
and most of them were criticising it – officers due to fear of compromising their 
position and powers, and officials due to the fear of redundancy. Pakistan‘s public 
service is divided into two main classes of officers and officials. Public servants 
working between grades 17-22 are called ‗officers‘ while public servants who are 
performing their duties between the grades 1-16 are called ‗officials‘. Similarly, 
officials have no powers according to the rules of business as it starts empowering 
officers from grade 17 gradually up to 22. I clearly remember in the start people 
accused the reform wing as being the devil‘s servant and the heart of evil planning 
due to their fears of being made redundant. These sentiments became stronger 
once an incentive of special pay was attached to the people working in the reform 
wing. This incentive, which was an effort of trying to gain more commitment 
from employees through financial rewards to counter act the traditionally slow 
and unresponsive attitude of public servants posted in reform wing, also 
perpetuated jealousy and anger amongst the rest of the employees. This anxiety 
was conveyed by the colleagues directly and indirectly to the members of the 
reform wing. This hostility was conveyed directly in everyday meetings and 
encounters, and it was conveyed indirectly whenever any help was asked by the 
member of reform wing as such request were met with replies like: ―Oh, really? 
The reform wing needs our support?‖ Or, ―You are the high fliers and highly paid 
people, you should do it yourself.‖ This resentment was understandable as by 
virtue of law reform wing employees were equal in position to other public sector 
employees. This priority treatment, however, boosted the morale of people 
working in the reform wing.  
While we, the insiders of reform wing, were equally powerless in policy matters 
as other public sector employees, we were more informed than the other 
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colleagues. Over time, this additional attribute somehow made the people working 
for reform very special and every other employee wanted to have links with them 
so that he/she could remain informed. I was working in the headquarters in 
Islamabad with approximately nine hundred other colleagues. Of those nine 
hundred I known only to a few people before my posting with Member TP&R, 
but soon I started realising that there was hardly a person left in that group of nine 
hundred who was a stranger to me after that. I started receiving smiles and 
handshakes while roaming around in the office as well as numerous intercom and 
phone inquiries about what was happening or was being planned. To my surprise, 
even the people like the Chiefs, Collectors, Commissioners and Directors from 
higher up the chain of command started extending invitations to have tea or lunch 
together knowing my position in the reform wing. This intrinsic reward somewhat 
raised my level of interest in and level of commitment to the reform process. It 
was really a test for me as I was entrusted by my seniors not to reveal classified 
information to anyone while, on the other hand, the majority of my colleagues 
were expecting otherwise. Though mostly I had to narrate lies, I soon realised that 
nobody believed what I was saying even in the instances in which I was sharing a 
truth. When my colleagues realised I was not telling them classified information 
they were disappointed and I became known as Shah Naloo Bota Shah Da 
Wafadar (A person more loyal than the king himself); but strangely the level of 
queries kept increasing, possibly due to the non-participatory approached adopted 
by the Board and also because of people‘s curiosity.  
I remained part of this huge venture for quite a long time during which I 
encountered numerous situations, saw many breakthroughs and witnessed failures. 
My journey ended in a quite disappointing manner when the person leading the 
reforms was faced discrimination based on religious grounds and told that he 
could not proceed to the next level, i.e. to Chairman or Federal Secretary.
12
 
Therefore, he lost his interest in the job. At this position where the only work 
motivation he had was gaining professional recognition in the form of leading the 
organisation he served for almost 35 years – was no longer there. Having his 
loyalty to his country questioned was really disappointing, not only for him, but 
                                                            
12 Member TP&R shared these feelings with the researcher as member of the reform wing.  
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also for the entire reform team. The dejected reform leader, after losing his dream, 
decided to quite this unfair civil service and started applying for work 
internationally. It wasn‘t a daunting task given his extraordinary tax career and 
reform experience. He was well-respected amongst donor agencies and recognised 
as a relatively effective leader. Soon he was asked to lead the reforms of a tax 
agency in a second world country. He accepted the offer and left FBR after taking 
early retirement. Soon after his departure the reforms once again went into the 
hands of inexperienced reformers and status quo bureaucrats. Unfortunately, 
almost at the same time the lead person from the WB Pakistan also made a career 
move and accepted another offer which meant leaving the WB. Even the 
successful initiatives that were well underway started getting halted, which caused 
disappointment to all the reform members. I also started applying for jobs outside 
the public sector and fortunately got employment in the United Nations (UN) and 
then with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). But 
even after four years away from the Pakistani PS the seeds of questions like why 
reforms, how reforms and when reforms always remained stuck somewhere in my 
mind. To find the answers to these questions finally I decided the best would be to 
research the topic under qualified instruction. 
4.7 An overview of fieldwork 
I have based my research on empirical material consisting of interviews, 
participant observation and document analysis (Yin, 1994). May (2011), Punch 
(1998) and Patton (2002) argue that in qualitative research these three are the 
main methods of data collection. In this project the main pillar of data collection 
is the in-depth, semi-structured interviews that took the form of informal 
conversation. As Kvale (1996) describes, their purpose is to obtain qualitative 
descriptions of the life world of the subject with respect to interpretation of their 
meaning. I used these interviews to deepen the understanding of an individuals‘ 
perspectives by giving a sense of the multiple interpretations, as reality is made by 
people‘s interactions. I shall now discuss the each step i.e. sampling, data 
collection, approaching research informants, research ethics etc., involved in the 
fieldwork. 
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4.7.1 Sampling and Interviews 
I used the technique of snowball sampling to extend the sample size, bearing in 
mind the legal constraints of informants and making the process more reliable. 
During the fieldwork, I assured informants that all data would be treated 
confidentially. This is an essential principle in all research, but specifically in 
Pakistan where it is illegal for any government employee to express their views 
about the government‘s actions (Pakistan, 2007). Griffiths and others (1993) 
suggested following criteria of privileged access interviews: a) having contracts or 
can easily develop contact in population, b) having personal experience or 
attributes making none threatening to population, c) socially and educationally 
equipped to collect data. My earlier experience of working in the PS qualified me 
to occupy this role as I am known to many informants and also possess direct 
knowledge of the issues prevailing in Pakistan‘s PS. 
In total, twenty-two open-ended semi-structured interviews were conducted. From 
them twenty were with mid-level public sector employees, including Chiefs, 
Director Generals, Acting General Managers, Directors, Deputy Director 
Generals, Secretaries, Joint Directors, Second Secretaries, Deputy Directors, 
System Analysts and Assistants. And, two donors‘ representatives of ‗specialist‘ 
level to record donor‘s perspective on the issues raised by the research 
participants of the case study organisation. During these interviews, I also felt that 
I should also include the point of view of the donor agencies, the WB and the 
Asian Development Bank, on their funding priorities and monitoring 
mechanisms. This was not part of the original plan. Their inclusion was thought 
appropriate due to some questions and observations that were raised by the 
respondents on their role during my interviews with them. After getting approval 
from my supervisors, I tried to contact the WB, IMF and ADB but only could 
manage to get responses from the WB and ADB. The following table contains the 
complete information about the interviewees: 
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Table 6: Complete list of interviewees 
Respondent 
# 1 
WB 
Sex - Male 
Age - 42 
Education - Masters 
Experience - 16 years 
Level Officer - Specialist 
Respondent 
# 2 
ADB 
Sex - Male 
Age - 44 
Education - Masters 
Experience - 13 years 
Level Officer - Specialist 
Respondent 
# 3 
KML 
Sex - Male 
Age - 42 
Education - Masters 
Experience -18 years 
Level Officer - 19 
Respondent 
# 4 
FM 
Sex - Female 
Age - 48 
Education - Masters 
Experience – 26 years 
Level Officer - 19 
Respondent 
# 5 
SS 
Sex - Male 
Age - 39 
Education - Masters 
Experience - 14 years 
Level Officer - 18 
Respondent 
# 6 
ND 
Sex - Male 
Age - 51 
Education - Masters 
Experience – 29 years 
Level Officer - 20 
Respondent 
# 7 
NA 
Sex - Male 
Age - 40 
Education - Masters 
Experience - 18 years 
Level Officer - 18 
Respondent 
# 8 
UW 
Sex - Male 
Age - 49 
Education - Masters 
Experience - 27 years 
Level Officer -19 
Respondent 
# 9 
HSA 
Sex - Male 
Age - 44 
Education - Masters 
Experience - 22 years 
Level Officer - 18 
Respondent 
# 10 
SP 
Sex - Male 
Age - 55 
Education - Masters 
Experience - 29 years 
Level Officer - 20 
Respondent 
# 11 
YK 
Sex- Male 
Age -51 
Education -Masters 
Experience -32 years 
Level Officer – 20 
Respondent 
# 12 
ARH 
Sex -Male 
Age -48 
Education -Masters 
Experience- 27 years 
Level Officer - 19 
Respondent 
# 13 
SJ 
Sex - Male 
Age - 55 
Education - Masters 
Experience – 31 years 
Level Officer - 19 
Respondent 
# 14 
WA 
Sex - Male 
Age - 44 
Education - Masters 
Experience – 19 years 
Level Officer - 18 
Respondent 
# 15 
GA 
Sex - Male 
Age - 46 
Education - Masters 
Experience - 28 years 
Level Officer - 20 
Respondent 
# 16 
MS 
Sex - Male 
Age - 40 
Education - Bachelors 
Experience - 22 years 
Level Officer - 16 
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Respondent 
# 17 
SA 
Sex - Male 
Age - 38 
Education - Bachelors 
Experience - 18 years 
Level Officer - 16 
Respondent 
# 18 
NQ 
Sex - Male 
Age - 49 
Education – Charted 
Accountant 
Experience - 8 years 
(private sector inductee) 
Level Officer - 20 
Respondent 
# 19 
MS 
Sex - Male 
Age - 53 
Education - Bachelors 
Experience - 27 years 
Level Officer - 16 
Respondent 
# 20 
MZ 
Sex - Male 
Age - 39 
Education - Bachelors 
Experience - 20 years 
Level Officer - 16 
Respondent 
# 21 
SA 
Sex - Male 
Age - 44 
Education - Masters 
Experience - 23 years 
Level Officer - 18 
Respondent 
# 22 
ZK 
Sex - Male 
Age - 46 
Education - Masters 
Experience - 26 years 
Level Officer - 18 
 
Mid-level employees were approached for two reasons: first, getting access to the 
top echelon is often difficult and also they mostly provide policy level guidance 
only, second, getting a hold on mid-level manager is comparatively easy because 
of their abundance and also they are the ones who actually implement the policies 
on the ground. They not only decode the seniors‘ directions, but also roll them out 
practically, hence they are an important part of the negotiated order. Of the 22 
interviews, 17 were recorded on a digital recorder and 5 were written by me 
during interviews. These hand-written 5 interviews were then shared with the 
interviewees to get their agreement on the script I wrote during these interviews. 
These interviewees after reading my manuscript of their replies identified few 
issues of my misunderstanding and made corrections accordingly. These 
suggested changes were carefully incorporated in the responses of these 5 
interviewees.  
 
The interviews ranged from 29 to 101 minutes and the total time of recorded 
interviews is 1,129 minutes. The interviews were recorded in English or Urdu 
languages. In the empirical chapter six, the quotes from both the languages are 
separated with ‗E‘ representing the English language and ‗U‘ denoting Urdu. The 
use of language was selected considering the language-ability and time 
availability of interviewees. To quicken the proceedings where time was an issue, 
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the national language of Urdu was used. To ensure the data quality, like the 
manuscript interviews, English translations of the interviews recorded in Urdu 
were shared with the research informants for their vetting. Participant observation 
and compilation of field-notes also served as sources of primary data collection. 
4.7.2 Participant observation  
According to Bernard (1994) participant observation ―involves getting close to the 
people and making them feel comfortable enough with your presence that you can 
observe and record information about their lives‖ (pp. 136-137). This comfort 
level I was able to gain after a few visits to the organisation as there were many 
moments from my time working there in the past helping me to reconnect with the 
employees of this organisation. In fact, I experienced a dual role and commuted 
between being involved and being detached (Simpson and Tuson, 1995). 
Observation took place throughout the period of fieldwork as I spent almost the 
entire period amongst the employees of the case study organisation, but special 
attention was paid to this aspect when I was conducting the semi-structured 
interviews with them. Here, again, my earlier experience of work in the public 
sector also helped me put my feet in their shoes and quickly picking up the 
gestures, postures, pauses, and emotions etc., of the interviewees and relate them 
with the answers. During the entire period of fieldwork, including the interviews, 
I maintained a field diary containing field notes of my research experience. This 
not only helped me to recall the situations, but also helped me to make sense of 
the experiences and interviews with interviewees.  
4.7.3 Documentary analysis 
May (2011) notes that alongside observational data, documentary analysis 
facilitates the research at two levels:  
―At one level this was introduced as a means of enhancing understanding 
through the ability to situate contemporary accounts within an historical 
context. It could also allow comparisons to be made between the 
observer‘s interpretations of events and those recorded in documents 
relating to those events‖ (pp. 191). 
Secondary data consisting of various official and unofficial documents from both 
government and donor agencies were gathered to deepen the analysis. The main 
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documents analysed during this research are: public reports like Government of 
Pakistan‘s report of National Commission on Government Reforms (NCGR), 
Report of the Task Force on Reform of Tax Administration (TARP), President‘s 
approved Strategy Document, Project Implementation Completion and Results 
Report (PICRR), the Vision 2010 and Vision 2030, the World Bank‘s Project 
Appraisal Document (PAD), Framework for Civil Service Reform in Pakistan. 
Other sources of information include various internal classified reports and 
documents e.g. Project Implementation Plan (PIP) of the FBR, and the reports of 
the various National Commissions / Committees government formed to assess the 
Pakistan‘s administrative problems and suggest changes i.e. Munir, Egger, 
Gladieux, Ahmed, Cornelius, Power, Meer, Haq, Patel, Anwar, Chattah, Pasha, 
Imam, Choudhary and Naqvi. 
In this research this source serves two purposes: I used documents to analyse the 
current reforms within the historical context (chapter 2) and I compared the 
reformers‘ intentions by analysing the documents (chapter 5) in light of the 
interpretations of the reforms provided by people during fieldwork. Scott (1990) 
argued that the documents should be approached by the researchers to extract 
meanings at three levels: intended, received and internal (pp. 34). Foster (1994) 
reminded that the use of documents with respect to organisational research 
―should never be taken at face-value. In other words, they must be regarded as 
information which is context-specific‖ (pp. 149). May (2011) suggests that 
―documents may then be interesting for what they leave out, as well as what they 
contain. They do not simply reflect, but also construct reality and versions of 
event‖ (pp. 199). While analysing the documents collected during fieldwork, I 
considered these precautions proposed by several scholars during data analysis to 
make the product more insightful, objective and reliable. 
4.7.4 Interview protocol 
The interview protocol was comprised of open-ended questions (Appendix A). 
The interview questions were constructed mainly based upon deliberations made 
with my PhD supervisor, the literature review and personal experience. There 
were six sections of the interview protocol: i.) biographical information, ii.) about 
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informants‘ work, iii.) overall impression about reforms, iv.) covering the reform 
need, conceptualisation and implementation, v.) attempts to reform and change in 
implicit contracts, and vi.) reform achievements and results.  
To be sociological, I asked people: about their work and what they see as their 
priorities; who are the important people they need to work with (here I am asking 
about the negotiated order, in colloquial terms); what have been the most 
significant changes for them, directly in terms of their work, and as they see 
impacting on their organisation and the public sector in Pakistan as a whole (here 
I am asking about reform attempts); and how they have been affected by these 
changes - whether they have made it easier or harder for them to do their work (I 
am in effect asking about how it has changed their implicit contract).  
4.7.5 Testing of the interview protocol 
I also conducted a mock interview with one of the senior officials during which I 
realised that there are few questions whose answers were repetitive. These 
questions were not only irritating for the interviewee, but also increased the length 
of the interview to almost 90 minutes plus. I shared experience of my mock 
interview with supervisor and requested elimination of some repetitive questions, 
which was granted. Hence, I tailored the questionnaire in light of the feedback 
from the mock interview with the agreement of my supervisors and also translated 
the questionnaire into the national language (Urdu), which was to be used to 
conduct the interviews with the public officials who had difficulties understanding 
the English language or tight schedules. 
4.7.6 Clarifying some ethical issues 
Before I describe the fieldwork I would like to clarify some ethical issues that I 
encountered during the data collection. These issues were not compromised 
intentionally or for adventure, but because there was no way around. There are 
three instances in total, the first time it was when I had to enter the Red Zone (a 
no go area for ordinary persons) with the help of an invalid identity card where 
my target organisation was located. Secondly, asking the informants to give their 
input on governmental affairs despite knowing that as per government‘s 
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guidelines they are bound not to do so. The third instance was when I played some 
of the unidentifiable portions of the recorded interviews for the encouragement of 
other colleagues to record their interviews as well.  
4.7.7 Accessing the Red Zone: a constant challenge 
The first challenge that I encountered was accessing the headquarters of both the 
target organisations situated in the Red Zone. The Red Zone is the most sensitive 
area of Pakistan‘s capital Islamabad as declared by the Government of Pakistan 
located in Sector G-5 where access for the common people is prohibited for 
security reasons. These security arrangements are related to the current law-and-
order situation Pakistan is facing due to their involvement as a global ally in the 
‗war against terrorism‘.  
To access this area, one needs an official identity card issued by the respective 
organisations located in this area or an invitation from a senior government 
officer. Since I needed to visit this organisation on a regular basis during the 3-4 
month period of fieldwork I needed a solution that would allow me frequent 
access. To solve this issue, I called one of my ex-colleagues from the FBR who 
agreed to take me in a vehicle with a Government number-plate in which he 
crossed the check post by waving his official Identity Card (IC) at the security 
check post.  
During my first visit to the FBR I met with several ex-colleagues who appeared to 
fully appreciate the purposes of my research and my ambition to achieve a PhD. 
Some of them expressed their apprehensions about my decision of leaving a 
highly valued job with USAID for this adventure. Here, when I was sharing their 
lunch from colourful lunch boxes which they brought daily from homes, I asked 
for their help regarding frequent access. Several solutions were discussed, but we 
all agreed on the use of my expired IC, which I knew was still lying in my drawer 
at home, as the only thing on the card security official checks is the photo and the 
confidence of the presenter. This idea worked very well in the coming days and I 
kept on using my expired IC for the rest of the fieldwork in order to access the 
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Red Zone. After getting into the Red Zone crossing the gates of the target 
organisations with the help of office occupants was relatively simple.  
4.7.8 Approaching informants 
While entering the organisation was no longer an issue for me the actual issue of 
getting information from the government employees in the form of a recorded 
interview was still a challenge. It was very difficult to convince the government 
employees to give interviews when the penalty for such activity could be 
dismissal from service (Pakistan, 2007a). To be honest, if I had ever been asked 
for an interview while I was serving for the government I would have refused. I 
would not have risked my permanent employment for the sake of someone‘s 
research. Considering the volatile economic condition and high unemployment 
rate, Pakistan‘s public service is still considered one of the safest options as it has 
an assured monthly salary, job security, health cover, housing benefits and 
pension plan.  
In order to help interviewees overcome all their fears I decided to talk with an old 
friend who himself happened to be research officer at my parent department 
DR&S and who was now promoted to Secretary in one of the reformed units. He 
had recently completed a degree in Holland and training in the United States. 
Thanks to a social networking tool I was not only in contact with him, but also 
apprised with his developments. I requested him to be a volunteer and record his 
interview, I knew asking for a recording was very sensitive, but I had to record the 
interview for various reasons. My greatest reason for recording the interviews was 
the fear of losing important data while trying to note everything down on paper 
and also to provide stronger evidence for my research analysis. I was so sure that 
my interviewees would refuse to be recorded that before departing for data 
collection I explicitly got approval from the University‘s ethics committee for not 
providing any recorded material. But fortunately my expectations were proven 
wrong and this first interviewee happily agreed to record the interview under the 
condition that I not share the interview with anyone and keep the name and 
designation anonymous. It was really a breakthrough. I was not only able to 
secure a recorded interview, but also gain his commitment for convincing one or 
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two more colleagues to be interviewed. Encouraged by this first experience, I 
started approaching people I believed might be helpful for my cause. It was a 
random search with no set criteria for informant choice except willingness to 
participate. The second interview I recorded was of a person belonging to the 
statistic wing. I decided to approach him because he had a reputation for being 
outspoken. On my request, he asked to come for the recorded interview after 
office hours as he was sharing his space with other colleagues. This is a general 
practice in Pakistan‘s public sector – that senior officers are provided a private 
room while the middle managers share space with support staff. After recording 
two interviews my confidence started rising and I continued my data collection. 
Mainly people showed a mixed reaction to my request as they were really 
interested in lending their voice to the topic, but were also afraid of the potential 
consequences that doing so may have. In addition to my personal assurance and 
trust gained from the informants, I believe timing was also a factor in successfully 
recording of the maximum number of interviews. The organisation I targeted has 
completed almost 10 years of reform activities and now people are ready to speak 
out despite known threats. To encourage interviewees to have confidence in the 
interview process, and especially in letting me record their answers, I had to play 
a few unidentifiable portions of previous interviews with other colleagues to 
prove that the recordings would be truly anonymous. All the interviews were 
recorded in interviewees‘ respective offices during or after office hours. Locking 
the door from inside, removing the phones from their cradles or meeting after 
office hours were the general actions taken by the interviewees during the 
interviews as precautionary measures to prevent on the plea that they don‘t want 
any disturbances during their interview. 
During the interviews I found that many of my informants raised questions about 
the donors‘ roles. Realising the situation, I decided to expand the scope of 
interviews to include the donors‘ representatives as well and asked for permission 
from my supervisor who happily accepted my proposal. Now, when I actually had 
to approach these agencies for these interviews I learned how daunting it could be. 
Despite my various calls I could not arrange even one interview with any of these 
agencies. They all responded to my calls in the same way by asking for an email 
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stating the purpose of the meeting, and then did not respond to any of my emails. 
This was the time when I started believing that there was hardly any difference in 
the functioning of bureaucracies either working for so-called lethargic Pakistan 
public sector or promoted proactive international organisations. I was at the point 
of writing another email for permission to roll back and stick to the original 
scheme when I found a lead during an interview with an official working for FBR. 
During discussions he pointed out that he usually has discussions over reforms 
with his brother who was working for one of the donor organisations. I told him 
my story of failure in securing any input from donor agencies. During the 
conversation he called using the intercom through exchange to a senior level 
official working in the same organisation where his brother was working and 
fixed my meeting for 30 minutes in just two days‘ time. I felt astonished and 
happy that I found a way to enter after all. It was really unexpected for me, but I 
started preparing myself for that interview. After recording this interview from a 
donor‘s representative I felt like completing a sketch with input from all quarters. 
But my concern of relying on just an interview pursued me to look for more 
interviews from the donor community. This concern was resolved with the help of 
another former colleague who was the main point of contact for another donor 
agency in FBR. He was the one who provides information on the progress of 
reforms as demanded by the donors in order to complete their obligation of 
reporting, so the donors couldn‘t reject him. Another interview from the donor 
representative was made with the condition that I not reveal his name or his 
position, nor record his voice to which I agreed. Even with conditions the 
interview was worth taking as it helped me to understand the situation in more 
depth. 
4.7.9 Unrest in the Capital 
Everything in the field was going smoothly until public unrest and turmoil 
suddenly started against the government. It was sparked off by price hikes and 
non-availability of basic necessity like gas, electricity, fuel etc. This seriously 
created problems for all the citizens of the capital. Almost every day a large crowd 
gathered on the roads agitating against government policies. They were burning 
tyres on the roads to block the traffic, and attacking and burning government 
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vehicles and public transport. This situation was controlled by the government in 
about a two-week time and law and order were restored in the capital. As this was 
my home-ground, I continued data collection by using my best judgement about 
timing and the routes by which to approach informants.  
4.8 Analysis and interpretation 
According to Anderson and Burns (1989), ―the purpose of data analysis is to 
translate the evidence into a form which allows the researcher to make clear and 
concise statements of description and/or associations‖ (pp. 200). Conceptually, 
abstract analysis started happening from the day I recorded the second interview 
during the fieldwork. The first interview along with the observation provided the 
base by which to compare and contrast the feedback received during interviews. 
The process expanded along with the size of sample and soon I realised that it was 
no longer possible to comprehend the information without proper and systematic 
arrangement of the data. It became necessary to employ some techniques to make 
analytic sense of the raw data. As soon as I finished transcribing the data I started 
sorting the data according to emerging themes and termed this process as 
‗bucketing process‘13. The bucketing process involved arranging the data into 
themes and subthemes. The themes and subthemes were identified after 
segregation of data in different ‗buckets‘ making similar excerpts and or 
containing variant of the main themes or sub-themes. During this process a clear 
link was ensured to track the source of these excerpts. Once the bucketing process 
was over I was left with transparent buckets of selected, simplified and organised 
data ready for interpretation. These records were then uploaded into NVivo 
software in order to get swift and accurate results through generating specific 
queries. Where this process helped me to organise the data, it also ended up 
categorising it for analyses through which themes and patterns were discovered. 
Undoubtedly, it was a very complex process as noted by Marshall and Rossman 
(1999) that the responses during interviews are not according to the categories 
determined by researchers. But, it helped me to familiarise myself with the data 
more closely. Hence, abstract analysis started getting firm basis of categorised 
                                                            
13 I borrowed this term from discussions with my supervisor Dr. Alison Hirst. 
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interviews, field notes and other material collected through fieldwork. This 
process helped me to relate my data to rival theories as well identified 
contradictory themes emerging within the data. For example, use of IT was seen 
as a facilitator by some and a hurdle by other interviewees. Identification of such 
difference upfront pushed my thoughts to explore it beyond its face value. Brewer 
(2000) argued that data analysis is not just about putting data into categories, but 
joining those categories properly. For example, enhanced use of IT was supposed 
to be reducing face-to-face contact between officials and clients, but it was clearly 
regarded as producing the opposite results. The analysis furthered as ―an iterative 
process in which ideas are used to make sense of data, and data used to change 
ideas‖ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, pp. 158). Simultaneously, the process of 
theory development ensued during fieldwork, and analysis and emerging 
theoretical ideas were recorded through analytic memos. The fieldwork was 
guided by the ideas that came out of the relevant literature and have been 
presented in the conceptual framework above were embraced by the concepts 
emerged during fieldwork.  
4.9 Research Quality 
In qualitative research, trustworthiness terms as measures to ensure the quality of 
the research. In this regard, Yin (1998) suggested eleven tactics under four tests to 
the researchers for increasing the quality of their case study. To maintain the 
quality of this case study I am using seven out of eleven recommended tactics. 
The remaining four tests (time series analysis, logic modelling, replication logic, 
and review by key informants) were ruled out due to unavailability of the 
appropriate data required or its applicability in multiple cases. A summary 
showing actions taken to meet with the suggested tactics for this case study can be 
seen below (table 2): 
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Table 7: Research quality 
Test Tactic When Action 
Construct 
validity 
Use multiple 
sources of 
evidence 
Data 
Collection 
Interviews, documentary evidence, 
participant observation, field notes, 
published and unpublished 
government records and 
photographs. 
Establish a 
chain of 
evidence 
Interview data, field notes and diary 
were updated simultaneously and 
relevant material was also taken 
and transferred to the computer. 
 
Internal 
Validity 
Do pattern 
matching 
Data Analysis 
Emerging patterns were identified 
and matched during detailed data 
analysis.  
 
Do explanation 
building 
The underlying links were traced 
and explained during analysis. 
 
External 
validity 
Use rival 
theories within 
single cases 
Research 
Design 
Rival theories were consulted 
during designing of research. 
Reliability Use case study 
protocol 
Data 
Collection 
Same method of data collection 
was used to conduct all the 
interviews.  
 
Develop case 
study database 
Database is maintained with the 
recording and transcripts of 
interviews and field notes.  
 
 
4.10 Summary 
This chapter explains the research methods I have used to study the consequences 
reforms have had on the way the Pakistani public sector organisations functions as 
well as why these organisations are resistant to reforms. This research follows a 
qualitative paradigm and, in particular, uses an exploratory case study approach to 
be able to dig deep and get rich explanations of the phenomena from an emic 
standpoint. In line with assumptions I hold about reality and knowledge, I have 
adopted inter-subjective epistemology and the ontological belief that reality is 
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socially constructed and consists of people‘s subjective experiences of the 
external world. The case study organisation has been conceptualised through 
Strauss‘ (1978) concept of ‗negotiated order‘. To do so, I have used an 
ethnographic-oriented approach (Watson, 2008) which treats ethnography as a 
form of writing. To ensure the quality of this case study I have applied seven out 
of eleven tests recommended by Yin (1998).  
After discussing the relevant literature and setting the methodology, in the next 
chapter I will discuss the reform actions introduced in the FBR. 
  
90 
Chapter 5. Reforming the federal tax agency 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this first empirical chapter, I analyse the reformers‘ (Government of Pakistan 
and The World Bank) expressed official intentions of reforming the tax agency to 
make it more efficient, transparent and effective. This organisation seems to be 
very important for the reformers, as it was part of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) negotiated in 1990s, is part of the Poverty Reduction 
Programme, which replaced the SAP from 2000, and also included in the list of 
key national organisations by the National Commission on Government Reforms 
(NCGR) to improve the overall Governance. The main sources of secondary 
information in this chapter are Public reports like Government of Pakistan‘s 
(GoP) report of NCGR, Report of the Task Force on Reform of Tax 
Administration, approved Strategy Document, the World Bank‘s Project 
Appraisal Document (PAD) and Project Implementation Completion and Results 
Report (PICRR). Other sources of information include various internal classified 
reports, documents, Project Implementation Plan (PIP) and presentations of the 
Federal Board of Revenue (FBR).  Some of the sources, e.g. donor‘s reports were 
classified documents at the time of the start of this project. However, because of 
my personal contacts inside the FBR, I was able to get them, along with other still 
classified documents like PIP. Nonetheless, the donors‘ reports are no longer 
classified. Due to their recognition of the right to information act the donors have 
gradually authorised their disclosure.  
After analysing all the available documents, it seems that the reformers have 
adopted a two prong strategy: policy reforms to rationalise the tax rates, simplify 
the tax laws and broadening of the tax base; and, administrative reforms to 
increase the administrative efficiency and control through improved human 
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resource management (HRM), information technology (IT), business process 
reengineering (BPR) and structural changes in the organisation. In this chapter I 
briefly introduce the case study organisation and explain its functions. Then I 
analyse the main reasons and areas of the reforms identified by the reformers. 
Finally, I analyse the aims and strategy opted by the reformers to introduce major 
reform initiatives in the case study organisation.   
5.2 Evolution and Functions of FBR 
The Central Board of Revenue (CBR) was created after implementation of Central 
Board of Revenue Act, 1924. In 1944, it was converted in a full-fledged Revenue 
Division
14
 (RD) under the Ministry of Finance (MoF). This arrangement was 
altered in August 1960 when on the recommendations of the Administrative Re-
organisation Committee (ARC) (see chapter 2), CBR was made an attached 
department of the MoF. In the year 1974, further changes were made to streamline 
the organisation and its functions and a full time position of Chairman CBR was 
created with the status of ex-officio Additional Secretary. To remove the 
impediments in the exercise of administrative powers of a Secretary to the 
Government and effective formulation and implementation of fiscal policy 
measures, the status of CBR as a RD was restored under the MoF on October 22, 
1991. However, the RD was abolished in January 1995, and CBR reverted back to 
the pre-1991 position (Ahmed et al., 2005-06). Once again the status of CBR was 
restored as RD in 1998 which continued to exist till 2007. By the ratification of 
CBR Act 2007 which empowers the Chairman to exercise additional 
administrative and financial powers, the CBR has now become FBR. These back 
and forth changes made in the status of FBR over the period of time show a 
constant power struggle between the FBR for autonomy and MoF for its control. 
These changes are more frequent from 1990 onwards, due to frequent changes in 
ruling regimes (see chapter 2) and their reaction to address the grave financial 
problems. Following table presents the chronological order of the changes made 
in the status of FBR over time. 
                                                            
14 According to GoP‘s Rules of Business, 1973 ‗Division‘ "means a self-contained administrative 
unit responsible for the conduct of business of the Federal Government in a distinct and specified 
sphere and declared as such by the Federal Government‖ (pp.1) 
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Table 8: Fluctuating status of case study organisation 
Changes in Status Year 
Creation of CBR 1924 
Converted to RD 1944 
Made an attached department of the MoF 1960 
Appointment of independent Chairman 1974 
Restoration as RD under the MoF 1991 
Abolition of RD reversal to the pre-1991 position 1995 
Restoration as RD 1998 
Converted into FBR with more financial and administrative 
autonomy 
2007 
Source: Author‘s compilation 
Currently, the FBR has over 30,000 employees on its payroll with its countrywide 
presence of 1,000+ offices at divisional, district and tehsil
15
 level. The FBR and 
its subordinate departments, namely, income tax, customs, central excise and sales 
tax, administer  Pakistan‘s tax system. The constitution of Pakistan empowers the 
federal government to levy and collect: 
i. Taxes on income, other than agriculture income; 
ii. Taxes on capital value of assets, other than capital gains on 
immovable property; 
iii. Customs duties on international trade; 
iv. Excise duties, other than on liquor, opium and other narcotics and  
v. Taxes on sales and purchase of goods. 
Source: (FBR, 2008-09)  
In the existing setup, according to FBR yearbook 2008-09, the Chairman is the 
executive head of the Board as well as Secretary of the RD, has the responsibility 
of: (1) Formulation and administration of fiscal policies, (2) Levy and collection 
of federal taxes; and (3) Quasi-judicial function of hearing of appeals. His 
responsibilities also involve interaction with the offices of the President, the Prime 
Minister and Ministries of economic, trade and industry. The current 
organisational structure of the FBR is presented below: 
                                                            
15 The tehsil is the second-lowest tier of local government in Pakistan; each tehsil is part of a larger 
District. Each tehsil is subdivided into a number of union councils. 
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5.3 Tax Administration Reforms in Pakistan 
Most developing countries face two similar challenges. One is poor generation of 
revenue from within the country and the second establishment of public 
organisations that can tackle the pressures of the government‘s budgetary 
constraints, face the global competitive environment, and meet peoples' rising 
demands (Ohemeng & Owusu, 2013). Pakistan also falls within the category of 
these countries whose citizens are sceptical about the performance of public 
sector, global competitiveness, efficiency, and governance indicators rank it at the 
bottom and its expenditure is far greater than its revenue. It was estimated by the 
IFIs that the Pakistan is collecting far less than its due taxes. The two major 
argued reasons behind this problem were as: complex and irrational tax rules; and, 
inefficient administrative mechanism.  
In chapter 2, I explained that Tax Administration Reform was initially agreed with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the year 1998 as loan conditionality of 
the structural adjustment programme (SAP). Two main reasons promulgated by 
the Government and IMF together for tax reforms were enhanced revenue and 
Figure 3: The current organisational chart of FBR 
Source: FBR website (www.fbr.gov.pk) accessed on 14.05.2013 
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documentation of the economy. To achieve these objectives the tax base was set 
to be broadened by including the un-taxed income and sectors in the tax net. The 
IMF and Government also agreed on an overall tax administration reform by 
establishment of an independent agency to be called Pakistan Revenue Services 
(PRS) in place of the existing CBR. The idea was to create an autonomous 
organisation that can perform its functions without financial, administrative and 
political hurdles. In this regards, a bill to form the PRS was tabled in the National 
Assembly on December, 31, 1998 but could not pass from the floor of the house 
(Hors, 2001). This apparent reason for this was the overwhelming influence of the 
industrial and business communities over the ruling government, who saw it as a 
threat to them and their businesses. 
However, soon after the General Mushraf led military government took charge of 
the country in October, 1999, it agreed with the IFIs to conduct an extensive 
diagnostic study of the federal tax agency and in June 2000 appointed a Task 
Force on Reforming the Tax Administration (Generally known as Shahid Husain 
Committee). The financial and technical support to this Task Force was provided 
by the World Bank (WB) and IMF together. 
5.4 The Task Force and its recommendations 
The Task Force was headed by a senior retired bureaucrat Syed Shahid Husain 
supported by a team of 10 Members and two Advisors from civil society, 
including retired tax officials, lawyers, charter accountant, academicians and 
economist. The Task Force after conducting an extensive review of the tax 
system, presented its findings and recommendation in May, 2001. The findings 
identified following main problems hindering the functioning of the organisation: 
i. Sudden and frequent legal and administrative changes 
ii. Low taxpayers‘ education 
iii. Substantive discretion of tax collectors 
iv. Tax policy changes are not supported by appropriate adjustments 
in the administrative framework 
v. Complex rules, procedures and processes 
vi. Manual operations 
vii. Inappropriate organisational model   
viii. Coercive & adversarial relationship between the taxpayers and 
collectors. 
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ix. Deficient financial resources and logistics support not matching 
with the growing demands of tax administration 
x. Extremely mismanaged human resources 
xi. Extremely low wages which compel the official to corruption 
xii. Over-employment especially at lower positions  
xiii. Reduced productivity due to an inappropriate mix of officers and 
staff 
xiv. Inadequate physical infrastructure and poor work environment 
 
The report, particularly focusing on the issues of BPR, Corruption, HRM, IT, 
Organisation of CBR and suggested a wide-ranging, comprehensive reform 
programme  in place of the piecemeal approach adopted in the past. To do so, the 
report proposed a series of policy and administrative changes in the CBR. 
Specifically, It proposed that CBR should: 
i. Be granted financial and administrative autonomy so that it can 
perform its functions more effectively and without hurdles 
ii. Reorganise its existing cylindrical structure on functional lines. 
iii. Reorganise its Income Tax department on functional lines to 
reduce the bureaucratic layers, eliminate tax collector‘s discretion 
and gain specialisation. 
iv. Simplify of all taxes, i.e. Customs, Sales Tax and Income Tax 
through extensive BPR. 
v. Encourage extensive use of IT to gain efficiency, transparency and 
minimise face to face contact between taxpayers tax collectors to 
control the corruption 
vi. Improve its relationship with taxpayers and launch initiatives for 
taxpayers‘ education and facilitation.  
vii. Rationalize its workforce through an appropriate mix of higher and 
lower grades and skills to increase the productivity. 
viii. Concentrate on Human Resource function to address the issues like 
wages, recruitment, retention, training etc.  
 
Following the Task Force‘s recommendation the GoP requested the IMF to send 
their experts for an independent assessment of the Pakistani tax system. 
Subsequently, IMF mission visited Pakistan in August, 2001 who presented its 
finding after detailed discussion with the MoF, Establishment Division (ED), the 
Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) and endorsed Pakistan‘s tax 
administration reform.  
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5.5 Leading the Reforms 
One of the highest quoted reasons by the IFIs for the failure of past reform efforts 
across developing nations are the issue of the lack of ownership. Therefore, 
learning from the past, and realising this as one of the potential risks in successful 
implementation of the reforms, the reformers decided to take the organisational 
management on board. To resolve the ownership issue of the reform process, they 
called top 30 managers of the CBR to attend a three-day workshop at a hill-station 
near Islamabad in October, 2001. It is important to note that before this workshop 
all the proceedings of the Task Force were kept secret from the employees of 
CBR, excluding the Chairman. After reviewing the recommendations of the Task 
Force the CBR management agreed to proposed reforms in the organisation. 
Strangely, despite understanding that these reforms were going to impact radically 
on them, their status, power and work, no opposition whatsoever was officially 
recorded by the senior managers in any of the documents I have analysed. This 
affirmative response from the government servants seems to be obvious 
considering their vulnerable status in front both the powerful groups of IFIs and 
the government. To move ahead, they came up with a strategy document 
consisting of the following four main components to transform the CBR along the 
lines the Task Force envisaged it: 
i. Organisation of the Tax Administration 
ii. Business Processes Redesigning for Income & Sales Tax and Customs 
iii. Human Resource Management 
iv. Infrastructure development 
However, they themselves being part of the system raised concerns over 
implementation of such radical changes in the CBR within the proposed 
programme life of 5 years without all out political, legal and administrative 
patronage. To facilitate the speedy implementation constitution of a high powered 
supervisory council (SC) consisting of political and bureaucratic elites was 
recommended. The role of the SC was suggested to be acting as an independent 
overseeing body of the CBR‘s reform process which can take the important 
decisions like setting the national revenue targets, budget, HR policies and 
compensation package. To perform these tasks, it was essential that SC should 
have appropriate authority and power vested in it. The strategy document 
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therefore proposed that this council should have the status of committee of 
Cabinet to exercise the power on behalf of federal government. This council was 
supposed to be headed by Minister for Finance and assisted by Chairman CBR, 
Deputy Chairman Planning Commission, Secretary General Finance and 
Secretary Establishment and can also request any other relevant government or 
private sector functionary to join on need.  This was an unusually strong and 
powerful mechanism proposed for the implementation of these reforms which 
needed the approval by the President of Pakistan, the then country‘s highest 
authority. A graphical representation of the SC‘s structure as per PIP is as follows: 
 
 
I interpret that the demand of such strong and unprecedented powers from the 
government was a tactic used by these senior managers to test the government‘s 
determination behind it. As in normal circumstances, getting approval of this 
mechanism alone would have taken a substantial amount of time for undergoing a 
massive consultative process involving the ministries of Finance, Law, 
Commerce, Science and Technology, and Establishment & Planning Divisions. 
But, it got approved by the President of Pakistan just within the period of two 
months showing strong support for these reforms. This also represents the 
unquestionable authority and the unanswerable position of the former self 
proclaimed President which helped him to take such quick and bold decision. 
Following which the reformers started preparations to launch the pilot phase for 
testing the proposed changes and setting the momentum before initiation of the 
full programme. 
Figure 4: Structure of Supervisory Council 
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5.6 The Reform Package 
Following the positive development of the Presidential approval, the CBR was 
awarded a project preparation facility (PPF) of USD 2.9 Million by the WB in 
2002. This amount was granted to support the pre-reform activities for testing the 
proposed reform measures on a small scale and preparation of PIP. To prepare a 
detail PIP with timelines and costs, a UK based International consultancy firm 
was hired with the consultation of the WB. The remaining amount was used to 
establish pilot projects of the Large Taxpayers Unit and the Model Sales Tax 
House at Karachi and the Medium Taxpayer Unit at Lahore. This pilot phase was 
planned to test the new concepts of functional structure, integration and co-
location of Income and Sales Tax, taxpayers facilitation, better work environment 
and deployment of employees through Internal Job Posting on improved salaries. 
Subsequent to reports of successful pilot testing by CBR, the WB prepared the 
PAD for the main tax administration reform programme (TARP) in the year 2004.  
The total financial outlay of this five year programme was calculated at USD 
123
16
 Million (PICRR, 2012). The project initiated at the start of 2005 was to be 
completed by end-2009. However, before reaching to closing date the project was 
restructured for another two years. The restructuring of the project was 
recommended by the WB‘s midterm review in late 2007. The main reason for this 
recommendation was the slow utilization of funds, especially relating to the 
development of IT. The total budget of the programme was also reduced to 73.90 
Million. Following table presents original and revised budget of the programme. 
Table 9: Original and Revised Programme Budget (Million USD) 
S. No Head Original Revised Change ('+' '-') 
1 Works 18.00 31.04 +13.04 
2 ICT-Hardware & Software 76.00 23.71 -52.29 
3 Consultant Services 14.10 7.27 -6.83 
4 Training 10.00 6.36 -3.64 
5 Vehicles 2.40 2.11 -0.29 
6 Admin. and front fee 2.50 3.41 0.91 
 Total  123.00 73.90 -49.10 
Source: Author‘s calculations 
                                                            
16 Excluding local component of 26 million USD. 
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It is evident from the above table that when every aspect of the programme was 
restricted, the amount was increased under the head of the Works by 13%. This 
trend indicates two main points: one the focus of FBR‘s managers more towards 
the development of physical infrastructure, instead of focusing on the 
strengthening and improvement of operations and system; and, second the 
unquestioned shift of money towards it by the WB. Ideally, at this point the more 
drastic cuts should have been made on account of the Works being the supporting 
component.  
This point is more magnified in the following table which in the column 7 and 8 
shows the percentage share of the amount spent on each activity. Row three shows 
the results of this generous allocation of money on infrastructure which at the end 
of programme constituted almost half of the total programme cost as against the 
originally planned share of 16%. Followed by another major spending head at row 
three, this shows a quarter of the total programme spending on procurement of 
information technology related hardware. This procurement of hardware was also 
contingent to software development, which was planned to be consuming the 36% 
of the total programme budget (row two, column eight) but ended at 4%. 
However, despite such huge downward revision in the revised budget of the ICT 
software, it still shows an increase of 1% in hardware related procurements. In 
fact, this head should also have gone down significantly due to non progression on 
the software front, for which this hardware was required. But it appears as there 
was neither FBR team was making coordinated efforts nor the spending driven the 
WB monitoring these radical alterations in the original plan. Or the focus of both 
the parties was on the achievement of spending targets, against which the progress 
of the programme was being measured. Whatever, the case was, the expenditure 
patterns do not reflect any synchronisation with the changes in the original project 
plan. 
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Table 10: Actual Expenditure of the Programme (Million USD) 
 Description  GoP 
Component 
Foreign 
Component 
Total %age 
share 
revised
17 
%age 
share 
planned
18 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 
1. Technical 
Assistance 
11% 0.92 89% 7.27 100% 8.19 9% 11% 
2. ICT- 
Software 
2% 0.08 98% 3.83 100% 3.90 4% 36% 
3. ICT-
Hardware 
10% 2.21 90% 19.89 100% 22.10 25% 24% 
4. Infrastructure 
Development 
24% 9.72 76% 31.04 100% 40.76 46% 16% 
5. Vehicles 20% 0.53 80% 2.11 100% 2.64 3% 2% 
6. Training 3% 0.20 97% 6.37 100% 6.56 7% 7% 
7. Programme 
Management 
19% 0.77 81% 3.29 100% 4.06 5% 4% 
Total 16% 14.11 84% 73.78 100% 87.89 100% 100% 
Source: Author‘s calculations 
As, it was assessed by the WB‘s review mission that the TARP programme is 
going to miss its targets, therefore, they during the restructuring of the programme 
not only shrunk the programme budget by 51%, but also reduced the project 
development objectives (PDOs) from four originally set to only one and restricted 
the programme components from seven to four (table 5). The originally set four 
PDOs seem to be more specific against which the progress could have mean 
measured individually. However, their revision to one umbrella PDO is also 
seems to be an effort by the reformers to cover the non-progression on 
achievement of individual PDOs. The following table 4 shows the actual and 
revised PDOs of the TARP. 
                                                            
17 The PICRR shows the actual expenditure of USD 87.89 Million including GoP share. 
18 The PAD shows total outlay of USD 149.00 Million including GoP share. 
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Table 11: Actual and revised PDOs 
Actual Revised 
1. Improving organisational efficiency and effectiveness of 
revenue administration 
 
To improve 
the 
effectiveness 
of Pakistan's 
revenue 
administration 
2. Promoting compliance through strengthened audit and 
enforcement capacity and transparent high quality tax services  
3. Improving integrity and fairness of tax administration  
4. Improving trade facilitation through modern and 
internationally acceptable customs procedures 
Source: CBR‘s internal presentation & WB PICRR 
The original project was designed around seven components, however, during 
restructuring these components were reduced to four. The justification given for 
this change was the simplification and more effective implementation and 
monitoring. However, the above discussion suggests as this was done to mitigate 
the poor results and limited achievements of the programme. This revision seems 
to be more about framing the results in more generic components that can justify 
the programme spending by the end of the programme. A summary of the original 
and revised components is as under: 
Table 12: Original and revised components of programme 
Original Components Revised Components 
1. Management and Institutional 
Development  
2. Improving Revenue Operations  
3. Strengthening Revenue Services  
4. Creating a Tax Compliant Culture  
5. Adopting Responsive I.T Systems. 
6. Infrastructure Up-gradation and 
Development 
7. Programme Management and 
Implementation 
1. Enforcement & Audit 
2. Organisation and 
Management for Efficiency 
3. Information Technology 
4. Programme Management 
and Implementation 
Source: CBR‘ internal presentation & WB‘s PICRR 
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5.7 The implementation 
As previously noted, Pakistan intended to reorganise its federal tax agency in 
1998. However, this reform programme took more proper and substantial shape in 
2000 as the TARP, a comprehensive reform of both structures and administration. 
Tax Administration Reform is a unique challenge in itself as it involves not only 
designing tax reforms, but also developing appropriately supporting tax 
administration. This is even complicated in Pakistani context as it involves 
arguably large and weak bureaucracies. Therefore, the package of suggested 
reforms was divided into two major categories: policy reforms and administrative 
reforms. The policy reforms were aimed at simplifications of laws, less 
dependence on withholding taxes, elimination of exemptions and immunities, the 
introduction of alternate dispute resolution (ADR) mechanical, tariff reduction 
and the introduction of the USAS Scheme. While administrative reforms targeted 
the reorganisation of the CBR on functional lines, amalgamation of homogenous 
taxes like Sales and Income Tax, improved HRM process, including trainings and 
salary, reengineering of business processes and automation. This arrangement 
shows an equal attention by the reformers to both, better policies and their 
efficient administration mechanism. As argued by Tanzi and Pellechio (1997), 
―inefficient tax administration reduces tax revenue, creates unintended distortions, 
or nonneutralities, in the tax system, which means that taxes affect markets in 
ways not intended by legislators, and introduces inequities through the tax system, 
for example between honest citizens and tax evaders‖ (p. 274). Bird (2004) also 
supported the above stance and assert: 
―The administrative dimension is central, not peripheral, to tax reform. 
Without significant administrative changes, the alleged benefits of many 
proposed tax reforms will simply not be achieved, and, as a result, it is 
unrealistic to expect such changes. Too many tax reform efforts have 
regarded tax policy and tax administration as quite separate matters. The 
world is not like that. No policy exists until it is implemented, and it is the 
manner of its implementation which really determines its impact. Those 
who would alter the outcomes of a tax system must therefore understand in 
detail how it is implemented, and adjust their recommendations accordingly 
if they want to do good rather than ill.‖ (pp. 326) 
The recommendation of the Task Force also confirms this position in Pakistani 
scenario and suggests simultaneous changes in the tax policy and administration. 
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This tax administration reform model is generally referred as Revenue Authority 
(RA) model. A number of scholars (Fjeldstad & Moore 2009; Kidd & Crandall 
2006) have argued that the RA model has become most popular revenue 
administration system. Fjeldstad (2007) explaining the RA model argued that it is 
a ―governance model for revenue administration where the revenue collection 
function typically is removed from the ministry of finance departments into an 
agency with a degree of autonomy from civil service rules to structure and 
manage it‖ (pp. 4).  Crandall (2010) describing the RA model said that it involves 
the creation of a quasi autonomous agency, ―which has a role in the processes of 
national government, but is not a government department or part of one, and 
which accordingly operates to a greater or lesser extent at arms‘ length from 
ministry‖ (pp. 3). In this regard, the World Bank (2002) argues that the RAs are 
semi-autonomous because they ―are not meant to be as autonomous as other types 
of public sector organizations like the central bank nor as dependent as ministerial 
line departments, hence, the moniker ‗semi-autonomous‘‖ (pp. 3).  
This discussion suggests that the tax agencies due to their very nature has been 
classified within the core functions of the government, which cannot either be 
privatised nor it can be declared fully autonomous. However, yet the reformers 
driven by the quest for efficiency wants to improve its performance. But the 
question which comes up as to how this very important institution can be made 
more effective, efficient and responsive? In this regard, Moore et al., (1994, pp. 
13) asserts that the main feature of NPM is the effort to simulate the performance 
incentives and the disciplines of the market to those public sector organisations 
those which cannot be privatised. Therefore, it appears, as to import and promote 
the performance incentives of the market into these qausi government revenue 
agencies the NPM inspired administrative reforms are being made a compulsory 
part of the tax reform programme. Chand and Moene (1999) and Polidano (1999) 
argue that this model is an African variant of NPM, which has been adopted in 
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda. Furthermore, they termed 
this model as corporatisation wherein various taxes are merged and the 
organisations are granted some financial and operational autonomy to make them 
efficient and effective 
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The employees of the FBR as insiders were mainly affected by the administrative 
reforms; either through changes in their employment patterns, altering pay 
packages and career development or changes in their work processes, i.e. 
introduction of IT to replace the manual procedures. Therefore, their concerns 
during the fieldwork were chiefly related to administrative changes as opposed to 
policy reforms, i.e. introduction of USAS or ADR which mainly affected the 
taxpayers as outsiders. Therefore, I will explore the administrative reforms more 
in details for better understanding of the concerns raised by the employees in the 
next empirical chapter. 
5.8 Administrative Reforms 
As explained above that the reforms of administration has become an integral part 
of modern day‘s taxation reforms. Acknowledgement of recent work on the 
importance of organisations and institutions and their quality (see chapter 3) 
seems be affecting the reformers thoughts, that the policy changes alone cannot be 
effective unless they are accompanied by appropriate and efficient implementing 
mechanism. Specially, in the context of poor countries where the PS is suffering 
with acute capacity problems. Perhaps, this is why it is said that in developing 
countries the ‗tax administration‘ is ‗tax policy‘ (Bird & de Jantscher, 1992; CBR, 
2003). To meet this challenge, and bring significant improvements in the outputs 
of the tax machinery, the capacity building interventions were made in the areas 
of policy, administration, organisation and HRM. The rationale provided for 
capacity building efforts in the last three areas was to develop an appropriate tax 
administration system and competent human resource to create an enabling 
environment for effective implementation of policies. It seems to be perceived by 
the reformers that the changes in the tax policy may have only limited effects 
without appropriate administrative reforms, as both policy and administration are 
complementary and creates reinforcing effects. Therefore, this programme 
included a full-fledged training component, in addition the managers working for 
this tax agency had access to an independent PSCBP (details chapter 2). This 
clearly shows the complete faith of the reformers in the role of capacity building 
in the tax reform programme and in other development programmes targeted to 
strengthen the economic management. 
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The concept of capacity building and institutional development (see chapter 3) is 
conceived by various researchers differently, as Glenday (1997) argue, 
―Capacity building is viewed narrowly by some as merely increasing the 
supply of specific types of human capital, whereas others view it more 
broadly as the development of both the personnel and the institutions to 
deliver some product or service in a sustainable fashion. Similarly, 
institutional development is taken by some to refer to the development of 
formal organizations, whereas others take it to cover both the formal and 
informal relationships and rules that develop in a civil society that allow 
the operation of governments and private sector entities.‖ (pp. 334).  
It is therefore very important to attach specific meanings to capacity building for 
effective discussion in the context of tax administration reforms. In this 
organisation, the reformers seem to be adopting it in the broadest sense with the 
intention to develop the organisation and HR capacity to work together for the 
effective implementation of policy reforms, to contribute in a broader institutional 
environment of the country. The reformation of CBR seems to be addressing all 
three dimensions of the public sector capacity building as discussed in chapter 3. 
At the micro level, it involves the capacity building of the employees working in 
this organisation for improved productivity through trainings and salary, at the 
meso level, it involves the organisational capacity building to help it to generate 
appropriate control systems to increase efficiency, promote transparency and 
control corruption with the help of BPR & IT and at the macro level improvement 
through enabling check and balance being an important rule of the game in the 
action environment for private sector development.  
One of the two important aspects this research covering is an understanding of 
why recent control measures taken by reformers under the capacity building and 
does not produce the desired results of efficiency, effectiveness and 
responsiveness. This interest ultimately dispatches towards looking at the output 
of capacity building, i.e. what has been planned and how it has been implemented 
to achieve the results. The approach could be either building ‗input-oriented 
capacity‘ where the capacity may be judged against the high volume of training 
was undertaken, whereas an ‗output-oriented capacity‘ focuses that emphasises 
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the effectiveness of the training for desired results (ibid, pp. 335).  In the case 
study organisation it appears as the approach of ‗input-oriented capacity‘ is opted.  
As explained in the chapter 3, the capacity building in the public sector can be 
defined in three categories of human resource, organisational and institutional. In 
the case study organisation, the first two have been addressed under 
administrative reforms and the last under policy reforms which reflects that the 
social institutions of a country and sets the rules of the ‗tax game‘. However, this 
project does not cover the policy dimension and concentrate on the HR and 
organisational reforms introduced as part of administrative reforms. The 
administrative reforms, can further be subdivided in two broad categories: i) 
development of the appropriate mechanism; and, ii) preparation of human 
resource to make efficient and effective use of the new system. The first category 
relates to the development of an appropriate tax collection mechanism involves 
extensive information systems for forecasting, monitoring, assessing, collecting, 
investigating, processing refunds, auditing. This mechanism has three key direct 
stakeholders, i.e. government, taxpayers and tax collectors. The government wants 
maximum revenue collected in a fair and equitable manner, timely and accurate 
information, and an efficient and transparent business environment. The taxpayers 
as customers needs an efficient, helpful, friendly and hassle free tax system. And 
to maintain the personnel, finances, assets, budgets and many other administrative 
functions for arranging a large bureaucracy. To ensure the effective management 
of all these in an efficient and effective manner, the information technology is 
being used extensively in the modern tax administration.  The second category 
belongs to the development of appropriate human resource: no matter how the 
advance mechanism one may install, its effectiveness relies on its users. To take 
full advantage of the system, it is absolutely vital to train the human resource. 
Considering this fact the components of trainings and salary are included in the 
reform package. This component seems to be added to train and upgrade the 
knowledge base and give decent living wage to employee for eliminating 
corruption and promoting positive behaviour to make them ready for the new 
efficient and digitalised environment. Now I will discuss the major initiatives 
introduced under administrative reforms in the FBR during the reforms. 
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5.8.1 Training 
The report of the Task Force on reforms was the first ever to analyse the training 
system of the FBR. The report pointed out serious weaknesses and gaps in the 
training system at various levels. The report addressed the training issues of both 
the categories of employees, i.e. officers and officials. Before exploring the 
details, it is important to clarify that the officers of the CBR being part of the 
overall Pakistan civil service are the beneficiaries of the general training 
programmes. These mandatory training programmes are designed to prepare these 
officers before performing their duties on the four stages of their career.  
The report for officers‘ training noted that the trainings provided through the 
existing training structure of Government are not compatible with the specialized 
needs of the organisation. On the first stage of the common training programme 
(CTP) which is provided at the time of appointment it criticised ―The CTP suffers 
from inappropriate length, irrelevant curriculum, lack of rigour in the subject 
matter, and poor quality of the resource persons‖ (pp. 195). It also, criticised the 
second training stage of Specialised Training Programmes (STP) and said, 
―In STP the main emphasis is on the development of technical skills and 
little attention is paid to areas like information technology and 
management skills. Officers in the field informed us that STP lacked 
practical orientation and was of very limited use in their actual jobs. The 
curriculum, training design, and faculty skills all contribute to the poor 
quality of the training programme‖ (pp. 195).  
 
The report commenting on the third stage of training conducted at the National 
Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) praised the learning environment, but 
the training contents were found less relevant to the trainee‘s job assignments. 
The focus of this training was more administrative than technical and programme 
was found deficient in the areas of leadership skills, HRM and negotiation skills. 
However, interestingly the report commended the last leg of government training 
programme conducted at the highest training forum of the Pakistan Administrative 
Staff College (PASC). Praising its usefulness the report noted that ―The National 
Management Course at PASC is an advanced management programme aimed at 
enhancing management skills. The quality, objective and duration of the course 
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was assessed as satisfactory and meeting the training needs of senior officers of 
tax administration‖ (pp. 195). I found it interesting because, apparently, this 
institution is also part of the government‘s overall training system, preparing the 
generalist administrators; hence what made it different while evaluated by the 
Task Force. How did its length, curriculum, training design, and faculty suddenly 
become suitable for the senior officers of the tax administration?  
Report on the training opportunities for the second category of official cadre noted 
that it was almost nonexistent. Only few opportunities are available, which are 
seriously deficient and impart only theoretical knowledge, ignoring practical 
aspects of the position. The report out-rightly rejected any positive impact of such 
trainings on the performance of their duties.  
The analytical stance taken by the Task Force seems to be very broad and long 
term, as it suggests training measures of separating all training activities of the 
CBR‘s officers and officials from the national training institutions and creation of 
an independent specialised training institution dealing with the specific needs of 
the tax agency only. Although, these recommendations make sense keeping in 
view the different needs of the officials working in the tax agency, but its 
application appears to be rather complicated. The two prime beneficial reasons for 
this government of Pakistan are the generalist status of civil servants in Pakistan 
and duplication of the training cost. Despite, allocation of different groups, 
traditionally the officers joining the civil services of Pakistan are trained to work 
as generalist rather than specialists so that they can be utilised across various 
government departments. The second apparent benefit of keeping this 
arrangement is the sorted arrangement of trainings within minimum costs, as the 
same established training institutions are imparting these trainings in the 
thousands of officers being recruited and promoted in hundreds of government 
departments. 
During the planning phase of the TARP, PAD also accorded the training as one of 
the vital reform agenda. The PAD endorsing the Task Force‘s finding noted that 
the training as one of the important factor impeding employees‘ performance. 
Explaining further it says: 
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 ―The current training system is not geared to address the existing training 
needs of CBR. For most staff, there is no explicit linkage of training to 
career advancement or promotion, and neither training needs analysis is 
carried out by the local offices of CBR. Finally, lack of performance 
evaluation leads to a haphazard application of an essentially supply driven 
training‖ (pp.13). 
However, contrary to the Task Force‘s position, the WB‘s PAD seems to be 
focusing its targets more specific due to programme‘s limited life cycle. While the 
main objective of this initiative was the overall capacity building of the CBR 
employees the specific aims of this component were set as: 
i. Training the manager to formulate training strategy, budget, 
personal management and evaluation. 
ii. Building capacity to meet with the requirement of the new 
functional organisational model 
iii. To develop curriculum and training manuals for subjects relating to 
the reform for trainees and retraining of the selected staff in the 
new functional organisation. 
iv. Build-up regional training centres to meet the local capacity 
building and competence required for the new functional 
organisation. 
v. Impact assessment of the training of individuals, units and 
organisation to bring improvements after getting feedback and 
setting benchmarks.     
 
The results of training drive envisaged were i) it would help organisation to learn 
and adopt the new model smoothly, ii) help to promote integration of training 
activities of entire organisation iii) help to conduct an objective Training Need 
Analysis (TNA) to link as annual development plan in the employees‘ annual 
performance evaluation iv) help preparing annual training plan in functional areas 
for officers and officials and v) implementation of specialised internal induction 
programme to bridge the gaps not covered through general induction programmes 
offered by the Government.  
The main stance taken by the PAD for increasing the capacity of CBR employees 
was to upgrade their skills to bringing them along the changing needs of modern 
IT enabled efficient organisation so that they can play their roles more efficiently. 
Therefore, the PAD under the component of Management and Institution 
Development addressed the issue of Training. An amount of USD 10 million was 
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earmarked for trainings out of which 9 million was to be spent on international 
trainings whereas 1 million on local trainings. Such generous allocation for the 
foreign trainings as compared to local suggests the reformers‘ full support for 
importation of international skills as compared to local or in-house trainings.  
The officers of CBR not only got the opportunity to raise their calibre through 
their own organisational reform programme, but being part of the overall Pakistan 
Civil Service got the opportunity to get trained through another independent 
initiative PSCBP. This programme was run by the Government with WB‘s loaned 
amount of USD 52.00 million out of which USD 6.00 million was earmarked for 
the capacity building of CBR officers. The broad stated objective of this 
programme was also to fill the capacity gaps of public servants through 
appropriate trainings for the effective implementation of the ongoing Economic 
Reform Programme. This project was aimed at strengthening government‘s 
capacity to facilitate complementary broad-based civil service reforms (CSR). It 
was envisioned that the project initiatives will lead to improvement in the overall 
quality of policy formulation, reform implementation, service delivery, and HRM 
of the public sector. However, neither the PAD nor PSCBP seems to be 
accommodating the training needs of the officials working in lower cadres despite 
the equal emphasis given to both by the Task Force in its report. Another point 
worth noting is non-identification of training nature or types as it has been totally 
left at the discretion of tax agency‘s management to decide, this reflects the 
‗input-oriented capacity‘ approach adopted by the reformers with more focus on 
the number of trainings. 
5.8.2 Salaries 
Beside other independent research on pay differentials, a number of studies 
conducted by the government of Pakistan itself have highlighted that existing pay 
structure is deficient. And recommended a substantial increase in the salaries of 
public servants but due to the fiscal stress the government could never address the 
problem completely (NCGR, 2008). As explained in the chapter 2, during the 
course of the last six decades at least six national commissions and committees 
categorically address this issue and presented their findings confirming the 
substantial pay gap between the public and private sector employees, and 
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suggested its improvement to provide the public servants a decent living wage. As 
part of the government‘s conscious effort, the pay structure of the public servants 
is being continuously reviewed to provide the living wage. Though not 
substantial, but government since last many years has made this raise an integral 
part of the federal budget every year, to provide at least some relief to public 
servants against the inflation
19
. However, still several studies confirm the existing 
pay disparity between the public and private sector managers.  There are also 
several evidences confirming that the main cause of corruption amongst the public 
sector managers is the poor wage (NCGR, 2008; NACS, 2002). 
The report of the Task Force marking the compensation as a major issue in 
Pakistan tax administration asserted that ―The present compensation packages for 
all employees are extremely low. Employees do not get a living wage. With this 
wage, even the upper rungs of the organisation cannot afford a middle class 
standard of living‖ (pp. 197). The report also marked this issue with relation to a 
major cause of corruption amongst employees of tax administration. The Task 
Force recommended that if Government wants to make the tax administration 
efficient and honest, it should upwardly adjust the current salaries with 
comparison to the market. The report also identifies the poor compensation 
scheme as a barrier against bright minds to attract, motivate and work in the 
public service. It recommended various options of increasing the salaries up to 4 
times and suggested starting point of the local banks‘ pay structure. 
PAD addresses this issue of poor compensation to improve the productivity and 
morale. It sees the existing pay structures as seriously deficient. Explaining the 
situation, it notes ―In Pakistan, salaries and incentives for tax officials have been 
highly inadequate and fall short of what officials could earn in the private sector‖ 
(pp. 8). Going further it also relates it to the big branch of corruption and sees it as 
a root cause. Validating the finding of Task Force it confirms that the existing 
taxation system provides substantial discretionary powers to tax officials to accept 
or demand bribes and fostered extortion. It recommends the immediate attention 
                                                            
19 According to FBS figures, the average inflation between 2000-13 is calculated at 8.8%, with a 
maximum of 20.15% in 2008 and lowest 3.16 in 2006. 
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to this issue and endorses visible improvements in the compensation structure that 
ensure a reasonable standard of living for tax officials and their families. It is 
important to note here that though the PAD supports the upward revision of salary 
structure but no funds were budgeted for this account. The primary reason seems 
here is the recurrent nature of this expense, which cannot be supported by a time 
bound programme. Therefore, the government had to decide about the increase, 
which it could sustain in future.  
The government decided through President‘s approved strategy to adopt a two 
step approached of short and long term to improve the compensation of FBR. First 
for the short term to support the reform process, it empowered the Chairman for 
granting the financial rewards to selected employees, to use it as a helping tool 
that would facilitate the reform process by shaping employees‘ positive behaviour 
and booster of commitment levels. Secondly, long term, for the post reform 
period, wherein, the salaries were to be raised up to a living standard subjected to 
successful reforms of the organisation resulting rationalised staff and placement of 
monitoring mechanism. This approved mechanism suggests a different approach 
adopted by the government by rejecting the suggestion made by the Task Force to 
form an independent pay structure matching the prevailing incentives given by the 
local Banks and approved the additional measures to compensate the CBR staff 
within the Federal Pay Scales (FPS). Since a permanent solution of the deficient 
pay structure was being sorted therefore, already prevalent practices of ‗reward on 
detection was discontinued.  Reward on detection practice was an effort to 
motivate the employees to avoid bribe and get a certain percentage of the total as a 
reward on detection of the undeclared taxable incomes.  
This system of financially rewarding the selected employees adopted as a short 
term solution, remained during the first year of reform, but was abandoned with 
the introduction of a permanent system of IJP to select the employees against a 
selection criterion to qualify for a permanent special allowance equalling the base 
pay
20
 by 100%. This process of IJP was considered to be acting as filtering plant 
for selecting the employees suitable to work under reorganised, modernised and 
                                                            
20 Base pay is the fix amount of public servant‘s pay scale used to calculate the various applicable 
allowances to make it gross pay. 
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automated environment. The desired number of each positions required in the 
reorganised CBR with selection criteria was posted on CBR‘s website to allow the 
existing employees compete for it. The employees were allowed to apply against 
their respective cadres and grades only to move horizontally and not against other 
higher or lower positions, i.e. Auditors can only apply against the positions of 
auditors. However, they were allowed to compete against each other on different 
locations, i.e. an auditor working in Islamabad can compete against the position of 
auditor in Karachi. This transition was to be made over the next few months could 
not get success as the non-selected employees started getting together and formed 
various forums across Pakistan. These forums starting giving strike calls which 
affected the organisational work and started affecting revenue collection and 
irritated business communities. The government and CBR could not face this 
pressure and surrendered in front of its agitating employees by extending this 
benefit to all selected and non selected employees. 
The transitory periods during which the pay reforms were implemented in the case 
study organisation has affected the employees and their work many ways. The 
next chapter explores this issue in detail from the perspective of employees of 
FBR. 
5.8.3 Information Technology 
Information technology along with organisational structure and human resources 
is one of the three enablers for redesigning the organisational processes in the 
CBR. Peterson (1997) explains the process design as to ―how an organization 
does its work‖ (pp. 158). Davenport (1993) argues that process design can be in 
two ways i.e. process improvement and innovation. The first process 
improvement is done to improve the existing functions gradually, while the 
second, innovation is about bringing radical changes to introduce the new 
processes across functions. This second approach is also commonly known as 
reengineering (Peterson, 1997). Hammer and Stanton (1994) define the 
reengineering as ―The fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business 
processes to bring about dramatic improvements in performance‖ (pp. 3).  
Business Process Engineering was one of the main tasks the reformers 
  
114 
endeavoured to perform during this reform attempt and IT was central to this 
effort. Zuboff (1985) explaining the expected benefits of IT said ―managers 
harness information technology to their strategic goals, they usually plan to 
accomplish one or more of three interdependent operational objectives – to 
increase the continuity (functional integration, enhanced automaticity, rapid 
response), control (precision, accuracy, predictability, consistency, certainty), and 
comprehensibility (visibility, analysis, synthesis).‖ (pp. 7). Extending the 
argument Peterson (1997) argued that continuity and control promote integration, 
completeness, and accountability as he asserts,  
―A process can be greatly simplified and integrated by using a program 
that requires only a few steps. Completeness is promoted by the data 
processing cycle, which provides a structure and discipline to work while 
the technology promotes monitoring to ensure that transactions are 
complete. Accountability is promoted by creating parallel manual and 
computer systems that provide extensive audit trails.‖ (pp. 164). 
As it appears in the case study organisation, as the reformers have attempted to 
attain all possible benefits from the use of IT explained above. In CBR need for 
the use of IT was suggested by the Task Force. The committee highlighting its 
importance included an entire chapter on Information Management. The report 
reviewed the CBR‘s existing IT infrastructure and compared it with its current and 
future needs. Though the report commended the CBR‘s past efforts for keeping 
abreast with the changing needs of the organisation, but still it founds the 
organisation deficient on the multiple fronts.  Categorically pointing report 
mentioned,  
―Presently, nine data processing centres exist across the country. These are 
working in a standalone mode. There is no integrated database. Hence, 
automation has not provided any meaningful support to tax audits and 
expansion of the taxpayer's net. Except for some ad-hoc reports on tax 
collections, the system does not generate reports for control or policy 
formulation‖ (pp.18).  
 
Thus summing-up it identified following deficiencies in the overall Information 
Management System (IMS): i) unidentified information requirements ii) 
ambiguous, disjointed and isolated application development iii) missing integrated 
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tax process database iv) incoherent operational facilities across country v) 
inadequate system of IMS report generation.  To overcome these problems the 
Task Force suggested following measures: 
i. Rigorous mapping of information needs for designing of complete 
information architecture. 
ii. Creation of a dedicated position of Member IMS in CBR who should take 
lead in all IT related strategic and operational matters. 
iii. Outsourcing of systems and application, if needed   
iv. Introduction of single registration number, separate processing of tax 
document from tax audit and establishment of customer service centres  
v. Strengthening of customs electronic declaration at import and export 
stages and introduction of risk base management mechanism. 
vi. Automation of all core business processes.  
The PAD also validates the Task Force‘s findings and notes that:  
―Despite substantial past investments in information technology by CBR, 
desired results have not been achieved because the standard IT 
development methodology has not been followed. IT project management 
has been inadequate with almost no preparation for a user interface, little 
management ownership and isolated systems development. Moreover, the 
development of IT systems in the past has proceeded in an ad-hoc and 
unplanned manner so that most departments operate stand-alone modules 
that are not integrated into the main system‖ (pp.62).  
This analysis of the WB‘s team also followed by suggestions on the adoption of a 
responsive IT strategy based on two broad principles: i) identifying a technology 
path that will meet the current and future requirements; and ii) enable CBR to 
attain its targets of reforms and revenue through creating a transparent functional 
environment to produce timely and accurate information for decision making.   
The ultimate goal of ICT strategy that PAD sets is the move away from highly 
manual to an automated environment that helps decision making at various levels 
in organisation. To facilitate them information will be made available: 
i. To gain improved management control close to the industrialised countries 
ii. To make the organisation transparent 
iii. Reduce day to day contact with taxpayers 
iv. Better information management for increased revenues, clients and trade 
facilitation 
v. To adopt best international practices 
vi. To encourage e-communication under e-signature ordinance, 2002 
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PAD keeping in view the past poor performance on this front recommended the 
CBR‘s IT strategy should accommodate a durable information management 
structure for the production of accurate and timely information in a shared 
environment on reasonable cost. This involves the entire process and work culture 
reengineering. The PAD further recommended the two-tier MIS system for CBR, 
first to produce the numerical and projection revenue information and second to 
support the modules of HR, financial and asset management. The PAD 
concluding its importance noted that ―use of information technology and 
automation would not only bring efficiencies within the organisation, but would 
help improve transparency in the process of tax collection, reduce discretion and, 
as a result lower the cost of doing business for the private sector‖ (pp.31). 
The PIP recognises this issue under the component of Adopting Responsive IT 
Systems. It identifies two main roles of technology in CBR i.e. the main initiatives 
of the procedural reforms like minimising contact between the taxpayers and tax 
collectors, universal self assessment, risk management and audit are relying 
strongly on technology; and, it will help to improve its functioning and manage its 
relationship with taxpayers.  It viewed the challenged twofold at general and 
specific levels that CBR is facing in effecting its IT strategy.  At the general level, 
establishment and maintenance of large numbers of workstations and networks 
connecting them in an organisation like CBR with its countrywide presence is a 
challenge. And at the specific level, CBR is using IT extemporized and 
uncoordinated as various computer applications have been developed without 
clear direction. This further creates two main problems, i.e. duplication of data 
entry at different offices that leads to different reported figures and restricted 
benefits of computerisation due to partial automation of manual processes instead 
of process reengineering.  
After reviewing all one can see two broad ICT lines of action suggested for CBR, 
in technical terms – hardware related changes and software related changes.  
Hardware related changes were envisaged to build strong basic infrastructure for 
connecting the organisation within and outside for elimination of duplication work 
to save cost and time, efficient and reliable information flow, and for transparent 
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and efficient service provisioning to taxpayers. The hardware changes on which 
the CBR had made little progress in the past were found deficient as explained 
earlier and cannot serve the purpose unless it is appropriately backed by the 
specialised live softwares. Therefore, it was absolutely vital for successful 
implementation of ICT strategy to ensure that appropriate specialised software 
accommodating each automated reengineered process goes live for which the 
hardware was prepared.   
5.8.4 Restructuring of organizational design 
Historically, the organisational structure of the CBR was cylindrical based on 
traditional lines of vertical responsibility where both the functions of policy and 
operations were lying together. This system was found incompatible with the 
concept of modern tax administration, which calls for efficiency through 
separation between the functions of policy and operations. First ever in Pakistan 
public sector, the Taskforce on tax reforms raised this issue of organisational 
design and suggested transformation from cylindrical to the functional 
organisation by separating policy and administration function of the organisation. 
Previously, both the functions were performed directly by the line members.  This 
over occupy line members‘ attention for resolution of petty issues arising from the 
field and taxpayers. Further excess centralization and little functional management 
inhibit CBR from addressing important areas of tax policy, HR, Audit and 
Taxpayers‘ education.  
The committee in its finding says:  
―The central features of the suggested processes for the individual taxes 
are improved human resource management, audit, substantial 
strengthening of information management and taxpayer assistance and 
education. The Central Board of Revenue should, therefore, be 
reconstituted on a functional basis so that these critical issues, as well as 
tax policy, become integral features of management. Line management 
would be strengthened by interaction of members responsible for 
operations with members responsible of specialist functions. The Board 
itself should move from a hierarchical and command and control style to a 
more collegial and consultative mode, where the Chairman would be the 
primus inters pares‖. (Report of the Task Force, 2001, p. 266) 
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Furthermore, the Taskforce proposed increase in numbers of top management 
with the inclusion of specialised professionals in the fields of human resources, 
audit, member legal, information management, and taxpayer relation and 
education.  
One of the initial steps of reform was to redesign the managerial structure and the 
reorganisation was based on the ‗functional model‘ where staff is organized into 
functional groupings, i.e., registration, information processing, accounting, audit 
and enforcement.  Although it was official intention to convert the structure from 
‗Hierarchical‘ to ‗Functional‘, while I looked into the details of action that 
organisation have taken is a mix of functional and Divisional Model instead of 
functional only. This mix is evident from the actions planned by the organisation 
to reorganising itself on functional lines, e.g. Registration, Enforcement as well, 
creating the dedicated units like LTU for exclusive treatment of the large 
taxpayers. The following table compares the intended and actual actions taken by 
the FBR.  
Table 13: Selection of the organisational model 
Models: Hierarchical Functional Divisional 
Focus: Individual Tax Function  Taxpayer 
Structure: By tax type, i.e. 
corporate tax, 
sales tax, income 
tax 
By functions: 
registration, 
processing, 
enforcement, audit, 
taxpayer service 
By type of taxpayer: 
Large, medium or 
small taxpayers 
Change: Obsolete  A mix of Functional and Divisional mode 
have been used by the FBR to gain 
efficiency, transparency and providing 
specialised services to each segment of 
taxpayers.   
Source: Author‘s compilation  
The advantages envisaged by the reformers of this shift from hierarchical to 
functional were better taxpayer service at a single point of contact, single tax 
number, common internal accounting framework, simplified return processing, 
cross checking of tax liabilities across the taxes before paying refund, coordinated 
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enforcement activities, easier to coordinate audit activity and allows specialisation 
and clear career paths. While the potential disadvantages of this transformation 
was foreseen as difficulty in coordination amongst standalone functions, internal 
power-struggle between functions to control the resources, losing sight of the 
‗big-picture‘, functional specialisation may eliminate the generalists.  
5.9 Summary 
The chapter focused on the reform initiatives introduced in the case study 
organisation. The review of various documentary sources suggests the CBR as a 
very important national organisation as the reformers are trying to reorganise it 
from 1990s, but could not stand successful due to political and administrative 
constraints. However, the latest attempt made under military-led government was 
able to materialise from the year 2005. This effort was started with a Task Force 
formed by the government to study the federal tax system and make 
recommendations for its improvement. The Task Force after a complete review of 
the organisation suggested comprehensive reform covering the organisation, 
Business Process Reengineering, Corruption, Human Resource Development and 
Information Technology. Subsequently, a strategy document was prepared by the 
CBR management, which not only endorsed the findings of Taskforce but also 
took the ownership of the reform process by leading it. This report was then 
considered by the WB to convert its recommendation into a project appraisal 
document and the allocation of financial resources. The WB recommended the 
adoption of RA model. To implement the recommendations of PAD, a PIP was 
prepared with the help of an International consulting firm from UK. 
After analysing several public and classified documents relating to TARP it 
appears that the reformers have designed a broad reform around two main planks 
of Policy and Administrative reforms. Policy Changes were made to create the tax 
system more responsive to growth and simple to administer; and Administrative 
Changes to increase the efficiency of the organisation. It was envisaged that after 
the implementation of reforms the CBR will be transformed into a fully functional 
organisation. If not all, most of the functions will be performed digitally with the 
help of business process reengineering on IT enabled environment. The 
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employees will be ready to perform their duties more efficiently and effectively 
after getting appropriate trainings, living wages and better work environment.  
In a nutshell, a trustworthy environment will be created where taxpayers can pay 
their taxes voluntarily without any hurdle. And the trained and motivated tax 
collectors can perform their duties efficiently in a comfortable workplace without 
any financial tension, and political pressure. Now in the second empirical chapter 
I will analyse the employees‘ account of these organisational changes and how 
they were affected by them. 
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Chapter 6. Insiders’ experiences of change 
 
6.1 Introduction  
In this chapter I seek to represent the employees‘ experiences and accounts of the 
organisational reforms.  I focus on the problems that they spoke of as central and 
requiring change, their accounts of the reforms‘ aims and processes, and the 
consequences of its implementation. It was notable that during the fieldwork, 
informants spoke chiefly about two strands of the reforms, which they appeared to 
regard as most important. These strands were Human Resource Management 
(training and salaries) and Information Technology (IT). During, fieldwork, the 
research participants from the case study organisation also raised some questions 
about the donors‘ role, which also have been addressed in this chapter through 
analyses of two interviews made with the donor‘s representative. The rest of the 
chapter is dedicated to explore the each category in detail.  
6.2 Human Resource Management (HRM) 
During the fieldwork, all 20 interviewees introduced the topic of HRM in 
response to my open question about what type of reforms they had experienced.  
In particular, they expressed strong views about the changes that had been made 
in terms of salaries and training and what they presented as their poor results. 
None of the interviewees challenged the principles behind these initiatives, but 
they all expressed strong reservations about the processes through which 
employees were selected for periodic monetary rewards or additional salary 
through internal job posting (IJP), and given opportunities for trainings.  The great 
majority of my informants praised the underlying concepts of these initiatives, but 
criticised the ways in which they had been executed as unfair and unjust, or as 
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being implemented in a chaotic fashion.  Almost uniformly, they argued that such 
poor implementation created hurdles instead of support for the changes sought 
through these initiatives. 
As noted in chapter 5, the components of training and salary were considered to 
be important enabling factors, by the reformers for a successful reform of the case 
study organisation. The intention behind trainings was identification of 
employees‘ skills ‗gaps‘ so that they can be effectively bridged through the 
arrangement of appropriate trainings. The objective behind this initiative seems to 
be a preparation of organisational employees to prepare and align their skill set 
with the future vision of an automated, dynamic and efficient organisation.  Also, 
salaries were raised as a way of gaining the support of employees, motivate them 
to perform better and eliminate corruption by providing a living wage.  Below I 
consider each factor in turn.   
6.2.1 Training 
In chapter 5, I discussed the details of the training initiative made as part of the 
reforms in the case study organisation. This initiative was designed to serve two 
main purposes: first, to facilitate the on-going reform through providing selected 
trainings to change leaders, and second, to build the capacity of all CBR staff to 
meet the new requirements of a reorganized, modern and automated CBR. Shahid 
Hussain Committee‘s report on Tax Reforms (discussed in chapter 5) in its review 
also pointed out serious weaknesses and problems in the training system used in 
CBR for both ‗officer‘ and ‗official‘ categories of employees i.e. officers and 
officials (explained in chapter 2). The main finds of the Committee were that: 
i. The prevalent training system was deficient and incompatible with the 
specialized needs of the organisation.  
ii. The curriculum was inappropriate in terms of its design, length and faculty 
at all levels, excluding the final stage of Pakistan Administrative Staff 
College (PASC) 
iii. There was no systematic procedure for the identification and 
recommendation of appropriate candidates for existing national and 
international training opportunities.  
iv. Training opportunities for lower cadres were non-existent 
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The Committee recommended that all the existing training facilities of the 
organisation, with its headquarters in Lahore and two regional offices in 
Islamabad and Karachi should be amalgamated to create ―The Tax Administration 
Academy‖. It was suggested that the new Academy would prepare both categories 
of the workforce, according to the specialised needs of the organisation, by 
providing both specialised and common trainings (details available in chapter 5).    
Through its Project Appraisal Document (PAD) (discussed in chapter 5), the 
World Bank (WB) also reconfirmed the findings of the task force and suggested 
immediate attention to it. The PAD also viewed the lack of training opportunities 
as a major hurdle impeding the improvement of employees‘ performance, and 
criticized the prevalent training system as being outdated and inadequate (detailed 
in chapter 5). The suggested actions recommended in PAD (pp. 49) were: 
i. To prepare a breed of change managers through extensive training in the 
specialized area of project management  
ii. To prepare the whole CBR workforce, according the future organisational 
needs 
iii. To build an appropriate training mechanism to support sustained change 
initiatives across the organisation  
iv. To establish a monitoring and evaluation system for continuous training 
quality management.  
These recommendations for new training initiatives were also augmented by 
another standalone parallel programme named Public Sector Capacity Building 
(PSCBP). PSCBP was initiated by the Government with the help of The World 
Bank to build the capacity of government employees across Pakistan for effective 
implementation of ongoing economic reform programmes (discussed in chapter 2 
and 5). A sizeable number of CBR officers, being part of the overall Pakistan 
Civil Service, were also included in this project as well. 
Training was one of the most frequent areas people communicated about during 
the field work. All 20 interviewees agreed that it was an important initiative 
introduced as part of the reforms and acknowledged its positive role in any 
organisation, including the CBR, to perform more effectively and efficiently. As I 
mentioned above, there was widespread agreement, and the excerpts below 
represent this interesting degree of homogeneity between them.   
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There is a national programme called public sector capacity building 
project being run by the Government to upgrade the skills of its 
workforce. These projects build the capacity of all public sector 
employees through arrangements of national and international 
trainings and courses. This will make the organisation perform more 
efficiently and responsibly. (SJ, Secretary), [E] 
Trainings are being imparted to improve the functioning of 
organisations. (NA, Deputy Director), [E] 
 
Yes, I would say there are many positive changes made in the public 
sector. I would like to put them in different categories. The first thing is 
compulsory trainings for the officers, Government has introduced Mid-
level management course to enhance their calibre, vision to bring them 
out of conventional setup where they can share their and learn from 
others and others experience. (SA, Second Secretary), [E] 
 
The support for this initiative is evident from above statements. The interviewees 
appeared not only to be acknowledging its importance for the organisation, but 
were also predicting its positive effects on the functioning of the public sector 
overall. They are expressing that the  government started paying attention to its 
existing national training systems by not only reinforcing it with new zeal, but 
also through top-up programmes like PSCBP which provides extraordinary 
opportunities of international exposure (chapter 2 and 5).  From the above 
affirmative statements of the informants it can also be viewed that employees of 
the case study organisation also agree with the reformers‘ diagnosis of the 
problem that poor performance of the Pakistani public sector is due to untrained 
workforce. Explaining the training need and Government‘s recent attention 
towards it in the Pakistan public sector, GAJ, a Joint Secretary, stated: 
The important thing is that Government [in the past] never gave 
importance to the trainings in the public sector. It [the government] 
always believed that few weeks training from NIPA and Staff College 
before promotion to the next grades would be enough for the officers to 
cope with the next assignment. This was not enough. If we do the job in 
routine and will not apply the innovative techniques, the quality of the 
services will compromise. Realising its importance now training is 
being given priority. [E] 
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KML, Director, also echoed similar views about training and said: 
It‘s an old system, remained ignored for long. Recently, the Civil 
Service Reform Unit was established to modernise the Public Sector in 
Pakistan who worked on the capacity building and modernising the 
system. A lot has been done, but still the gap for improvement is there. 
[U] 
The respondents also linked the poor performance of the public sector employees 
with the shortage of training opportunities and exposure to new tools and 
techniques. They seemed to recognize through their responses that in the past 
training has not been a priority agenda in the Pakistan public sector. It was 
considered to be a formality of completing papers to get promoted to the next 
level of the ladder rather than acting as a preparatory exercise for challenges that 
officers will face ahead. Informants appeared to regard the changes to the training 
system as a genuine and potentially effective way of introducing reforms. They 
were of the view that there is a strong link between the employees‘ capacity and 
quality of service. Most people during the responses highlighted the importance of 
training need for improved performance. A respondent GA, Secretary, talking 
about training effectiveness stated: 
This [training] was not enough. Improvement in the public service is a 
continuous process as now you are not only competing with your 
colleagues in the public sector but also with private sector and 
internationally who can enter  the public sector through various routes 
i.e. MP-I or MP-II
21
 as the ultimate goals for the government is to 
support the public. Their work should be done on priority. The things 
are interlinked, take my duty as an example, I am not providing service 
directly to the general public. But if I am unable to resolve the 
promotion case of a doctor who is working in a government hospital in 
time the mental tension that I will give him he will pass on to the public 
[as patient]. He/ she will not be able to perform their duties 
professionally and motivated. If we will keep doing our jobs in a 
routine manner and will not apply the innovative techniques, the quality 
of the services will be compromised. Therefore, training has been given 
the priority. [E] 
 
                                                            
21 MP stands for Management Position. MP-I/II/III are specially designed scales equivalent to 
PBS- 20/21/22 for appointment of high calibre professionals on contract from private sector 
against management positions.  The main rational of these positions was immediate bridging the 
temporary skill gaps in the public sector organisations and promoting managerial practices. 
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Also ZK, Deputy Director, highlighting the importance of imparting technical 
training for efficiency gain, said: 
The point is, unless trained workforce is not available no matter how 
sophisticated equipment you install, it will produce zero results. [E] 
 
Apart from building the technical capacity, trainings were also seen as a potential 
remedy by respondents for a major problem concerning the mindset of employees. 
A total of 14 from 20 respondents declared mindset a main cause of the poor 
performance and status quo in the public sector. Several informants commented 
on this issue as follows: 
Of course, there is a need to change the mindset of public servants- 
basic thing. (YK, Director General), [U] 
 
Basically, these reforms are necessary as we need to change our [public 
servants‘] mindset and without it, no change can be successful. (HSA, 
Second Secretary), [E] 
 
New buildings have been built, new furniture has been purchased, 
computers have been purchased and trainings have been arranged. Let 
me tell you these all are in waste because basically we are unable to 
change our [public servants‘] mindset. (UW, Secretary), [E] 
 
The term ‗mindset‘ was frequently referred by the informants. They represented 
this as an important issue that should have been addressed through reforms to 
bring any visible change. They argued that the reforms have been designed as a 
package of material changes. Although such changes have contributed as enabling 
factor, they have not led to the much-needed behavioural changes which in the 
Pakistani case are a major challenge. ‗Bureaucratic mindset‘ is an established term 
in Pakistani context, and refers to a ‗ruling‘ attitude inherited by the civil servants 
that does not place value on serving the public.  Furthermore, they appeared to be 
suggesting that the civil servants should know that if they are failing to deliver the 
quality services to the common people they will be penalised. The research 
participants argued strongly that so far, the reforms have missed this important 
dimension, which should have taken priority. Following are the responses 
received from the respondents during interviews stressing its importance: 
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Yes, it [training] is required to change the mindset. (ARH, Secretary), 
[U] 
It [reforms] has ignored a very important dimension of behavioural 
reform, which is most needed at present. No change will work unless 
the bureaucratic mindset is there. (NA, Deputy Director), [E] 
 
Buildings have been renovated. The dent in the bureaucratic culture 
was made through converting closed door offices to open. But 
unfortunately, it did not yield much, as the mind-set [attitude] of the 
civil servants is still the same. They do not accept themselves as a 
servant to the people, but ruler on them. This somehow needs to be 
changed. This was the actual product of the entire process - a visible 
change in the provisioning of service delivery. (ZK, Deputy Director), 
[E] 
The reforms are very much required. Specially, the mindset needs to be 
changed as we need to be reiterated that we are Government Servants 
and should do our job according to our job description. (YK, Director 
General), [U] 
Corruption, red-tapism and other problems will not resolve unless 
behavioural reforms of the employees are done. (SA, Data Processing 
Officer), [U] 
 
Training was considered to be an effective tool by the respondents to address this 
problem. The interviewees appeared to be suggesting that through exposure to 
appropriate local and international quality trainings at the induction stage and 
throughout the career this problem could be addressed. Furthermore, they 
suggested that through effective training programmes their role may be redefined 
and reoriented so that the people who join the public service should be trained on 
serving and not ruling. Following are the views shared by some respondents as to 
how trainings can address this problem.  
Government is facilitating officers to get trainings from abroad this will 
help to bring mind-set changes. (SA, Second Secretary), [E] 
 
Currently in service training programmes do not prepare the officers to 
work as servants of the public. However, a dedicated part of the 
training programme is about how to deal with public in different 
situations. I think we need to re-programme the whole concept of 
trainings so that on induction trainee officers are clarified about their 
changing role and expectations. (ND, Chief), [E] 
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As noted in chapter 2, in Pakistan historically the function of tax collection is 
considered equal to policing instead of facilitation. The roots of which can be 
found in British-led pre-independence history. During British Raj, the taxation 
was enforced and collected through district officers from the strong apparatus of 
the Indian Civil Service (ICS) (explained in chapter 2). These characteristics were 
then transmitted in Pakistan Civil Service (PCS) which did not greatly alter the 
methods of collection and enforcement from those used by the British. The traits 
built in ICS officers through training were to guard and rule the empire (details in 
chapter 2). Philips Woodruff, a veteran ICS officer commenting on the district 
officer‘s training it said [training] ―aims at producing confidence and certainty, 
virtues in a ruler which may degenerate into arrogance towards the ruled.‖22 This 
very strong heritage of PCS always kept the rulers‘ instincts alive in Pakistani 
bureaucracy as remnants of ICS who were nurtured under circumstances when the 
British Raj needed a lot of guardians instead of public servants to extend the rule 
of the empire. Berger and Luckmann‘s (1966) work helpfully explain as to how 
this problem of ruling mindset that has been passed down by the generations is 
‗internalised‘ by the employees of the case study organisation as ‗taken-for-
granted‘. This internalisation has given birth to a mindset which still likes to enjoy 
great discretionary power and act as ruler. Government through various reforms, 
especially, by the Bhutto regime (chapter 2 discuss them in detail) in the past have 
targeted these discretionary powers, but could not succeed due to the fact that 
without the delegation of powers to bureaucrats the government cannot perform 
its functions. This mindset prevents an officer to reorient itself as a public servant. 
Against this background, trainings by the informants have been considered to be a 
medium that can bring attitudinal change through reorientation of public servants 
to their role. There was also a strong realisation that reforming an established 
mindset is not an easy task to perform, but continuous efforts through effective 
implementation of specialised training programmes could enable it to be achieved. 
Several informants considered such a continuous process:   
                                                            
22 Philips Woodruff, The Guardian (New York, 1954), p. 14. Seen in Ralph Braibanti‘s ―The Civil 
Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis, in Evolution of Pakistan Administrative System, 
2003, reprint  
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Change is a long process. It‘s not like an order which you can pass in 
few minutes and it will happen. To bring the change you need to 
change the mindsets of the people working there. People have different 
expectations, problems and needs. You need to address them in groups 
and start from the group which is affecting the most. Then keep on 
doing it on a continuous basis till the time it becomes culture and 
people start exercising instantaneously. Don‘t start taking U-turns on 
different pressures. Strong checks and strict punishments should follow 
it. (SA, Second Secretary), [E] 
 
Whenever you bring changes, people have set mindset which is jolted. 
They don‘t accept willingly, but when these changes are made practice 
people start indulging in. It is really hard to get the people‘s 
commitment in a third world country like Pakistan. (SJ, Secretary), [E] 
While interviewees appeared to be fully supportive of the spirit of the initiative, 
they were quite critical and vocal about the way it was carried out in their 
organisation during the reforms. They also argued that one of the reasons for 
haphazard training exercise was the intent of quick ‗utilisation of funds‘ as 
donors‘ criteria for quantitatively measuring the reform progress instead of 
measuring its effectiveness as parameter of success. Research participants very 
openly criticised the procedure for the selection of candidates, their approval of 
nominations without consulting the training need assessment exercise done by the 
organisation and then their poor utilization on return from trainings.  A respondent 
UW, Secretary, talking about this stated: 
The trainings, believe me 99% is unplanned. People have gone to such 
trainings which are either not relevant to their role or has no benefit for 
the organisation. We are playing number game to reports more number 
of trainings, buildings, computers in nutshell more expenditure to report 
success. [E] 
 
SA (Deputy Director) also commented:  
No one is being sent on trainings after assessing needs, but only to 
please people and utilize the funds. No one is telling why he/she want 
to attend this particular course, what he/she has learnt and how it is 
going to help the organisation to achieve its goals. [E] 
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UW (Secretary) spoke further about this lack of planning and evaluation:   
Professional capacity building is still missing. The money has been 
wasted on unwanted trainings. The people have not been sent to 
trainings on merit. According to latest audit report only 2 people have 
been sent on the appropriate trainings they needed else everybody gone 
to attend the irrelevant trainings to visit abroad on loan and public 
money. [E] 
 
Another respondent IA, Accounts Officer, commented: 
There needs to be joined-up and harmonised efforts. Likewise, we 
started many capacity building projects under CSRU and facilitated the 
graduation and masters programs for the officers, but we failed in 
capitalising those capacity building into improved service delivery. [E] 
 
The above statements were representative of the views of most informants, to 
whom the training opportunities were never provided equally and rationally. 
Discussing the details of poor management of this very important initiative the 
respondents associated the poor results with unchanged mindsets and lack of 
professional capacity required to improve the performance of the organisation.  
The interviewees also criticised the superficial nature of initiatives like 
preparation of Job Description booklets containing job descriptions (JDs) of all 
the position in the presence of already defined JDs by the Government which 
were advertised during the recruitment process. Similarly, exercise of training 
needs assessment (TNA) was referred as unfruitful exercise as actually it has 
never been referred back while approving trainings for the employees. They 
framed the issue as that practically nobody bothers to consult these sorts of 
booklets in the conduct of daily office business (i.e. while assigning official tasks 
or approving the trainings) they are there just for the purpose of meeting the 
donors‘ criteria and report as milestone on paper but practically they are not being 
referred. They were regarding, these potentially useful initiatives non-productive 
due to their disconnection in practice from the whole process of reforms. 
Another issue raised by different respondents related to training was poor 
utilisation of employees after returning from trainings. They emphasized that 
since there was no planned exercise being undertaken by the organisation 
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therefore expecting placement plan for their proper utilisation on return was too 
much. There were various examples quoted by the respondents which indicated 
that officers who attended several trainings under this program were subsequently 
transferred to other Government departments for which the training was not 
relevant. SP, Joint Director, stated:   
The people who were sent to trainings have been posted to other 
departments ignoring expenditure made over them. [E] 
 
KML (Director) also commented: 
The nominees when approved to send on trainings draws on paper a 
great relevance of target course with regard to their current duties 
which suddenly becomes irrelevant when he/she is posted to another 
desk even just on return. [U] 
 
This analysis of the situation is very close to the NCGR‘s findings on public 
sector capacity building project, which concludes that the desired results of 
capacity building programmes are missing. The two main impediments to 
capacity building NCGR suggested were a lack of proper TNA and lack of proper 
placement of officers on their return from training.  
6.2.2 Discussion 
Several reports by international agencies highlight the capacity problems amongst 
the developing countries‘ public sector employees. They have claimed that low 
capacity of the public functionaries hinders them from performing their roles 
more efficiently and effectively (The World Bank, 1997, 2005) and suggested that 
trainings can be an effective means of building employees‘ capacity.  A number of 
academic studies also demonstrate that training can have a positive impact on both 
individuals‘ and organisations‘ performance. Wynarczyk et. al., (1993) found a 
significant relationship between the training of employees and performance of an 
organisation. d‘Arcimoles (1997) found that training is associated with effects on 
both productivity and profitability. Kalleberg and Moody (1994), Delaney and 
Huselid (1996) and Harel and Tzafrir (1999) suggested that training has a positive 
impact on the perceived performance of an organisation. Hence, the international 
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agencies, specially the World Bank have made the capacity building component 
an important part of any public sector reform programme (The World Bank, 
2005).  
In the case study organisation, on the recommendation of the task force and the 
World Bank the government agreed to include this component in the overall 
reform programme. The component of trainings in the case study organisation was 
included mainly due to two reasons: facilitating the ongoing reforms and 
preparing the workforce for the future needs of the organisation. The findings of 
this study, however, show that the result of this component was compromised 
despite its demonstrated support by the employees. The majority of employees in 
their responses acknowledged the importance of training for any organisation. But 
in their views this initiative in CBR was undermined during its implementation.  
They alleged the TNA and JD exercise as ceremonial and superficial. They 
pointed towards the absence of any objective criteria and transparent, systematic 
selection process of the employee training. In their opinion majority of the 
trainings were unrelated to the nominee‘s official role. The interviewees looked it 
as an opportunity which should have been used to address the specific problems 
of attitude and technical capacity building targeting current and future needs of 
the organisation. Instead, this process has been treated as fulfilment of criteria to 
meet the conditions on paper and spend money. The criticism remained on the 
ineffective implementation of this important initiative. It can be inferred from the 
responses that the reformers have assumed that once the training target in numbers 
and cost will be met on paper the organisation will be transformed and employees 
will be prepared to work under new settings. The responses are suggesting that the 
failure of this initiative can be attributed as a result of this false assumption 
leading the implementers to undertake a technical exercise that ignored the 
contents of trainings, by passed the genuine process of selecting appropriate 
candidates and overlooking their utilisation on return but focused meeting the 
numbers. The second important change under the human resource initiative often 
discussed by the research participants was salaries. 
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6.2.3 Salaries 
In chapter 2, I indicated that the pay structure of the Pakistan public sector does 
not offer a living wage to its employees. Several studies have marked it is one of 
the leading causes of a de-motivated, non-responsive and corrupt workforce 
(Pakistan, 2002; Mehdi, 1996; Haq, 1978; Ashraf, 1998). The Government has 
made several attempts to bridge this gap through small raises but could not fully 
succeed due to fiscal stress. Despite putting more pressure on the exchequer, this 
strategy could not satisfy the financial needs of public sector employees. The 
absence of a living wage created a need and justification for public servants to get 
involved in the financial and moral corruption. Employees who were able to 
utilise the Government‘s position and power to generate extra financial resources 
exercised this option (Government, 2002). The remaining, who either were not in 
power and position to engage in financial corruption or due to any other reasons 
e.g. religion, did not used this option started involving in moral corruption such as 
absenteeism, unprofessional attitude towards work, and go-slow.  These practices 
enabled them to use their energies and efforts somewhere else to generate 
additional financial means.  
It is very commonly observable that professional public servants, such as doctors 
and engineers, started their own practices in parallel, while non-technical and 
generalist officers and officials are running their private businesses or doing other 
part time jobs in private capacity (i.e. chartered accountancy firms or corporate 
offices of large taxpayers in the case of organisation under study) during and after 
office hours. Pakistan‘s National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) noted 
―...doctors and teachers deliberately providing poor services so that clients buy 
their private clinic and tutorial services. The Transparency International (TI) 
survey highlights teachers insisting on pupils buying their books through 
designated shops where they get commission and this benefits relatives or friends‖ 
(pp. 29). In Pakistan‘s case it appears as corruption has also become 
institutionalised as NACS further pointed on page five ―Corruption is largely 
socially accepted as a norm and regarded as inevitable ‖, therefore, the people 
who did make a living wage are also involved in corruption. In any case, Pakistan 
public sector‘s performance was compromised, and was criticised for being a non-
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responsive and corrupt institution. Chapter 5 explains that the Government‘s task 
force and WB‘s PAD both found that the existing pay package offered to the 
employees of CBR was extremely insufficient. In their findings, existing pay was 
neither acceptable as provider of living wage nor justified against the 
discretionary powers granted by law to the employees of CBR. This disparity 
pushed the employees towards financial and moral corruption. Both the 
documents also identified a strong connection between the provision of a living 
wage and the establishment of an effective and honest organisation, and endorsed 
an upward adjustment of the employee compensation package with comparison to 
the market. The task force also recommended workforce rationalisation declaring 
it highly inappropriate mix of various grades. Furthermore, the task force 
recommended a rationalisation of the workforce which would reduce the number 
of staff in lower, non-technical grades.  The cost savings realised from this could 
then be used to finance the additional cost of wages of selected employees (details 
in chapter 5).  
The Government, however, disagreed upfront with the proposal of downsizing 
due to expected political repercussions and left it to the option of natural attrition 
while banning the new appointments at lower levels in the organisation. The 
Government also, overruled the recommendations of both reports and instead 
approved a short term strategy of discretionary rewards and a long term strategy 
of an additional allowance equal to 100% of basic pay for selected employees 
while keeping them in the existing Federal Pay Scales (FPS). This approval was 
in-line with the failed strategy (chapter 2) of previous attempts of government to 
provide some support to employees pay in the shape of ad-hoc allowance or ad-
hoc relief allowance. Two plausible explanations could be presented behind this 
decision: i) Government did not have enough financial resources to sustain this 
initiative and ii) that the Ministry of Finance is superior and supervising body of 
CBR along with many other financial organisations, was still drawing the low 
wages under FPS. However, the Chairman of CBR was given extra financial 
authority to reward the selected employees on his discretion. The practice of 
giving rewards only selected individuals continued until the people were selected 
through the process of Internal Job Posting (IJP) which made them qualified for 
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the additional allowance. The entire process of reward practice and the selection 
process of IJP become a mean of corruption itself and affected the employees and 
their work immensely. 
During fieldwork, all 20 interviewees talked about the issue of salaries addressed 
during reforms and shared their experience about it. All of them argued that the 
not provisioning of living wage lead to a number of severe problems like 
corruption and red-tapism. The following statements from the respondents portray 
the situation regarding poor pay and its effects: 
Corruption, red-tapism, everything leads from low wages. (NQ, 
Director), [E] 
All bad things are prevailing in here like corruption, irresponsible 
behaviour, unaccountability, favouritism etc. The root cause of all these 
is poor salary structure. (MZ, Senior Auditor), [E] 
I think every department requires reforms. People are not performing to 
their abilities. Wages are inappropriate. The mechanism of supervision 
is totally missing. Corruption is one of the leading problems. 
Corruption compels a person to disprove his capability. The corruption 
has spoiled our departments. (MS, Private Secretary), [E] 
Corruption is one of the main effects of poor wages. It is from top to 
bottom. It is unfortunate that we have become a corrupt nation. (ZK, 
Deputy Director), [E] 
Generally the respondents welcomed the increase in salaries and expressed their 
satisfaction over provisioning of enhanced financial perks. However, they argued 
that it still did not constitute a living wage and did not match their responsibilities 
and available discretionary powers. The respondents viewed this discrepancy as a 
basic cause of inefficiency and corruption. Still for them undoubtedly, this small 
incentive against the substantive increase recommended by the Taskforce was the 
biggest advantage associated with the entire reforms programme. As several 
interviewees commented: 
The only attraction for us in reforms was [enhanced] salary. (WA, 
Deputy Commissioner Income Tax), [E] 
Employees were in favour as they were expecting an increase in their 
income. The only consideration for me was financial benefits. (SA, 
Second Secretary), [E] 
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They [employees] were in its favour because of benefits attached to it 
like salary increase, more trainings and progressive opportunity. (UW, 
Secretary), [E] 
By looking at the overwhelming popularity of this initiative displayed by the 
interviewees, one can say that, if it had been utilised appropriately, it could have 
served as an enabling factor for the wider reform (detailed in chapter 5). However, 
responses received during the fieldwork suggested that the adjustments to salaries 
adversely affected both progress on reforms and the overall functioning of the 
organisation. During the interviews employees heavily objected the process of its 
implementation. They alleged that the process was highly subjective and unfair 
and that the ‗favourites‘ of power holders were rewarded. A respondent NA 
(Secretary) presenting the situation in his words said: 
Since the people were chosen to occupy new roles on personal liking 
and disliking therefore, anxiety was prevailing all around. The people 
who were chosen were happy as they were feeling their jobs secure and 
getting additional allowance and people who left were questioning why 
they were not picked. There was no clear procedure and things were 
messed. A person sitting in the same room in the same rank doing 
similar activities for same hours was getting double the wage and 
without any [concrete] reason was unjustified. [E] 
 
This account raises three important issues:  unfair selection process, anxiety 
amongst employees, and general demotivation and distrust as contributing factors 
in the deteriorating work environment instead of motivated, satisfied and 
productive workforce foreseen at the time of conceptualization this initiative. 
Similar thoughts were shared by another respondent UW, Secretary, while giving 
his feedback on this issue: 
Salaries were raised, but not linked with the performance. People were 
selected at their will without any proper system and eventually all were 
granted high salaries that actually killed the spirit of this initiative. [E] 
He was backing his argument with his experience of reforms and pointing the 
process deficient enough to ruin the entire efforts of linking the performance with 
reward expected from this initiative. This spirit, he was referring to was the 
promotion of the healthy work competition amongst the employees through which 
the hardworking, efficient and honest employees were to be financially rewarded 
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to influence the rest. The initiative, which begun with ambitious objectives 
suddenly surrendered in front of agitation, strikes and go-slow policy adopted by 
the employees who were not selected in competition and or considered misfit in 
the new organisation and eventually all employees were accommodated. They 
were of the view that there has to have a strong foundation for such reform action 
before implementation otherwise its impacts will be compromised as in the case 
of CBR. This shaky policy of granting tiny additional allowance instead of 
provisioning of a living wage to all after going through a huge exercise and 
creating acute turmoil in the organisation yielded nothing except incurring 
additional financial costs towards pay bill and dissatisfied and divided workforce 
(chapter 5). The other beneficiaries of this amnesty were the elements involved in 
financial corruption also rewarded with this additional bonus. A respondent NA 
explaining this in his own words said: 
Let‘s take the example of raising salaries, it does matter to them only 
who are surviving on salary alone and what is the point of putting a 
laptop on the table of a person who don't know how to use it and how 
these together can ensure increased performance? There has to have a 
wilful logical mechanism to put them all together and ensure their 
accountability otherwise all is wasted. [E] 
Similarly ZA, Deputy Director also voiced: 
Employees were happy with the increase of pay, especially, a person 
who is only relying on his/her salary and no other means of income. [E] 
In the above statements, both the interviewees pointing towards their fellows who 
are already earning far more than their salary and such increases don‘t motivate 
them to stop corrupt practices. They were predicting its possible affect on the 
people who are involved in petty corruption or moral corruption as it was 
balancing their small earnings from other resources, but it is potentially an 
additional advantage for those who are already making big money from other 
illegal means (details in chapter 5).  The first respondent particularly suggested a 
proper scrutiny process and a chain of actions for getting better results. Wages, 
corruption and accountability were three interrelated factors presented by some 
respondents together. Following are a few quotes from the interviewees 
explaining this relationship in their words: 
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Corruption is a relative phenomenon, why people are so interested in it 
because there is always a reflection of society which is a mindset and 
any person who bring-up in any society he/she adopts them. Corruption 
is ever increasing. Let‘s take the example of a taxpayer, who does not 
pay the tax with honesty, he/she is also involved in the corruption. If a 
civil servant helps a taxpayer to avoid the tax it needs to be stopped, 
likewise, if a civil servant is helping someone to get the contract with 
undue favour then the quality of work will compromise. It is very 
important to control it. The second is accountability, without it nothing 
can be achieved. It should not be applicable to clerks and lower level 
employees only. It should start from top to bottom. If a person allows 
building an extra 15 mile patch in an approved road to please a 
personality is a perpetual loss. It is not only increasing the current 
liability, but also accumulating future loss in the shape of its 
maintenance, fuel consumption, etc. So the accountability is a must to 
ensure efficiency and reduce corruption. (GAJ, Joint Secretary), [E] 
 
WA, Deputy Commissioner Income Tax, shared similar thoughts and said: 
It‘s a predominately related to behaviour, but another thing which I 
think is important that the system of reward and punishment is also 
fading from the PSS.  The problem is of accountability. Previously, any 
person who does extraordinary work and let‘s take the example of tax 
collector if an officer was detecting and recovering a huge amount, 1% 
of it was given to him as a token of reward, then there was no need for 
him to make corruption. Even then, if a person was found in any 
corruption or malpractice he/she was either dismissed as major penalty 
or at least he was made ineligible for good postings. In the beginning 
good posting were the reward of only clean and honest people known 
for their character. From the time this concept of accountability has 
vanished and everyone has gone corrupt. They know nothing will 
happen do whatever you want to do. [E] 
The above responses present a possible proposition where corruption is a result of 
low wages and unaccountability. The prime cause of the trail they see is low 
wages which corrupt employees use to justify their corrupt practices, partnering 
with their fellows working as agents of anticorruption thus unaccountability is 
also ensured. The responses also explain the poor effects of policies implemented 
over time, resulting in promoted corrupt practices and discouraging hard work and 
honesty. Furthermore, senior servants are not held accountable for their decisions 
and actions, even if they post the known corrupt official to a more lucrative 
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position, nobody is checking it. This process doesn‘t end here according to FM. It 
starts an unstoppable chain - reaction amongst the rest of the employees, she said: 
Why people do the wrong things is the questions? This is because when 
he/she sees a person sitting next him is doing something wrong and 
he/she get away with it he start believing him/herself as a fool. Despite, 
the opportunity he did not take advantage. This leads to a situation 
where the difference between the good and bad is eliminated. Rather, a 
person who opted bad and got rewarded leaves a message to those who 
didn‘t that you are an idiot. A very strict monitoring and accountability 
mechanism is absolutely essential. Evaluations should be honest and 
every horse and donkey should not be treated equally. Fair evaluation 
and strict vigilance is needed. [U] 
The effects of this action and reaction further travels across the public sector in 
the shape of examples and stories and spread message of being fooled amongst all 
honest employees that prompt them to bad-practices as well. The respondent 
proposed strict accountability mechanism ensuring unbiased and prompt reward 
and punishment practices as a potential solution of this problem. A senior rank 
officer YK, Director General expressed his views as: 
Actually, part of accountability is totally missing. If any of us fails to 
perform our job we should be penalised. But again our culture comes 
here and we start receiving phone calls for favourable considerations. 
Like in Islam the punishments are hard but once they are exercised 
people start behaving. If a person knows that he will be caught if he 
crossing the line he will never cross it. [U] 
Exemplifying some good examples of check and balance from other countries, 
though not similar to Pakistan, a respondent GA, Secretary said:   
In countries like Singapore, Malaysia and New Zealand people have 
been rewarded handsomely, but at the same time if they fail in 
delivering and found in corrupt practices they are punished heavily. A 
similar mechanism is also needed here. [E] 
The respondents were of the opinion that the public servants are underpaid and 
keep looking at the other means of income all the time. This situation creates two 
types of problems: one, financial corruption because their salaries are not good 
enough for survival; two, the people who are not involved in financial or moral 
corruption start involving as they start any other business or job in the private 
sector and visit offices for the sake of attendance only which results in poor 
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performance. This is backed by prevailing poor monitoring and accountability 
system in the public sector, which ignores both types of corruption and gives 
space to flourish it across the public sector organisations. Since, the system does 
not effectively blocks and punishes the people who are involved in financial or 
moral corruption, therefore others who are clean also start thinking on the similar 
lines. The point they were trying to make is that the Government should use a 
carrot and stick policy to improve the PPS. Carrot by ensuring paying living 
wages to PS employees and then stick as imposition of heavy punishments and 
penalties for those who are involved in any sort of corruption 
6.2.4 Discussion 
Like many other developing countries in Pakistan as well, the Government 
employees are getting low wages, even lower than their counterparts working in 
the private sector (Cyan, 2006; Hyder & Reilly, 2005; Ishrat et al., 2008; Kiragu 
& Mukandala, 2003; Nasir, 2000; Shafqat, 1999). The World Bank in its study of 
Africa public sector (The World Bank, 1994) noted ―as government compensation 
falls, both in absolute terms and relative to alternative remunerative activities, 
civil servants adjust to the new situation. Turnover rates and absenteeism, 
increase; moonlighting and day-lighting become more frequent, and the latter, 
more blatant, recruitment and retention, especially of professionals, become more 
difficult. It has also been argued that petty corruption rises, including the sale of 
government services themselves, for example, under-the-table charges for 
livestock vaccinations or the extorting on payments by teachers to instruct 
schoolchildren‖ (pp. 27). Rjickegham and Weder (1997) in their analysis of civil 
service wage, meritocracy and corruption in 31 countries concluded that active 
wage policy can help in tackling corruption. The task force after analysing the 
case study organisation recommended substantive increase. The World Bank 
endorsing it as the main problem in the case study organisation also recommended 
plugging it through appropriate upward pay adjustment and linking it to the open 
market. The two basic reasons for this were i) the wages were not justified as 
living wage ii) it was not appropriate against the discretionary powers and 
opportunities available for corruption.  
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The government however, refused to do so and raised a small proportion of the 
salaries with an open window of subjective discretionary financial rewards. The 
main reason provided by the Government in Pakistan for not been able to correct 
this problem is insufficient financial resources (Ishrat et al., 2008).This study 
founds both the decision deficient and toxic enough to kill the spirit of initiative. 
The salaries were not sufficiently raised thus neither the doors for corruption were 
shut permanently nor motivated, dedicated and efficient workforce sought through 
this was prepared. On top, the reward practices and IJP selection method adopted 
by the organisational leadership for its implementation also seemed to be regarded 
inappropriate by the interviewees. This further deepened the performance issues 
by creating divide between privileged and unprivileged classes of workers across 
the organisation. The 16 respondents from the 20 accorded unanimously the 
selection process as unfair, ambiguous and biased.  These results are aligned with 
the findings of previous studies e.g. (Frey & Felix, 1997; Frey & Jegen, 2001) that 
perception of unfair division of the performance related financial incentives could 
result in declining intrinsic motivation. However, interviewees displaying 
overwhelming popularity and reception of this initiative appeared to be convinced 
that through effective implementation of the recommendations it could have easily 
achieved the targets set at the time of conceptualisation.  
While responding to the question of significant changes introduced in the case 
study organisation, use of information technology was mentioned by the most 
respondents along with, training, and salary.  
6.2.5 Information Technology 
In chapter 2, I explained that the Government has recently started digitalization in 
the public sector through approval of National IT Policy and Action Plan, 2000. 
To implement the E-Government programme, the Government in 2002 
established an organisation called Electronic Government Directorate (EGD) 
under the Ministry of Information Technology. This programme was aimed 
towards economic development and competitiveness by effectively connecting the 
Government within, with citizens and with entrepreneurs. Another major step the 
Government took in 2005 by approving the E-Government Strategy & Five year 
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Plan (details in chapter 2). Though, the Government has been able to bring some 
improvements since then but the overall progress of the programme was found 
unsatisfactory by the National Commission for Government Reforms (NCGR) in 
its review of 2008.   
Chapter 5 highlights that in the case study organisation the extensive use of 
Information Technology (IT) was recommended by the Taskforce constituted by 
the Government. The committee, after studying the entire system and evaluating 
current and future IT needs of the organisation pointed several deficiencies 
(details in chapter 5). The committee also gave a roadmap for taking corrective 
measures and strengthening the IT base in the case study organisation (chapter 5). 
The WB through its PAD also attested the committees‘ recommendations and 
suggested transformation from manual to automated work environment for 
effective control, bringing transparency, gaining efficiency, minimizing face-to-
face contact between taxpayers and tax collectors to reduce the corruption, and 
availability of accurate information for swift decision making.   
It seems from a quick review of intentions above that computerisation or IT was 
introduced as a multipurpose ‗antibiotic‘ in the case study organisation. Mainly 
this was used to cure the prevalent illnesses like corruption, red-tapism, and 
inefficiency. It appeared that the reformers hold the assumption while designing 
the reforms for the case study organisation that enhanced use of IT will resolve a 
long list of technical and socio-cultural problems.  
The effort to promote the use of Information Technology is also one of the major 
changes that employees have felt at national and organisational level. All 20 
interviewees in their responses pointed and talked about efforts of the 
Government to increase the use of IT in Pakistan Public Sector (PPS). During 
interviews the informants in principle supported the overall idea of promoting the 
use of IT in the PPS as a whole and particularly in the case study organisation. 
But for the first time during my fieldwork, the majority of the respondents 
criticised the both parts of conceptualisation and implementation of any initiative 
at the national and organisational level.  
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During the fieldwork on my open question regarding major changes observed in 
the PPS at national level, 9 out of 20 respondents replied enhanced use of 
Information Technology.  A few responses received from the respondents are:  
The biggest improvement one can see [in PPS] is the enhanced reliance 
on the Information Technology which is improving its effectiveness. I 
think it‘s a challenging task and will take time to show results. (JS, 
Secretary), [E] 
I see things are getting better with the initiatives likes E-Government. 
This will make the organisation perform more efficiently and 
responsibly. (SJ, Secretary), [E] 
The government has introduced IT in various sectors like PIFRA, it‘s a 
big change. Although we have yet to reap full fruits of these changes, 
but definitely, things will improve over the time. Similar National 
Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) is working very well. 
The passport and immigration is also transforming from manual to 
digital system. Also computerisation of vehicles‘ record and licences 
are being done. So all in all, things are moving in a positive direction 
and of course one cannot expect results in days. We need to give these 
initiatives time to make an impact. (SA, Second Secretary), [E] 
 
The respondents were confirming IT‘s enhanced used in the PPS and also 
foreseeing its positive impact on performance. However, they are also agreeing 
and justifying its slow progress resulting in the low facilitation of common people 
on this account. This stance taken by the respondents is similar to NCGR‘s 
findings on E-Government initiative (details in chapter 2).  
A very senior officer DG criticising the overall computerisation efforts of the 
Government during interview explained that although extended use of information 
technology in the public sector organisations is being encouraged, but it is neither 
improving control of managers nor delivering improved service to public. He said: 
Reliance on the IT is being promoted at all levels in government to get 
facilitation from it. Examples of these in the public sector are PRAL, 
NADRA, FBS, and PIFRA. Actually, it is my favourite question; the 
down side of it is the expected cultural change in the PS is not there that 
is the biggest problem.  Look technology and systems and procedures 
can be cosmetics or decoration piece. So the Government, state and 
above all people will only get benefited when governance is improved, 
service delivery is improved and problems of people are also decreased. 
For example judicial system, policing, land administration, revenue 
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administration, hospital, schools, where people have daily contact of 
life have not improved. I, unfortunately, don‘t see any improvement in 
overall organisational culture. You know how such improvement 
comes? It comes from the mind, from value system – here money is 
everything. It‘s a huge area of research. Look at Pakistan Railways 
where heavy computerisation is done and even now you cannot get 
tickets on the date you want without paying bribe which means that the 
trains are fully reserved and yet Pakistan Railways book losses of 
billions every year. Same is the case of Pakistan International Airlines 
(PIA), [E] 
  
Furthering DG‘s voice, SA, Data Processing Officer, another respondent 
responding on the digitalisation efforts of the government said: 
Though we have introduced the IT in the public sector, but the problem 
of facilitation is still there. Recently, I had faced problems with 
NADRA and I lodged the complaint through a link given on their [web] 
page, but get a response to my complaint I had to wait 2 weeks. Is it 
how technology facilitates? No, there was not any data processing 
involved, but still people are behaving similarly. Nobody is monitoring 
its effectiveness. We need to bring soul in it, i.e. promptness and 
accuracy. In my own organisation still the things are so poor that I 
myself applied for a registration of sales tax since two months and still 
it hasn‘t done so you can well imagine the effectiveness of IT. [U] 
The respondents are categorically denying any current positive effects of 
computerisation on the public sector by quoting various examples where even 
after multimillion dollar investment in IT the results are not encouraging. The 
second response above is from a person working in the IT department of the case 
study organisation. Clearly he is also disappointed with the overall digitalisation 
efforts of the government and particularly from his own department where 
specific attention is paid to IT under the reforms. His response suggests alongside 
the investment on IT an objective monitoring mechanism which can ensure its 
appropriate usage and benefit. 
Their concerns are technical as well as human. They said that the government 
through external links (websites) trying to give impressions of technical 
advancement and efficiency, which is not there due to two main reasons, i.e. i) 
missing internal technical and human capacity, and; ii)  ineffective monitoring and 
unaccountability mechanism. The respondents were trying to make the point that 
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if the requests, complaints and applications are unattended for months and nobody 
is held accountable for their quick disposal then what is the point of using IT. 
They were saying that if this is the intent of technology introduction and making 
heavy investments on this account then it‘s useless. They were referring 
promptness, accuracy, transparency and accountability as the soul of IT 
initiatives.  Their views are also in line with the report of NCGR (chapter 5) 
which notes that the Government has made some progress on this account by 
making information available through departmental websites and open channels 
of communication with the masses but lacking in streamlining their business 
process and development of specific softwares to increase the productivity. They 
were conveying that unless a logical and systematic effort is not made by the 
Government with the intent to facilitate the public the things will not improve 
only because of IT installations. 
In the case study organisation the efforts to promote the use of IT was initiated 
even before the Government‘s dedicated attention to E-Government in the year 
2000 (chapter 5). For this purpose, the case study organisation in 1994 decided to 
form its own subsidiary called Pakistan Automation Revenue Authority (PRAL) 
to bridge the existing IT related capacity gap, particularly in the area of data 
management as a revenue collection agency. This was however being done, 
without a consistent IT strategy and in a standalone mode, at various levels of 
organisation to address the specific problems being faced by individual tax 
departments (Income Tax, Customs, Sales Tax and DR&S etc.). The PRAL 
although, could not fully achieve its objectives in the case study, but it was able to 
promote the IT use at the individual level and raise the level of IT awareness 
amongst the members of the case study organisation (role of PRAL is discussed in 
chapter 5). The task force in its report also commended the case study 
organisation for its efforts of promoting IT over time (chapter 5). Explaining the 
computerization process at CBR, a senior officer GAJ, Secretary, said:  
FBR's reform efforts were long going, previously we created an 
organisation within, known as PRAL to automate but it was just an 
effort to transform within. When we realized that it was not enough and 
we need to address it holistically, we did it under TARP. [E] 
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NA, Deputy Director also explaining it said: 
It was PRAL, a small organisation of technical people, who were called 
to provide help on IT related problems as and when required. Now, IT 
is being addressed under reform programme. [E] 
 
As explained earlier that the IT initiative was introduced by the reformers to gain 
multiple advantages of efficiency, transparency and control. The respondents‘ 
however, criticised the concept and alleged it was not based on ground realities. A 
respondent WA, Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax said: 
Computerisation has been done without understanding that only 25%
23
 
is the literacy
24
 rate of our country and it is also a fact that only those 
opt for [small] businesses those have rarely attended the schools. How 
will they cope with it? It‘s fine with the big businesses that has 
specialised departments to deal with it, but the majority of the taxpayers 
are illiterate and opted businesses because of not getting proper 
education. Such indigenous and cultural things should have been kept 
in mind while bringing changes. [E] 
 
Another respondent, ARH, Secretary adding on the issue said: 
Ideally [per the intent of the reformers] it should have been ensured that 
clients and we are completely disconnected. IT should have been used 
for it. Let‘s take the example of softwares we introduced for e-filing or 
registering are not being handled by common person doing business. 
They now come to [departmental] clerks and inspectors for e-filling and 
registration. [U] 
 
The respondents were highlighting the conceptual issues of IT initiative. Their 
emphasis was while amongst the prime causes of introducing the IT in the case 
study organisation is to minimise the face-to-face interaction of tax collectors and 
taxpayers to control the corruption, this initiative is working adversely. According 
                                                            
23 The literacy rate of Pakistan according to UNESCO Institute of Statistic in July 2002 is 43.2 %. 
The official released figure of Government is 45.09%. (http://www.pbs.gov.pk). 
24 The literacy in Pakistan is defined as: a person of 10 plus age is literate if he/she ―can read a 
newspaper and write a simple letter, in any language.‖  
http://unesco.org.pk/education/life/files/Need%20Assessment%20Report%20on%20LIFE.pdf  
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to them the majority of the clients are small and medium taxpayers
25
 who are even 
more dependent on the tax officials and vulnerable to rent-seeking behaviour 
because of low literacy rate and unfamiliarity with IT. 
While some of the respondents‘ correlated non-progressiveness on this account 
with inside resistance of the organisation. A few respondents suggesting this said: 
People didn't like it because installation of computer means bringing 
transparency and forcing the people to produce quick work. (WU, 
Secretary), [E] 
Once you start taking initiatives of reforms like introduction of IT 
people start taking it personal and start opposing it. (SJ, Second 
Secretary), [E] 
 
Adding on this point, some of the respondents also related it to workforce intent 
and said since they are not supporting this initiative therefore, success in any 
shape either efficiency or transparency is not possible. The respondents supported 
their point as: 
Computers still not facilitating the taxpayers because the intent is 
missing (UW, Secretary), [E] 
Though we have involved the IT but do think we are making use of it. 
No, it is not. Neither we have intention to do it quicker nor is someone 
monitoring it. It‘s the issue of Intent, through IT things reaches to the 
people quickly, but then waits for actions which ultimately to be taken 
by the men. We need to reform the users not the systems. When we will 
understand this point we will be able to get better results even from 
poor systems (SA, Data Processing Officer), [U] 
 
Although the majority of respondents criticized and confessed that in general 
CBR has been unsuccessful in achieving its objectives of computerization, but 
there were few voices lauding its achievements. One such voice was KML, 
Director, who said during the interview: 
Yes, through effective introduction of Information technology and its 
extensive use, things have gone quicker, time bound and transparent as 
compare to earlier. [U] 
                                                            
25  M(TP&R)‘s presentation at Commissioner Conference on 28.3.2004 the small and medium 
taxpayers constitute 99% of the total tax base.  
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Explaining further, he quoted the references of development of tax specific 
applications like Sales Tax Automated Refund Repository (STARR), Pakistan 
Customs Computerized System (PACCS) and Income Tax Management System 
(ITMS) through which automated business processes of each tax/levy is done. 
While the majority of the respondents negated this claim of fully functional 
automated tax type softwares and discussed during the interview that CBR has 
achieved the objectives of physical connectivity within and outside organisation 
through the establishment of LANs, WANs and website, but despite laps of entire 
project period software developments are still in testing phases. SA, second 
secretary explained the situation as: 
In IT we are standing nowhere. We bought the computer to replace the 
typewriters. The softwares which are being developed are not being 
done after detail studies and judging its needs. We order, then make 
payments, receive it and scrap it. Nobody is being held accountable for 
this waste.  A person who was responsible is posted to another place 
and nobody is in the picture what to do and how. [E] 
 
Explaining the situation another senior officer FM, Chief responded:  
We remained failed in developing softwares. Let us take the example of 
software developed for Income Tax. We tried to buy, prepare and 
customize different softwares but yet we are receiving complaints about 
them. Now it‘s being developed again by our subsidiary PRAL with the 
name ITMS. As regards, the problems with software development, we 
are also not clear, to the extent I have explored it and got feedback from 
users it is of the operational nature. I mean that it‘s the users who are 
unable to understand and put proper data which creates performance 
issues. For which trainings are required and if you just want to fail the 
software purposefully with false entries and then start complaining then 
nobody can ever make perfect software. [U] 
 
6.2.6 Discussion 
I indicated in chapter 2, that enhanced growth and use of Information Technology 
also facilitated the public sector reforms. In contrast to the bureaucracy which 
emphasised on centralisation the idea of new public management focused on 
decentralisation along with accountability. Greer (1994) argued that IT provided 
the necessary tools and structures for making managerial reforms. Moreover, it 
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demonstrated results to bring speed, transparency and reliability also qualified it 
to be the central ingredient of PSR. Therefore, IT reserved the central place in the 
designing and implementation of reform in the case study organisation as well. It 
was foreseen that it will work as wide-spectrum antibiotic to cure the diseases like 
corruption, red-tapism, ambiguity, inefficiency and unreliability. 
I noticed strong support of this initiative amongst the research participants. The 
major objections raised by the respondents on the conceptualisation were ignoring 
the ground realities like low literacy rate of the population, digital divide, difficult 
softwares, unresponsive PS organisations and non existence of monitoring and 
accountability mechanism. This to them produced the results opposite to desired, 
the frequently quoted example was enhanced contact between the taxpayers and 
tax collectors instead of restricted as desired outcome through application of 
softwares. While criticising its implementation strategy the respondents were 
discussing the undue hurry towards establishment of Hardware infrastructure i.e. 
laptops, PCs, Servers etc. and neglecting the part of software development for 
which this platform was being prepared. They also criticised the overextended 
planning, consultative, and experimentation phases which sabotaged the entire 
process of IT enablement hence no substantive achievement has been made on 
this front and the progress again remained till the hardware changes similar to the 
national efforts of digitalising public sector organisations (chapter 2).    
This scenario of the case study organisation is quite similar to already discussed 
first phase of overall government‘s performance on digitalization efforts. The 
general reasons attributed by respondents towards the low success was i) more 
focused efforts to build the infrastructure and procurement of new PCs, laptops 
and servers etc., ii) involvement of complex business process reengineering iii) 
lack of reforms ownership by each tax leaders iv)  negative attitude of employees 
towards Information Technology and fear of accountability.  
6.3 The donors response to FBR’s informants observations 
Before concluding this chapter it seems important to address the allegations raised 
by the research participants from the case study organisation. The two frequent 
allegations raised by the research participants on donors‘ role in the course of 
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field work were: poor monitoring mechanism and stress on expenditure.  I raised 
these important questions during my interviews with donors‘ representatives 
which I will discuss in the following paragraphs. 
Both the donors‘ representatives viewed the progress in Pakistan‘s Public Sector 
(PPS) differently. The World Bank‘s (WB) representative expressed his view as 
that Government of Pakistan has made good progress on account of bringing 
improvements in the Public sector. He highlighted the increased transparency in 
PPS due to the contributions of media, government‘s own regulating 
organisations, international watchdogs, democratic institutions and awareness of 
the public. While the Asian Development Bank‘s (ADB) representative 
maintained that the situation of the Pakistan public sector has become worse. 
Explaining further, he said PS cannot be viewed in isolation, but it has to be seen 
with in a full context of society as PS is a part of it. He expressed his opinion 
about the Pakistani society as that its values are fading so as the performance of 
the public sector being part of it as public servants are the members of a shared 
society. He, however, suggested a solution which has worked in other places of 
the world sharing the similar culture with Pakistan. He framed the problem as the 
public sector is hugely underpaid sector where servants keep looking at the other 
means of income all the time. He expressed (ADB‘s informant): 
I see the public sector as part of a whole society and not separate. And I 
have a firm belief that unless society overall will not improve neither of its 
sectors will show any significant improvement. Though some 
technological advantages we can spot to increase transparency, but it will 
not yield unless public servants will not be paid living wages and made 
accountable, these are two interrelated things and we want to produce 
results by correcting one side. [U] 
He was trying to make the point that the Government should use a carrot and stick 
policy to improve the PPS. Carrot in the shape of paying living wages to PPS 
employees and then stick as imposition of heavy punishments and fines to those 
public sector employees who even then found involved in any sort of corruption. 
Further, he expressed that the way government has addressed this with the support 
of donors will not address the problem completely. He argued that technological 
changes can help a person to improve its efficiency, but cannot improve his/her 
  
151 
will to work. Current policies to bring improvement in the public sector are just 
like that we are providing modern technologies, upgrading infrastructure, 
imparting trainings but ignoring the main ingredient that is employee. If their 
commitment to change is not gained its impossible to show improvement.  At this 
point I noted a consensus amongst the both informants as the World Bank‘s 
representative‘s answer was also supporting the stance of ADB‘s representative. 
The research participant from the World Bank said: 
Only technical problems can be corrected with the help of foreign 
assistance. The main problem, which is behavioural reforms, that needs 
time and leadership.  [E] 
Another point of consensus amongst both the participants was concerns over 
political leadership.  The interviewee from the ADB said: 
Major problem if I count is missing of political will and priority of 
personal interests over institutional interests. Everything revolves around 
self interest, as in the case of the 20th amendment passed yesterday
26
 in 
our national assembly. See what President wants - stand while I stand and 
sit while I sit. The same attitude trickles down in the Civil and Military 
bureaucracy who also use the institutions to serve their interests. [E] 
On the issues of ineffective monitoring and stress on money spending they said: 
I would say the Bank's role is to help recipient, financially and technically. 
This is how the Bank works. As regards, pushing on spending other 
developing partners like USAID direct and host contract, but the World 
Bank is only working through host contracts therefore, for us disbursement 
is the key to success. The evaluation of projects is therefore, made on 
disbursement basis. (The WB representative), [E] 
I agree that from the Aid effectiveness point of view I think all donor 
agencies needs to review their system to make it more effective. We also 
have shortcomings as generally it is not possible to appoint a dedicated 
team on each project, but I agree that technical support is even more 
important than financial assistance to reap the full benefits. Any project 
which is launched should be taken care of very well from start to end. 
(ADB representative), [U] 
Above given responses by the donor‘s representative concedes the observations 
recorded by the research participants from the case study organisation. During the 
                                                            
26 The 20th amendment was passed by the National Assembly on 14th February, 2012 whereas I 
recoded this interview on the following day i.e. 15th February, 2012 
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interviews I noted that the World Bank‘s representative was giving diplomatic 
answers and wrapped the interview within 30 minutes. Whereas, the ADB‘s 
representative took full interest in the research and gave detailed answers. There 
could be two reasons behind it i) since it was World Bank funded project therefore 
WB‘s representative was quite cautious about responses as it may bring 
repercussions while ADB‘s representative was not a direct stakeholder of this 
project hence remained quite expressive, and ii) the other reason could be 
difference amongst the organisational culture. 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter focused on those specific organisational reform actions that 
employees have experienced and talked about during fieldwork. It appears from 
their responses that the reformers have used two prong strategies, i.e. financial 
rewards and IT to gain the efficiency and transparency and also to reduce the 
corruption while trainings have mainly been used to bridge the capacity gaps 
before and during the reforms. 
The study found that there was strong support available for these initiatives 
amongst the employees. They were endorsing all three initiatives of reforms in 
principle and acknowledging their effectiveness. They challenged the designers of 
IT initiative on the grounds that it has proved to be counterproductive. They said 
contact between the taxpayers and tax collectors have increased instead of 
decreasing and ambiguities in the system have also increased in place of 
transparency. This situation compromised the assumptions held by the reformers 
of controlling corruption and bringing efficiency through IT. The prime reason 
they explained for it is ignorance of ground realities like poor national literacy rate 
and over-reliance on the global best practices. While their opinion cannot be ignored, 
it also seems that effective transformation from manual to automated system was also 
not in the favour of most employees. Therefore, I have some questions about how 
committed they really were to it. 
However, they criticised the implementation strategy of these reforms which was left 
to the discretion of management of the case study organisation. They explained that 
the main problems of implementation were: prioritising the spending money on 
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procurement of hardware over development of credible and functional softwares, 
sending employees on useless trainings without consulting the TNA to report high 
numbers and claim success to donors, obliging nepotism and ignoring fairness and 
transparency while rewarding employees. It appears from their responses that this 
non-participatory and non-transparent approach adopted for implementing reforms 
had the effect of isolating the employees so that they lost their confidence in the 
process and resisted the change. They expressed their point that the compromised 
results of these initiatives are because of their poor management.
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Chapter 7. Discussion and conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This is the final chapter of this thesis. It presents discussion on the main findings, 
conclusion and limitations of this research. It briefly introduces the research 
journey before presenting the findings and contribution of the study along with 
possible explanations within the Pakistani context. This leads to conclusions 
drawn at the end of this section. The final section of this chapter identifies the 
limiting factors of this research. 
7.2 Summary of the findings 
The two questions this research endeavours to answer are: what effects the NPM-
style reforms have made on the functioning of public sector organisation; and 
what have been its intended and unintended consequences. I have investigated 
these through a case study of Pakistani federal tax agency where explicit tax 
administration reforms programme (TARP) as part of governance reforms has 
recently been implemented. To do so, I have adopted ethnographic-oriented 
approach with emphasis on institutional past often ignored in the PSR (for details, 
see chapter 3) and by using Strauss‘s (1978) idea the case study organisation has 
been conceptualised as negotiated order (figure 2). During reforms in the case 
study organisation a number of administrative reform measures were introduced 
to promote efficiency and transparency and to control corruption. These include 
increase in salary, more training, promotion of information technology, business 
process reengineering, better work environment and restructuring of the 
organisation (see chapter 5). These reform actions are based on the WB‘s global 
experience of PSR, who lately saw the poor administrative capacity of the state as 
a main challenge to development (chapter 3).  Figure 1 in Chapter 2 depicts 
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adharance of Government of Pakistan‘s adopted strategy of PSR with the WB‘s 
trends. It appears as the Government is convinced and putting efforts to build 
‗small but smart‘ public sector (for details see Section 2.7 in Chapter 2). Since, 
this imported tactic also seems to be not working in Pakistan if we see the national 
and international indicators (chapter 1). Therefore, I have adopted a local 
approach for investigation that is based on employees‘ experience of reforms. 
This investigation is guided by a basic sociological conceptual framework (figure 
2) which uses Strauss‘s idea of ‗negotiated order‘  to conceptualise the FBR. And 
the initiatives of training, salaries and information technology are understood as 
managerial attempts to reshape the organisaitonal structures, process, and the 
employment relationship with employees as per the demand of NPM. This 
approach instead of relying on experimentation based on prior reasoning that what 
seems to be suitable relies on asking the people working in the organisation as to 
what fits better in their environment (chapter 4). This approach can help us to 
understand the main problem which I sought to address through this research as 
the employees have been absent so far from the entire reform process. The 
employees who constitute the organisation are nurtured along the society where 
the organisation is located which may propose solution better fitting to their 
environment. However, this approach may also bring the problems of employees 
proposing solutions that line-up their own interests with their recommendations 
about organisational reform.  
From the total six control measures introduced in the tax agency, the interviewees 
were more interested in talking about three particularly - salaries, training and 
information technology (IT). It is quite understandable as these three measures 
were directly affecting them in monetary terms, their professional enrichment and 
their changing work patterns in comparison to other three i.e. business process 
reengineering (BPR), restructuring of the organisation and better work 
environment whose impact was indirect. However, the last three seem to be going 
together in the background as the redesigning of process, functional redistribution 
and improved infrastructure are prerequisites to support the efforts of promoting 
the use of IT aimed at reducing manual process, reduce duplication of work and 
enhanced information sharing. In turn IT was conceived to provide efficient, 
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effective and transparent environment. As mentioned earlier, the research 
informants were more inclined to discuss the former, therefore I focused these 
three measures of salaries, trainings and IT to investigate, analyse and answer 
research questions by locating their impact and consequences. The other sources 
of information include participant observation, interviews with the donor‘s 
representatives, scholarly articles and published /unpublished documents of the 
Government and donors.  
It appears from the responses of research informants that the reformers have used 
two prong strategies, i.e. financial rewards and IT to gain the efficiency, 
transparency and also to reduce the corruption while training has mainly been 
used to bridge the technical capacity gaps before and during the reforms. This 
confirms that the reformers were able to convey their message to employees about 
their intent as their responses reiterated the reformers intent per documents, for 
example, the project appraisal document and project implementation plan. It also 
appears from their responses that there was strong support available for these 
initiatives amongst the employees. They appeared to be endorsing all three 
initiatives of reforms in principle and acknowledging their potential effectiveness. 
They also seem to be convinced that all three actions were important and relevant 
to bring about a positive change in the organisation. But the interviewees seem to 
be in disagreement with the strategy that was opted by the reformers to implement 
the reforms in the organisation. They appeared to be suggesting that during the 
execution of these initiatives Pakistan public sector‘s contextual issues like 
unfairness, favouritism, kinship based favours, referrals, recommendations and 
nepotism were not addressed. Thus the unfair division of financial incentives and 
opportunities of trainings resulted in declining intrinsic motivation and meant that 
employees had good reasons to resist the reforms. Therefore, neither of them 
could achieve their objectives, instead they have caused the unintended 
consequences: of increased corruption opportunities due to persistent low wages, 
new electronic obligations of taxpayers, the absence of objective performance 
monitoring mechanism; lowered work productivity due to the absence of an 
agreed IT platform leading to workflow on two parallel streams of manual and 
digital; and development of a pool of employees with generalists skills due to 
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irrelevant trainings. As I have suggested, the bribery was endemic in the 
organisation and wasn't sorted out by the inadequate salary increases. It seems 
likely that many of the informants have accepted bribes, although they all talked 
about this as if only 'other people' did it. Similarly, another frequent term used by 
all the respondents was ‗mind-set‘ while referring to other colleagues. It appears 
as if the research informants despite realising it as a problem in them self were 
pointing towards others. This gives a good idea of how the culture works. 
My findings suggest that the main reasons of limited impact of PSR in Pakistan 
are due to not paying appropriate attention to the weakness of theoretical 
assumptions held through NPM and, ignorance of contextual issues at national 
and organisational levels. The issues highlighted by the research participants 
during fieldwork provide the empirical base for extending the research towards 
these contextual factors. These contextual factors in turn facilitated to highlight 
the contribution made through this research. 
7.3 Research contribution 
My research demonstrates that, counter to the more Universalist approach to 
management adopted by the IFIs, context matters. In the example of Pakistan, the 
most significant aspects of the context were different social, cultural, economic 
and political conditions. This study shows that the implementation of these 
reforms was affected adversely by a number of local factors that were ignored.  
These local factors include the deeply entrenched socio-cultural attitudes and 
practices, and the frequent changes in the politico-economic context resulting in 
failure, to adjust salaries on a sufficiently large scale, the failure to introduce an 
agreed IT platform, the failure to conduct an effective training needs analysis. The 
modernization of the bureaucracy in Pakistan that was to be brought about by 
these reforms was unsuccessful as it was based on a number of unsound premises. 
Firstly the local realities were not considered. Second the conduct of reform as 
technical exercise. Third is the problem of motivation and commitment to the 
reform agenda. Fourth managers lacked the experience required to lead this 
innovation. Fifth the staffs were not encouraged to ‗own‘ these changes.  Sixth the 
modernization assumes that there is in place a particular form of bureaucracy that 
  
158 
in practice may not be in place. Overall it is concluded that this reform initiatives 
were ‗context-blind‘ and might have had greater chances of success if the 
particular nature of the Pakistani context had been recognised. Now I will show 
how the specific contextual factors affected the results at the organisational and 
national levels. 
7.3.1 Contextual contribution at the micro level of organisation 
i. Contextual factors affecting reward initiative 
As argued earlier, the main reasons for increasing salaries in the FBR were to 
provide extrinsic motivation for the employees to enhance productivity, to control 
corruption by providing living wages and finally to link reward practices with the 
performance to create a performance driven culture. However, this study suggests 
that none of these objectives were achieved. My findings reveal that the 
government, despite realising the fact that the salaries are not sufficient, did not 
approve the appropriate raise for the employees. Further, no evidence was found 
that can highlight any progress made on linking the reward and performance 
together. I noticed that instead of an objective criterion, this process started with 
the subjective selection of employees through recommendations of the senior 
officers leading each wing for the financial rewards. This process allegedly 
promoted the sycophancy-culture in place of performance-culture, as employees 
instead of concentrating on their work started making efforts to please their 
managers. In turn, these organisational elites rewarded them not on merit, but due 
to their place in good books. The next step taken with the aim to replace this 
problematic practice was a permanent salary increase after selection through an 
internal vetting process. This study found that the informants allegedly declared 
the selection process as unfair and the salary raise as insufficient. These both 
points I have discussed in the following two paragraphs. This shows that how 
local contextual factors can kill the spirit of this initiative to reward the honest, 
efficient, productive workforce to create a performance culture. Following two 
paragraphs discuss both these factors: 
 
This study suggests that implementation of reward strategy was influenced by the 
existing socio-cultural norms. The interviewees argued that initially they were 
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told by the organisation that the salary raise will be extended to only those 
employees who will qualify an internal competitive process called Internal Job 
Posting (IJP) costing an exam and interview. But it was claimed by the research 
informants that it was never followed in its true spirit as from day one people who 
were close to the elites of the organisation got selected and started getting 
additional salary without following any process. Furthermore, nepotism, 
favouritism and reference based selection also made the process controversial. 
This situation caused provoking agitation amongst other employees to which 
organisation could not resist and consequently raised the salaries of all employees 
working in this organisation. This action rewarded those inefficient and unskilled 
employees, who if would have gone through the proper process may not have 
qualified for the increase. More interestingly, I noticed that during this process, 
the existing practice of ‗reward on detection‘ which was a performance based 
incentive stimulating the employees to perform, was discontinued in the search of 
performance. Another contributing factor to this seems to be with respect to the 
non implement of an agreed IT platform that might have provided the appropriate 
monitoring mechanism and the objective basis of rewarding good practice 
amongst employees. This situation clearly shows how reform measures when 
actually hit the ground is affected by the prevailing societal norms and pressures.  
During this research, it was strongly pointed by the interviewees that the salaries 
even after raise still falls much below, then what they deserve and can earn from 
market or through other means using their positions as tax collectors. During the 
reform, the salaries of the FBR employees were raised considerably above the 
other public servants working in different organisations. Although, this raise was 
not given to the level recommendation by the task force, but the only attribute 
which distinguishes the FBR employees from the other public servants is their 
greater chance of getting involved in the corruption being the tax collecting 
agency. Else, as we already noticed the prevalent wage condition of the entire 
public sector is poor and the government is also well aware of it. According to my 
understanding, the logical explanation of this limited increase seems to threefold: 
one the government due to its fiscal problems was constantly pressed by the IFIs 
to suppress its PS wage bill, as it is considered to be a non-development 
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expenditure (figure 1); two, targeting the potential honest employees involved in 
the petty day to day corruption which hurts the majority constituting small and 
medium taxpayers. Whereas, it is also predictable that those who are involved in 
big corruption would not stop even if the salaries are raised beyond the 
recommended levels; and last, Finance as the controlling ministry of FBR did not 
support its case of being fully autonomous and increasing the wages on the 
suggested pay bands equivalent to local Banks. This reflects the efforts of the 
Ministry to retain the powers by controlling the largest and most powerful 
bureaucracy of Pakistan. This ambition is understandable as the privatization and 
deregulation of the financial sector (figure 1), i.e. banking sector in Pakistan has 
already shifted its powers from the Ministry of Finance to State Bank of Pakistan 
as an independent regulatory body.  
ii. Contextual factors affecting training initiative 
As noted earlier, the component of training was included in the reform to build the 
technical capacity of the employees for making better policies, to enable them to 
work more efficiently and effectively and help them to make use of the new 
technologies being developed. However, this study suggests that the initiative was 
not implemented as it was envisaged. Theoretically, it was supposed to be starting 
with a Training Need Assessment (TNA) exercise providing the basis for 
benchmarking and then bridging the capacity gap with appropriate trainings. 
However, the research informants claimed that though the TNA took place, it 
wasn‘t objective, and was too generic. Therefore, trainings that resulted had no 
direct link with the specific needs of the organisation. Most of the interviewees 
asserted that the exercise done in the name of TNA was not done properly. Instead 
of conducting this exercise rigorously by looking deep into the organisation‘s 
capacity challenges it was done superficially with a limited sample. Therefore, it 
did not provide a sound basis for identifying the actual training gap of the 
employees. Respondents also suggested that the underlying reason for this 
happening was the urgency to start the process so that there would be enhanced 
spending and high numbers in training. Informants suggested that if the proper 
TNA would have taken place in the organisation, then it should have spotted the 
biggest issue of behavioural reform, besides specific technical capacity issues 
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lacking in the organisation.  Even then, the recommendations of this exercise were 
largely reported to be ignored and a large number of employees were sent to 
irrelevant trainings reflect various social and cultural pressures i.e. nepotism and 
favouritism.  
As noted in chapter six that the trainings in Pakistani PS are not taken very 
seriously, for some it serves as the ticked checklist box to get promoted and to 
some it is a time to relax and earn some money, particularly in foreign trainings 
with lavish allowances and tourism opportunities. These traits associated with 
trainings make it a form of ‗favour‘ and a mean of ‗reward‘ which can be used to 
‗please‘ or ‗accommodate‘ someone superior in position or exchange against 
another favour. Bearing in mind that a significant amount of 9 million USD 
(chapter 5) was to be spent on this account, it should have become a most 
lucrative reform initiative providing opportunities to powerful elements of the 
organisation to use it to their advantage and the people they like. Particularly, 
these doubts gets firm basis when the majority of informants claims it and is also 
supported by the government audit reports confirming undertaking of irrelevant 
trainings.  
Time and again it was mentioned by the interviewees that instead of proper 
assessment and identification of training needs, priority was sending more people 
on trainings. Thus, from the very early days of its launch foreign study tours and 
similar training was started. Despite the fact that TNA was carried out by the 
organisation nobody referred back to it while approving these trainings. Here 
again they raised the organisational and societal issue of the powerful elite in the 
management who used it to their advantage and to reward the people they like. 
There appeared to be two main targets achieved through it: 
i) The WB as donor measures progress of the project on the basis of 
spending and numbers (i.e. number of trainings and expenditure) as they 
do not have any alternate system to monitor and assess its success. These 
facts were also reconfirmed by Bank‘s representative during the interview. 
ii) The attractive nature of this initiative, which not only provides an 
opportunity to raise the employee's personal profile, but also earns 
additional money during the training  
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Another logical explanation emerges if we see the acclaimed generic nature of 
these trainings alongside the deadlock on the agreed IT platform (chapter 6). As 
noted earlier, one of the main training objectives were preparing the FBR 
workforce for the envisioned future IT based environment which could not 
emerge. Therefore, I understand that the training mode instead of being specific 
should have been turned to generic to achieve the quantitative targets at least.  
iii. Contextual factors affecting IT initiatives 
The interviewees challenged the reformers IT‘s ambitions on the grounds of its 
contradictory results. They said that one of the main objectives of IT initiative was 
the elimination of manual process so as to increase the transparency and minimise 
personal contact between taxpayers and tax collectors. Also, the expected 
advantages were increased efficiency, transparency and reduced corruption. But 
they claimed that it has opposite effects as now taxpayers became even more 
reliant on tax officials.  This was made worse as the system has more bugs than 
earlier. The reasons given by interviewees was that it ignored societal and 
organisational realities such as low national literacy rate amongst the majority of 
taxpayers who are categorised as ‗low and medium taxpayers‘ and cannot afford 
to hire professionals from market to support them. This situation has made them 
even more vulnerable and docile for seeking rent in front of tax collectors. The 
face to face contact which should have decreased has increased in result of the 
introduction of softwares and requirements of electronic submissions. This was 
made worse because in its testing phase the ambiguities were far greater than 
expected transparency.   
As a BPR exercise was undertaken, new processes devised and IT supplied which 
were intended to simplify the processes, reduce face to face contact (and thus 
opportunities for bribery) and provide a record of the transactions done (to make 
the organisation more accountable). This was seen as an important part of the 
effort to build the capacity of the FBR. But the new IT equipment was never used 
and therefore the processes did not change. My empirical research suggests that 
the senior managers did not themselves have the capability to oversee this 
intervention because they lacked any experience and knowledge of IT-enabled 
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ways of working. This shows the difficulty of imposing radical change or 
'modernisation' in a situation where the managers implementing lack experience 
of the new expectations and instead have years or decades of embedded 
experience of working in the traditional 'Pakistan' way. The next challenge 
identified by this research is a dichotomy in term of: resolving the ownership 
issue, in a situation where, readymade solutions are not welcomed and exposure 
and capacity to produce indigenous solutions within the recipient countries is very 
limited. The results also suggest that the reformers were clearly lacking 
experienced and dedicated professionals who could have ensured the results of 
such massive investment and effort. Instead, it appears as whatever cooperation 
was required by one party was being supported by the other to complete the 
formalities. The shortage of appropriate experience in the FBR was pointed by me 
from my personal experience (chapter 4) of reforms and the donor‘s 
representatives confirm this during interviews (chapter 6). A very important 
challenge this research has highlighted is the missing bridge between the donor 
and recipients that can oversee and ensure the right track of agreed activities and 
can act as a balancing factor to increase the success rate of programmes and 
projects. An example which could be an extension of the task force‘s role which 
stood dissolved after presenting its report to the president. 
iv. Reform as technical exercise 
This study suggests that the implementation of reform in the FBR is very much 
undertaken as a technical exercise. This situation, where is highlighted by the 
documentary evidence, the interviews made with the public servants and the 
donor‘s representative also confirm it. All the sources suggest that the number of 
training, equipments and expenditure made thereof were the source of measuring 
the project success.  This research clearly suggests that the assumption about the 
technocratic nature of reform is still very much exists in the conceptualisation and 
implementation. Though the assessment level of the problems has been narrowed, 
i.e., from international to national but the way their solution is being made is very 
much based on the same assumptions. My research does not suggest that actions 
taken by the reformers are not required or their diagnosis is poor. However, 
considering that ‗x‘ number of training target will ensure the capacity needs of the 
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organisation or ‗y‘ amount of IT investment will establish the intended digital 
environment reflect this approach practically. 
Another point highlighted by several interviewees was an undue rush of 
management to buy and store, hardware equipment instead of prioritising software 
development. The majority of them stressed upon that even after five years, this 
organisation have not been able to reach on agreed IT path or software solution. 
According to interviewees, the money is being spent on procurement of Hardware 
equipments and building of its infrastructure, but software for which it will 
provide the base are still in testing or even in pre-testing phases of development. 
This rush on expenditure is understandable in the light of discussion made earlier 
in this chapter, i.e. to get legitimate in the eyes of funding agencies. However, I 
see the disagreement of common IT path or software as tacit resistance by the 
management as if conversion to fully automated environment will bring new 
challenges of performance monitoring, transparency and auditing of their actions. 
Accepting that the push was for the expenditure, but no evidence was found that it 
was sequenced bound as well: hardware first or the software; or which trainings 
are to be undertaken was to be decided by the organisation management leading 
the reforms.  
Another relevant factor appeared to be about the lack of ownership. The 
employees seem to be showing their detachment from the reform process on the 
grounds that they have not been made part of it. They appeared to be saying that 
they were treated as an object which has no say and can be directed through 
orders. As suggested earlier, a competent, independent implementation 
mechanism that had employees support was seemed to be missing from reforms. 
As the important initiatives like training needs assessment, adoption of consensus 
on IT issues and salary raises were seems to be done either haphazardly or too 
slowly. Also discontinuity of organisational leadership (i.e. changing of 4 
Chairman and 7 project director) was seen as an important contributing factor of 
poor results. A number of frequent changes at the top level were made during the 
period of reform. 
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7.3.2 Contextual contribution at the macro level of national 
i. Institution building to support NPM 
My findings suggest that the current push to build selected good institutions has to 
be accompanied by an awareness to and engagement with the country‘s specific 
stage of socioeconomic and cultural development and the related developmental 
needs. This study indicates that if it is decided that the public sector needed to be 
improved, then instead of just replicating the global trends (figure 1), restoration 
and strengthening of effective bureaucracy may be a better solution  more fitting 
to the  evolutionary need at the time. This point becomes more significant when 
we see countries like Japan, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Korea flourishing 
without altering the traditional public administration model. However, it is worth 
noting that despite differences in their contextual factors the bureaucracy 
successfully provided the required consistency and stability. This challenge to the 
assumptions based on the NPM model that bureaucracy is a limiter of economic 
development in Pakistan in the same way that it was in America and in European 
economies. In practice for Pakistan, and other developing economies, the 
bureaucracy could be an enabler of development more suitable to their societal 
evolutionary stage. Rapid or overnight progress to fair, efficient and effective 
institutions in this country context is unlikely to be achieved and in the light of 
this study seems to be an unreasonable expectation.  The quick transfer of this 
model from other contexts is unlikely to succeed and consideration should be 
given to the fact that this process took several decades in developed countries and 
in some cases is yet to be fully reformed. Instead, this should be seen as a 
continuous journey towards this direction that needs to be supported carefully as it 
slow or stall. 
This research indicates that the changes made within the public sector institutions 
intersect with the other local institutions and do not function well as if both are 
not compatible with each other. The apparent reason of this in Pakistani case is 
the assumptions held by the reformers regarding the existence of certain other 
institutions whose practical absence undermines the chance of success of these 
reforms. In particular, informal institutions like customs and practices, as formal 
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institutions to some extent are changeable with the help of written rules and laws, 
but to practice them still informal institutions plays a crucial part, whose change 
in the short term is impossible.  
Another factor noted during this research, is regarding implementation of reform 
at once. Its implementation in the package does not seem to be suitable for 
developing countries, as it initiates a large activity itself in the Government‘s 
apparatus. Pereira and Spink, (1999) also in his meta-study of 15 countries also 
reached to the similar conclusion noted that ad hoc, piecemeal and gradual 
reforms are more successful then ambitious and comprehensive reforms suggested 
by donors. This approach further disturbed the already poorly managed ongoing 
operations of the public sector. One possible explanation could be that these 
reforms were never implemented at once in those countries from where it has been 
inspired. Instead in those countries, these reforms have emerged through evolution 
process, in response to various challenges they faced over time (Larbi, 1999). 
Therefore, the assumption holds by NPM promoters and proliferates to introduce 
it as package seems to be not very realistic. Given the path dependence exhibited 
by institutions, it is also not possible to reform institutions in one go. The 
alternative to which is the gradual reforming of the institutions. North, Acemoglu 
and Rodrik also supported the alternate approach. 
This study suggests, that prescribed NPM model seems to be not properly 
accommodating contextual issues of the society and institutions where it is going 
to be replicated, as the societies wherein it was emerged had different challenges 
during their historical evolution then the countries it is being experimented. 
Possible explanation could be its gradual development in the western societies 
along with their developed civilization and institutional development over 
centuries. Therefore, it seems to be more compatible with advanced environment 
and provides a sound foundation for them. Vabø (2009) Schick (1998); Hughes 
and Teicher (2004); (Samaratunge et al., 2008) and (Lee and Haque, 2006) also 
highlighted similar problems. A relevant example is a push for more managerial 
autonomy in the wake of NPM type reforms which appears risky in Pakistan 
public sector and can accelerate already available problems of corruption. This 
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concern regarding developing countries has been recorded by several scholars 
(Mangkol, 2011; Hughes, 1998; Turner and Hulme, 1997). As argued earlier, the 
institutional development in the current developed countries is a result of their 
particular ideological struggles, political battles and legal reforms. This research 
suggests that the particular nature of institutions was ignored to the detriment of 
the reform initiatives and had the problems of replication been recognized getting 
the desired results in alien conditions might have been more possible. This is also 
emphasised by this research that, despite the efforts to create the good institutions 
under IFIs pressures, their good results cannot be guaranteed, unless they are 
effectively enforced. Creating such enforcement mechanism in the countries that 
are not ready will create problems. This also gives birth to related and important 
problems of ‗ownership‘ and ‗motivation‘.  
ii. Motivation of reforms 
This study suggests that in Pakistan, like many other developing countries PSR is 
being implemented as part of the conditions of receiving financial aid.  Thus, it 
fails to reach the moral high ground and receive the support of the masses. There 
seems to be a lack of political will from the governments which is more interested 
in financial support to get rescued from financial crunch and support of public 
sector employees who are the targets of these reforms.  People don‘t support them 
as they see themselves subjects of entrepreneurial governments. The government 
implements them to get legitimating in the eyes of donors and employees resist 
them as a threat to their employment and favourable conditions governing it. As 
noted in chapter 3, that the main impetus for the changes in the public sector of 
OECD countries other than economic and fiscal pressures was the public attitudes 
and increasing criticism and demand for efficiency and responsiveness. This very 
important factor in the case of developing countries seems to be missing (Larbi, 
1999; Mangkol, 2011) The important challenge needs to be addressed by the IFIs 
is to strike a balance in a situation where the consideration is either of ‗free goods‘ 
or ‗imposed as a condition‘. 
As argued by (Zifcak, 1994; Greer, 1994; Kettle, 1997) the public sector 
management reform (PSMR) in the western countries is driven by the changes on 
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the economic, social, political, technological fronts. Whereas, in developing 
countries PSMR is being used as driving force to bring economic, social and 
technological improvements. Although, both share the crises in common, but the 
intensity of those in developing countries is much more than the advanced 
countries had faced (Batley and Larbi, 2004). Also, a very important and deciding 
factor, which makes the major difference in the results, is that the policies and 
actions that were taken by the advanced countries were built after ideological and 
political commitments to meet the rising public expectations and demands. This 
factor seems to be missing in Pakistan. 
Frequent change in national leadership between political parties or amongst the 
politico-military elite and their fluctuating commitment to the reform process 
emerged as important issues for poor results (details in chapter 2). These frequent 
changes also bring changes to the national policies, including the role of the 
public sector. This is another contextual factor specific to Pakistan and quite 
different to countries where this public sector reform model flourished. In most of 
those countries historically political conditions remained favourable for reforms. 
Geoffrey Shepherd (2003) highlighting it noted that  ―This kind of impetus, where 
new political forces have gained sufficient power and legitimacy to change the 
way things are done, has been lacking in many developing countries‖ (pp. 12).  
This study confirms the work of Girishankar (2000) who also noted unmotivated 
and incapable government as the single largest obstacle to improvement in any 
public administration. However, the question which needs to be addressed 
whether a fledgling democracy like Pakistan with high political violence, the 
NPM-style reforms will strengthen or further weaken national stability. My 
research suggests, any generalisation of reform actions without paying deep 
attention to contextual factor may not produce the intended results.  
7.4 Revisiting the Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework (CF) (chapter 4) was developed primarily to shape the 
research protocol, tentatively guided the fieldwork and analyse the details of what 
is happening in the FBR within the wider understanding of the social and 
historical context of Pakistan. It would therefore be useful revisiting it on 
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conclusion of this research to see as to what extent this CF has been successful in 
achieving its objectives and or influenced by this research. 
Here in this section I will explain the expanding part of this CF only i.e. the 
negotiated order or implementation.  As this research could not note any 
conceptual deviation in the starting two steps of this CF i.e. PSR‘s enforcement as 
condition of loan onto the recipient governments and subsequent push of these 
government for efficiency, effectiveness and economy from their PS. 
Seeing that I wanted to analyse the actual changes to organisational social reality 
related to the introduction of the new reorganisation initiatives, I used Strauss‘s 
(1978) concept of the ‗negotiated order‘ and consider the individual employment 
relationship using the concepts of the implicit contract (already discussed).  
During this research the ‗context‘ which was seen as a contributor emerged as the 
strongest factor impacting results of PSR in Pakistan which encircles the each step 
of the negotiated order. Although, the reform process is technically guided by the 
reformers but as soon as this doctrine comes into action phase and activates the 
negotiated order amongst the employees, Berger and Luckmann‘s (1966) 
conceptualization clearly helps us to see how people deploy alternative meanings 
and invent new practices in pursuit of their own motives. As he argued, people 
tends to deviate from courses of action designed by others and may resist 
definitions of their situation.  In Pakistan the contextual corrupt practices of 
nepotism, favoritism, sycophancy and recommendation culture seems to played 
critical part during implementation which despite rolling out the tested reform 
initiatives of trainings, salaries and IT did not produced the aspired results of 
efficiency, transparency, fairness and controlled corruption.  Following revised 
CF shows this effect graphically. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
To achieve the objectives set for this study I reviewed the reform process through 
the relevant reforms documents to understand their intent and also analysed the 
interviews and participant observation recorded of the employees who 
experienced the reforms. This analysis facilitated an understanding of the ongoing 
negotiated order between the reformers and employees (figure 2). Certainly 
reform plan is important for providing overall guidance of the process, but equally 
Figure 3: Graphical representation of revised conceptual framework 
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important are the actions for its implementation through everyday interactions and 
work processes within the broader perspective of country‘s historical, social, 
economical, political, cultural and institutional context.  
This study makes contributions at two levels or organisational and national by 
identifying the reform actions and factor limiting the results of PSR in Pakistan. 
At the organisational level the study found that protection of the implementation 
process from the contextual issues, e.g. favouritism, nepotism and partiality is 
necessary to make the process trustworthy and successful. As Larbi (1998) argued 
that attending, the question of how to implement is equally important of what to 
implement. Brinkerhoff (1996) also emphasised upon the adequate attention to the 
implementation process. Also, it appears as the reform has been undertaken as a 
technical exercise which relies on the assumptions of more numbers as guarantor 
of improved results. Non-inclusion and prioritization of problems like 
accountability and ruling mindset of bureaucrats on the reform agenda was 
argued.  More realistic and harmonised approach accommodating contextual 
factors to conceive the organisational reforms has been suggested. 
At the national level it found the weakness behind the assumption of NPM-type 
PSR which ignores the history, culture, evolution, age and economics of the 
society in which it will be adopted. Also, its emphasis on the comprehensiveness 
of reforms seems a bit unrealistic considering the fact in mind that even these 
reforms were not implemented in one go even in those countries where it has 
emerged over time. Moreover, its reception as conditions also seems to be 
problematic despite of its promise of helping the country, it fails to reach the 
moral high ground amongst political leaders, public and public sector workers. 
This results in ceremonial reforms initiated by the government to fulfil the 
conditions of the loan without the support of these important stakeholders. 
Another important national reality in developing countries, including Pakistan is 
high levels of corruption which demands cautious attempt towards the 
experimentation of managerialism asking high levels of autonomy is risky.  
This study suggests if country specific contextual issues are given due importance 
and addressed at the time of conceptualizing, designing and implementation of 
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public sector reforms, probably their results could be improved. As argued by 
various scholars that positive result producing human resource theories and 
models may not produce the similar results in different cultural settings because of 
differences (Aycan et al, 2000; Khilji and Wang, 2007). Khilji (2003) confirms 
this in the context of developing countries like Pakistan. The study concludes that 
failure is a result from the impact of stubborn contextual constraints that are not 
effectively considered during implementation. In this regard, Wilder (2009) 
criticised the donors for pushing governance reforms in Pakistan ―without 
investing sufficiently in understanding social, cultural and political contexts 
within which the civil service reforms functions‖ (pp. 27). He, in the same paper 
quoting a former Pakistani Secretary Finance writes ―Civil service reform is 
reduced to a technical exercise - problems are reduced to boxes and then solutions 
are found to fit into the boxes. The political and cultural contexts are lost in these 
exercises.‖ (pp. 27). 
7.6 Limitations of the study and areas of future research 
Through this research it was not possible for me to cover all dimensions of the 
organisational reform and look into each minute action taken by the respective 
organisation. Neither this was set as an objective of this research considering its 
manageability within the time and resources available for this project. The main 
objectives of this study were to find what reform actions have been taken and their 
justification, why such laborious and expensive efforts yields low and record its 
desired and undesired effects. 
This study contributed to a better understanding of the initiation and 
implementation processes of the NPM-inspired PSR in Pakistan by identifying 
factors limiting its results. This in turn, uncovered the problems of reformer‘s 
presumptions of quick-fixing the institutions through rapid dosage of reform. The 
results of this study would be beneficial for reformers in understanding the 
reasons hindering PSR‘s expected results to include appropriate sustainability 
measures in such future programmes designed for Pakistan. 
A number limitations to this research can be identified, particularly, five 
dimensions of PSR in Pakistan this research could not cover, including: i) the 
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second part of this puzzle addressing as to how the contextual problems identified 
through this research could be tackled, ii) it is limited to administrative reforms 
only and did not covered the policy reforms initiated in the case study 
organisation, iii) considering enormity of the overall public sector reforms 
initiatives in Pakistan it could not encompass other PSR initiatives taken under 
governance, fiscal, and judicial reforms, iv) it neither provide cross sector nor 
cross country comparison of the Pakistan‘s PSR, and v) it could not appropriate 
level of delving into important national factor like corruption may be considered 
for future researches. 
Also from the ontological and epistemological perspectives this research intended 
to view the reform process from the employees prespective. Had this research 
been taken from an objectivism/subjectivism‘s positions, the focus of the 
investigation would have been entirely different because of different world view 
and epistemological beliefs i.e. ‗how we know what we know‘.  This approach, 
where allowed me to zoom-in to the research informants level, is also subjected to 
crticisims for neglecting the broader circles of the issue understudy. Similar 
observation can made regarding investigator‘s position as ‗insider‘ as opposed to 
an ‗outsider‘.  Athough, I as former employee of the PPS was able to provide 
special insight on the process of PSR based on my experience of the field and 
knowledge of Pakistani language and culture. But, it can be argued that this 
investigation lacks scientific deattachment and objectivity that a nonmember 
might have brought. 
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Appendix – A: Research protocol 
 
Biographical Data 
Sex  Age  
Education Level  Experience  
Officer Level   
Aide Memoire 
S. #. Theme Questions 
1. About 
respondents 
work 
1. Why did you choose working for the public 
sector? 
2. What are your main priorities at the workplace?  
3. Who do you need to work closely with?  
4. Who is the most important person related to your 
work?   
5. How your work is evaluated and what 
constitutes success? 
2. Overall 
impression 
about reforms 
1. What do you think are the important changes 
made over the past five years at the national 
level in the Pakistan public sector?  
2. What do you think were the reforms required in 
the Pakistan Public Sector and why? 
3. What were the main problems prevailing in the 
public sector that these reforms were intended to 
address? 
4. Have these reforms tackled those important 
issues? 
5. What significant changes have been introduced 
in your organisation during the reform period? 
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6. What important changes have been made in your 
department? 
7. How was the organisation reacting to the 
changes being introduced as reforms? 
8. What (positive or negative) changes you have 
experienced in organisation‘s functioning during 
and after reforms? 
9. Have the reforms had improved organisational 
synergy? Or has created more ambiguities and 
dark spots in the then prevailing work 
procedures. 
3. Need, 
conceptualisa
tion and 
driving 
reforms 
 
1. To what extent do you think that the reforms 
were properly conceived and effectively 
implemented? 
2. What was the general perception of other 
employees about reforms? Were they in its 
favour? 
3. What role do you think the donor agencies have 
played in reforms initiation and implementation? 
4. How well prepared do you think the organisation 
was to carry out the reforms? 
5. Were you consulted as stakeholder during 
reforms‘ conceptualisation or implementation? 
6. If yes  – how? and did you taken part in the 
process and were those suggestions given any 
weight? If no, how did you felt about it?  
4. Attempts of 
reforms and 
change in 
implicit 
contracts 
 
1. How effectively these reforms have made the 
organisation more responsive to the public 
needs? 
2. What changes did you felt in organisational 
processes, enhancing its efficiency after the 
implementation of reforms?  
3. How these changes have affected your work? 
What direct changes these reforms have brought 
to your work? Have these reforms made your 
duty easier or harder to perform? 
4. How these reforms have changed your feelings 
about the organisation? 
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5. What impact these changes have made on your 
relationship with your co-workers? 
6. How do you see these reforms impacting 
organisation‘s image overall in Pakistani 
society? 
5. Reforms 
achievements 
and results 
 
1. Do you think that public sector reforms have 
achieved its goals? If yes – please explain how? 
if no, please explain how these reforms could 
have been made more effective?  
2. What do you think were the main impediments 
of reforms? (lessons learnt) 
3. What do you think could have been the best 
reforms strategy?  
4. What do you think are the important elements 
the reforms have missed? 
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Appendix - B: A review of reports, 
recommendations and implementation status on 
administrative reforms in Pakistan 
 
S. #. Committee/ Commission/ Title Head / or Author Year 
1 Pay and Service Commission M. Munir 1949 
2 Improvement of Public 
Administration in Pakistan. A 
report with Recommendations 
Rowland Egger 
(supported by 
USAID) 
1953 
3 Reorganisation of Pakistan 
Government for National 
Development 
Bernard Gladieux 
(supported by Ford 
Foundation) 
1955 
Findings and status 
The first attempt made by the Government was soon after independence in 1948 
by appointing three committees: the first under the leadership of Sir Victor Turner 
a reorganisation committee, to look into the staffing needs and also examining the 
working procedures of the Government. The second committee was appointed by 
the central legislative assembly, to review the organisation and structure of the 
Ministries and Departments of the Government. And the third was a Pay 
Commission under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice M. Munir to form 
recommendations on remuneration levels. There was no action taken on the first 
two reports, however, on the recommendations of third committee, which 
recommended lowering the salaries of the bureaucrats to encourage the equal 
distribution of talent among all sectors of society (Islam, 1989; Government, 
1949). This recommendation was implemented without any resistance (Burki, 
1969). 
In 1953, Mr. Rowland Egger, an international expert from the USA was invited to 
Pakistan to make recommendations for measures to improve the public 
administration system of Pakistan. The Egger report accused the secretariat system 
and found it inappropriate due to its highly centralised, under supervised and rusty 
nature (Islam, 1989). Another important factor, it highlighted was the policy 
formulation by the generalists for the technical departments working under 
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technical experts (Naz, 1990). It also recommended the amalgamation of cadres, 
an administrative staff college, and a programme-based budgeting system 
(Pakistan, 1989). Following him, another international expert from USA, Mr. 
Bernard Gladieux visited Pakistan in 1955 and prepared a report on the 
reorganisation of the Government of Pakistan. He also viewed the secretariat 
system as problematic where the policy was being made by clerical staff. He also 
recommended the unification of cadres and decentralisation (Islam, 1989; Burki 
1969). As noted by Islam (1989) these reports were filed under pressure as the 
recommendations were challenging the elites of Pakistan‘s civil service. Both the 
reports were marked as classified and no action was taken. 
S. #. Committee/ Commission/ Title Head / or Author Year 
4 Report of the Administrative Re-
organisation Committee I & II 
G. Ahmed 1958 and 1959 
5 Report of the Pay and Services 
Commission 
A. R. Cornelius 1962 
6 Report of the Working Group on 
the Re-organisation of the 
Service Structure in Pakistan  
D. K. Power 1969 
Findings and status 
On the request of the Government in 1958, a senior civil servant Mr. G. Ahmad 
submitted a report on reorganisation of the Federal Government. And in 1959 Mr. 
Justice A.R. Cornelius was appointed by the Government to head a Pay and 
Services Commission, which presented its report in 1962 proposing a new 7 tier 
structure for the services with 3-5 grades under each group. The report stressed to 
end the elitist character of Pakistani bureaucracy (Islam, 1989; Ziring and Laporte, 
1974). But, like the past, the recommendations could not be implemented due to 
authoritative position of the bureaucracy (Burki, 1969), and the recommendations 
of these two reports were also shelved by the then governments with the 
previously archived reports. 
In 1959 once again the Government asked Mr. G. Ahmad to revisit the issue of 
administrative reorganisation of the Central Government.  Upon whose 
recommendations, the position of Section officer was introduced in the central 
Government with the objective to reduce the internal bureaucratic channels within 
a Ministry. This effort seemed to be addressing some portion from the 
recommendations of two international consultants i.e. R. Egger and B. Gladieux. 
However, the important dimension of policy formulation was still not touched 
(Braibanti, 1966). 
Following it a Working Group in 1969, led by Mr. D. K. Power, was constituted 
by the Government to prepare recommendations on the reorganisation of the 
Public Service structure in Pakistan. The working group also looked at the 
possibilities of Fulton Report applicability in Pakistan, which was presented in the 
UK to reform the British Civil Service. The working group presented its findings, 
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however, as per the past no action was taken by the Government on the 
recommendations. 
S. #. Committee/ Commission/ Title Head / or Author Year 
7 Implementation of 
Administrative Reforms 
K. H. Meer 1973 
8 Report of the Civil Services 
Commission 
S. Anwar ul Haq 1979 
9 Report of Services Reform 
Commission 
Justice Durab 
Patel 
1989 
Findings and status 
Another Administrative Reforms Committee was formed in 1972, under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Khursheed Hasan Mir, a Member of the Federal Cabinet. The 
Committee recommended i) the abolition of reserved key posts in Federal and 
Provincial Governments for the members of Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) cadre 
ii) the replacement of the CSP cadre with the District Management Group (DMG) 
and the Secretariat Group iii) the introduction of a unified service structure with 
different occupational Groups iv) the introduction of national pay scales for 
Grades 1-22 v) the removal of constitutional guarantees for civil servants. It also 
opened the way to induct from the private sector into services through lateral 
entry. These proposed reform actions were implemented in 1973 by the then 
Government. These reforms were made under the Bhutto regime came into power 
after the split of the country. In his opinion Bureaucracy was responsible for 
several problems in the country. Therefore, these actions were taken to weaken the 
strong bureaucracy so that it could be controlled by political masters. However, 
this alleged political intention behind reforms (Ziring and Laporte, 1974) and 
misuse of the lateral entry system restored some of its lost authority by 
abandoning the Bhutto reforms while the government was overturned by the 
military bureaucracy (Islam, 2004).  
In 1978 again a Civil Services Commission was formed under the chairmanship of 
Justice A. Haq, to revisit the 1973 Administrative Reforms and make 
implementable recommendations.  The Commission submitted its report in 1979, 
recommending improvements in the status of specialists. The report further 
recommended that ―the first step in the direction of administrative reform should 
be the replacement of the colonial structure of the services by a modern and 
scientific system, which is responsive to democratic aspirations‖ (Pakistan, 1979, 
pp. 32). This time as well, there was no concrete actions were taken, however, the 
bureaucracy was able to regain their position during military rule. 
A Services Reforms Commission lead by Mr. Justice Durab Patel was also 
established in 1989 that failed in producing any consensus report. 
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S. #. Committee/ Commission/ Title Head / or Author Year 
10 Report of the Economic 
Commission 
Raja Zafar ul Haq 1991 
11 Report of the National 
Commission to suggest 
measures to improve the 
efficiency of the Federal 
Government of Pakistan  
Hamid Nasir Chattah 1995 
12 Report of the Committee on 
Downsizing of the Federal 
Government 
Dr. Hafiz Pasha 1997 
Findings and status 
An Economy Commission constituted by the Government in 1991 and led by a 
member of the upper house of parliament submitted its report in 1992 with the 
recommendations of reduction in the number of Divisions of the Federal 
Government and abolition of 75 organisations that were found to be redundant. 
This was the first when the Government seems to be getting recommendations 
from within government to redefine its role in the pursuit of a ‗smart‘ government. 
Alongside, an effort to reduce the wage bill was also recommended through 
controlling the employment in the public sector. Some progress was made by the 
then Government to implement the recommendation, but due to its dismissal in the 
same year not much progress was made. 
In 1995, the Government appointed Mr. H. N. Chattah, to head another 
Commission for making broad recommendations from the size of the Government 
to the response time of the Public Sector.  The Chattha Commission also re-
emphasized the need for reducing the number of Divisions in the Federal 
Secretariat. This Commission was a sequence of early effort to control the 
expenditure and reduce the wage bill through consolidation of the size of 
Government. But unfortunately, this Government also could not last longer due to 
its dismissal on account of misconduct through presidential orders and call for a 
new election. 
This Commission was followed by Pasha Committee constituted in 1997 under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Hafiz A Pasha, the then Deputy Chairman, Planning 
Commission who also validated the findings of Chattah Commission to reduce the 
size of Government. But the fact is that although a few changes were made on the 
recommendations of these Commissions, their proposals were never implemented 
in their true letter and spirit. 
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S. #. Committee/ Commission/ Title Head / or Author Year 
13 A Framework for Civil Services 
Reforms in Pakistan 
The World Bank, 
Pakistan 
1998 
14 Report of the Commission on 
Administrative Restructuring on 
Re-engineering of the Federal 
Government Organisations 
Syed Fakhar Imam 1999 
15 Report of the Committee on 
Restructuring and Rightsizing of 
the Federal Ministries/ Divisions 
Dr. Shahid Amjad 
Choudhary 
2000 
Findings and status 
A framework was prepared by the World Bank at the request of the Government 
of Pakistan for assistance to improve its functioning. The report suggested two 
broad recommendations, i.e. redefining the role of government by reducing its 
footprint from the market and give way to the private sector to flourish and then 
focus on the core public sector organisations. This report suggested addressing 
general PS problems of salary, corruption, human, organisational and institutional 
capacity building, accountability, and inappropriate skill mix. The report also 
recommended comprehensive reforms in key sectors aligned with the Pakistan‘s 
development agenda. It suggested the federal tax agency and provincial health 
departments as the best candidates. Furthermore, it recommended less radical 
reforms in selected sectors and recommended the Ministry of Finance as the best 
candidate. This report also suggested adoption of a comprehensive instead of a 
piecemeal approach to revamp the Pakistani public sector. This report is discussed 
later in this chapter. 
Another Commission on Administrative Restructuring lead by Mr. Fakhar Imam 
was appointed in 1997 for the purpose of ‗right sizing‘ of Government 
functionaries and identifying surplus personnel. Although the Commission 
submitted its report in February 1999 but as per past the recommendations were 
never implemented and this time due to military takeover in the same year. 
In 2000 another committee led by Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission Dr. 
Shahid Amjad Choudhry was formed to restructure and right size the Federal 
Ministries / Divisions. The Committee submitted its report in April 2001 with the 
recommendations to reduce a large number of staff working in the lower 
categories performing helping or non-technical tasks. Though some efforts were 
made by the Government to achieve this objective, but mainly Government could 
not achieve it due to anticipated strong resistance from the civil servants, 
especially from the lower cadre which constitutes the major part of the Pakistan 
civil service. 
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S. #. Committee/ Commission/ Title Head / or Author Year 
16 The Local Government Book: 
Explaining the vision, concept and 
functioning of the local 
government 
National 
Reconstruction 
Bureau (NRB) 
2002 
17 Common Wealth Secretariat 
Local Government System in 
Pakistan and the Aberdeen 
Agenda 
2006 
18 National Commission on 
Government Reforms (NCGR) 
Dr. Ishrat Husain 2008 
Findings and status 
From the year 2000 another massive effort was made by the Government to 
improve its functioning through the Devolution Plan, prepared by the NRB. 
Through which the Local Government Ordinances of 2001 and the Police reforms, 
incorporated in Police Ordinance, 2002 and the amendments thereafter.  These 
reforms were made with the ambition to transfer the powers from bureaucracy to 
the elected representative of the people at the District, Tehsil and Union levels. 
These reform measures were rolled back by the newly elected government owing 
to the pressure of its collation partners by labelling them unsuitable for the country 
and appointed the civil administrators to represent the Government at district 
levels which brought the system to zero point. 
This commission was appointed by the Government to assess Government‘s 
structure, processes and human resource requirements and make suggestions for 
its improvement. The commission found the situation dismal at all levels of 
Government and suggested a complete overhauling of the system at all three levels 
of the Government i.e. Central, Provincial and District. However, its 
recommendations as well are yet waiting to be implemented. 
Source: Individual reports and commentary made by Ralph Braibanti, 1966, pp. 
214; C.H. Kennedy, 1987, pp. 63 
 
